Ex parte Birmingham Bd. of Educ.
Decision Date | 15 May 1992 |
Parties | 76 Ed. Law Rep. 284 Ex parte BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. (Re BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. v. Verdell HARDY). 1901618. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Gaile Pugh Gratton and James C. Pennington of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for petitioner.
David A. Sullivan, Birmingham, for respondent.
Fred D. Gray and Fred D. Gray, Jr. of Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan & Gray, Tuskegee, for amicus curiae Alabama Educ. Ass'n.
The following facts are undisputed:
Verdell Hardy, a nonprobationary employee of the Birmingham Board of Education ("the Board"), was informed by the superintendent of the Birmingham Public Schools that the Board had voted to consider a proposal to terminate her employment, because she had allegedly struck a child in violation of the Board's corporal punishment policy. After a full evidentiary hearing before the Board, at which Ms. Hardy was represented by counsel, the Board voted to terminate her employment. At her request and pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 36-26-100 et seq. ("the Act"), a second evidentiary hearing was held before an ad hoc employee review panel ("the review panel"). The review panel expressly found that the Board's decision to terminate Ms. Hardy was justified on the basis of good and just cause; that the action of the Board was not arbitrary or unjust for personal or political reasons; and that based on the facts of her case and her employment record, the Board's action was warranted. Nevertheless, the review panel ordered that Ms. Hardy was due back pay from November 23, 1988 (the date of the Board's final decision to terminate her employment) to January 20, 1989 (the date of the decision of the review panel).
Prior to the hearing by the review panel, Ms. Hardy filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, petitioning for a writ of mandamus, seeking declaratory relief voiding the Board's decision to dismiss her, and seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the Board from terminating her pay prior to a final adjudication by the review panel. She also sought money damages for breach of contract and violation of her due process rights under the United States Constitution. The trial court found that Ms. Hardy did not have a clear, legal entitlement to the relief sought and denied her request for writ of mandamus and injunctive relief, leaving her claims for declaratory relief and damages remaining. Subsequent to the review panel's decision, Ms. Hardy amended her complaint, adding an estoppel theory.
Subsequently, the trial court held that the Board was not obligated to pay Ms Hardy past November 23, 1988, the date on which the Board notified Ms. Hardy of its decision to terminate. Ms. Hardy appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, relying on its recent decision in Crenshaw v. Mobile County Board of School Commissioners, 560 So.2d 1059 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) ( ), reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the Board was obligated to pay Ms. Hardy back pay from the date of the Board's decision to terminate her employment to the date of the final decision by the review panel.
On appeal, the Board contended that Crenshaw v. Mobile County Board of School Commissioners was incorrectly decided and should be overruled and that Ms. Hardy is not entitled to an award of back pay for the time from the date of the Board's decision to terminate her employment to the date of the review panel's decision upholding the Board's decision. Addressing this issue in a written opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals stated as follows:
601 So.2d at 215-216. (Emphasis added.)
Subsequently, the Board filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted in order to address whether the Act requires an employing board of education to continue to pay a former employee after providing her with a full due process hearing and terminating her employment in accordance with the Act when the employee review panel finds that the termination was warranted and affirms the termination--whether the Act, specifically § 36-26-104, requires only that the employee be paid until the charges are "heard and determined" by the employing board and not until the hearing and determination by the review panel.
The Board contends that the requirement that boards of education continue to pay terminated employees pending the decision of the review panel was not legislatively created and cannot be found in the language of the Act, but rather that the requirement was a judicially promulgated amendment.
To resolve these issues, we must look to the pertinent language of the Act, whose overall purpose is to "provide non-teacher employees a fair and swift resolution of proposed employment termination," and which provides statutory guidelines for the termination of those employees protected by the Act. See Bolton v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 514 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.1987); see, also, Ex parte Clayton, supra.
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