Ex parte Byrd
| Decision Date | 10 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1210155 |
| Parties | Ex parte Charlie James Byrd v. State of Alabama In re: Charlie James Byrd |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Ex parte Charlie James Byrd
In re: Charlie James Byrd
v.
State of Alabama
No. 1210155
Supreme Court of Alabama
November 10, 2022
Montgomery Circuit Court: CC-18-1452; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-20-0609
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
BOLIN, Justice.
Charlie James Byrd petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment denying his motion to suppress certain evidence. We granted certiorari review, and, for the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
After being indicted by a Montgomery County grand jury for unlawful possession of a controlled substance -- delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (synthetic marijuana) -- a violation of § 13A-12-212, Ala. Code 1975, Byrd filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was the basis of his indictment on the ground that it was the product of an unlawful search and seizure. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion on September 3, 2019. On February 10, 2020, before pleading guilty, Byrd specifically reserved the right to appeal the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress. On May 13, 2021, the circuit court sentenced Byrd to 60 months in prison, which sentence was suspended, and he was ordered to serve 12 months in the Montgomery County jail followed by 24 months of supervised probation. Byrd timely
exercised his right to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. On October 8, 2021, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Byrd's conviction. Byrd v. State, [Ms. CR-20-0609, Oct. 8, 2021] __ So.3d __ (Ala.Crim.App.2021). After that court overruled Byrd's application for a rehearing, he petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted Byrd's petition to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of Byrd's motion to suppress because the State had failed to establish sufficient grounds to justify the warrantless search that led to the discovery of the evidence that Byrd sought to suppress.
The evidence produced at the suppression hearing tended to establish the following: On February 23, 2018, Byrd telephoned 911 because he was having chest pains. A safety alert was attached to Byrd's address, which required that the police be dispatched to ensure that the area was safe for medical personnel to enter. Two officers from the Montgomery Police Department, including Officer Cain Gray, responded to make sure that it was safe for medics from the fire department to assist Byrd. Once the officers determined that the area was safe, medics began assisting Byrd. Officer Gray testified:
"The fire medics had showed up, and they were dealing with Mr. Byrd, I guess getting his vital signs and stuff like that. And then originally he wanted to go with the medics, so they were waiting for the transport ambulance company to come. And then someone had said something about grabbing his jacket. And it was draped over the -- the porch, so I went up and grabbed it and checked it for weapons or knives or anything like that, and I had found a pill bottle. And then --
....
"So I had felt the pill bottle. And I know he was complaining. I think, about chest pain. So I had removed [the pill bottle] to make sure he wasn't on any medications and gave it over to the medics, because they're going to need to know that when they transport him to the hospital.
"And there wasn't a label on it. And there was -- it looked like -- a little bit like marijuana, but it didn't smell like it."
Officer Gray stated that, after he had pulled the pill bottle from Byrd's jacket, Byrd, who until then had been "peaceful and calm," became "upset" and "ended [up] ... denying the medics" and did not go to the hospital. Officer Gray then arrested Byrd for possession of a controlled substance.
Standard of Review
It is well settled that, in reviewing a decision of a trial court on a motion to suppress evidence in a case in which the facts are not in dispute, the appellate court applies a de novo standard of review. State v. Gargus,
855 So.2d 587, 590 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). The facts surrounding the search of Byrd's jacket, which was located on the porch of his house, are undisputed. Therefore, the proper standard of review in this case is de novo.
Discussion
Byrd argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress because, he says, the emergency-aid exception permitting a warrantless search did not apply. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The emergency-aid exception was first mentioned in dicta in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948), wherein Justice Jackson, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that "[t]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with." In McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948), the United States Supreme Court outlined a possible emergency situation, such as "where the officers, passing by on the street, hear a shot and a cry for help and demand entrance [to a residence] in the name of the law," in which a warrantless search could be permissible. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-94 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated:
"We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, ... 436 U.S. [499], at 509-510 [(1978)]. 'The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d 205, 212 [(1963)] (opinion of Burger, J.). And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Michigan v. Tyler, supra, 436 U.S., at 509-510; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. [443], at 465-466 [(1971)].
"But a warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. [1], at 25-26 [(1968)] ....
"....
"... The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6-11 [(1977)]. For this reason, warrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 [(1948)], Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 [(1948)]."
(Footnotes omitted.)
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-04 (2006), the United States Supreme Court held that the emergency-aid exception allows police to make a warrantless entry into a home to provide emergency aid to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury, stating:
"It is a '"basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."' Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); some internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (per curiam); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). We have held, for example, that law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto
private property to fight a fire and investigate its cause, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978), to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality opinion), or to engage in '"hot pursuit"' of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 43 (1976). '[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless "the exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978).
"One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. '"The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."' Id., at 392 (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (C.A.D.C. 1963) (Burger, J.)); see also Tyler, supra, at 509. Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to...
To continue reading
Request your trial