Ex parte Birchfield

• Decision Date: 23 November 1949
• Docket Number: A-11256.
• Citation: 212 P.2d 145,90 Okla.Crim. 197,14 A.L.R.2d 331
• Parties: Ex parte BIRCHFIELD.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

212 P.2d 145

90 Okla.Crim. 197, 14 A.L.R.2d 331

Ex parte BIRCHFIELD.

No. A-11256.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

November 23, 1949

Moody Mae Reynolds Birchfield brought an original action for a writ of habeas corpus to Merle E. Fuller, Superintendent of Girls Town, State Industrial School, for release from respondent's custody.

The Criminal Court of Appeals, Brett, J., denied the writ holding that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to commit petitioner to the Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent and that a commitment thereto until further order of the court was not void for indefiniteness or uncertainty as to the period of her detention.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where a girl under sixteen years of age is adjudged a juvenile delinquent under the court's continuing jurisdiction, it may commit her to an industrial school for girls, at any time prior to her attaining eighteen years of age, but not thereafter.

2. A girl under eighteen years of age is a child under the provisions of the juvenile act, and subject to the provisions of the juvenile act despite the fact that she was married.

3. The juvenile act fixes the limits of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over boys at twenty-one years of age, and over girls at eighteen years of age, and an order of commitment to an institution for no definite time is not void for uncertainty, since by operation of law detention ceases within the limits provided in the act, unless sooner effected, by earlier reformation and by further order of the court.

W. O Moffett, Tulsa, attorney for petitioner.

Mac Q Williamson, Atty. Gen., Lewis A. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., attorneys for respondent.

BRETT Judge.

The is an original action wherein the petitioner Moody Mae Reynolds Birchfield seeks to obtain a writ of habeas corpus directed to Merle E. Fuller, Superintendent of Girls Town, State Industrial School, Tecumseh, Oklahoma, by whom petitioner alleges she is unlawfully restrained of her liberty.

In her petition she alleges that she was born on March 5, 1933, that on March 4, 1949, the juvenile court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, entered its order adjudging her to be a juvenile delinquent and committing her to Girls Town State Industrial School as aforesaid. That on the 5th day of March, 1949 she was delivered to the aforesaid institution, said date being the date on which she reached the 16th year of her birthday. She contends that the order of commitment is contrary to law, for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction to commit her to said institution, she being 16 years of age at the time of her delivery to the superintendent of said institution.

Next, she alleges that the order was void in that the court was without jurisdiction to adjudge her to be a juvenile delinquent and commit her to said school for the reason at the time said court assumed jurisdiction over her on February 28, 1949 she was a married woman and had been married since July 3, 1948.

To the petition the state responded in effect by general denial and affirmative allegation that petitioner was being detained as by law provided.

The petitioner's first contention is without merit, for the reason that the juvenile court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner upon her being adjudged a juvenile delinquent, which adjudication occurred on March 4, 1949, one day before she reached her 16th birthday. Such action was taken in conformity with Title 10 O.S.A. 1941 § 101, reading in part as follows: 'This Article shall apply to any child under the age of sixteen years not an inmate of a State institution incorporated under the laws of this State.' The juvenile court clearly had jurisdiction to make disposition of said juvenile as by law provided, she not having attained her 16th year. Title 10, § 111, O.S.A. 1941, provides in substance 'In the case of a delinquent child, * * * the court may commit the child * * * if a girl, to an industrial school for girls * * *.' Title 10, § 112, O.S.A. 1941, provides in part 'Every child who shall have been adjudged delinquent' may be 'committed to an institution'. It is clear under the foregoing provisions that it was necessary that jurisdiction attach to the petitioner before reaching her 16th birthday for adjudication of her as a juvenile delinquent, Ex parte Lewis, Okl.Cr.App., 188 P.2d 367, not yet reported in State reports, but it was not necessary that she be committed to an institution before reaching her 16th year. Under the court's continuing jurisdiction and the further provisions of Title 10, § 111, O.S.A. 1941, as amended in 1945, as follows: 'In no case shall a child * * * be committed to an institution after such child has reached eighteen (18)', the petitioner's commitment to an institution might have been made after adjudication of juvenile delinquency at any time before she became 18 years of age. In making the foregoing contention apparently the said amendment was overlooked. The jurisdiction herein was well grounded, and the petitioner's contention in relation thereto is without merit.

The petitioner's next contention as to her marriage constituting a bar to her being adjudged a juvenile delinquent is likewise without merit. In Killian v. Burnham, 191 Okl. 248, 130 P.2d 538, 539, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said:

'Does the fact of the marriage of the child remove her from the protection of the Juvenile Act, and deprive the court of jurisdiction to commit her as a delinquent child? We think not. We find nothing in the statute indicating an intention on the part of the Legislature to make such an exception. The first section (§ 101) provides that the act 'shall apply to any child under the age of sixteen years not an inmate of a State institution incorporated under the laws of this State.' * * *

'Section 101 makes an exception in favor of those children who are inmates of a State institution. The Legislature having made no other exceptions, this court is not at liberty to make one. While the question is one of statutory construction, we point out that the majority view in other states is in harmony with our view. In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 115 A. 730, 19 A.L.R.

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