Ex parte Chavfull, 04-96-00863-CR
| Decision Date | 19 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-96-00863-CR,04-96-00863-CR |
| Parties | Ex Parte Donte CHAVFULL a/k/a Donte T. Chavfull. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Mario A. Trevino, San Antonio, for appellant.
Edward F. Shaughnessy, III, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, for appellee.
Before HARDBERGER, C.J., and LPEZ, and GREEN, JJ.
This is an accelerated appeal from an order denying a reduction in bail. Bail was originally set at $750,000.00. After an evidentiary hearing, appellant's request for a reduction was denied.
In one point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to reduce the bond. Instead of responding to appellant's contention, the State responds by asserting that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the order. We find the trial court had jurisdiction to deny the reduction and affirm.
We will first address the State's jurisdictional argument. The State's argument is that the 187th District Court lacked jurisdiction to deny the reduction because the indictment was not filed in that court at the time the ruling was made and there is no indication in the record that bail was originally set by that court. The State relies on two cases, Ex parte Clear, 573 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), and Ex parte Mitchell, 601 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), to contend that the only court with jurisdiction to reduce the bond is the court that originally set the bond. Since the record does not indicate that the 187th district court had originally set the bond, the State asserts the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the habeas application. 2
In Ex parte Clear, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a district judge was without jurisdiction to increase the amount of a defendant's original bond that was set by the justice court because the justice court possessed "sole jurisdiction over [the] complaint against relator, to the exclusion of all other courts, until such time that the complaint was either dismissed by the court or superseded by the action of the grand jury, or until the time that the requirements of Article 1.141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been met." 573 S.W.2d at 229. In Ex parte Mitchell, a district court undertook to set bail on a complaint for felony theft that had been filed in a justice court. 601 S.W.2d at 376. Citing Ex parte Clear, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Ex parte Mitchell, 601 S.W.2d at 377.
The State does not cite and does not reconcile the foregoing decisions with an earlier decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Mapula, 538 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). In that case, the magistrate in a justice court originally set bail at $50,000.00. Id. at 794. The appellant applied for habeas corpus relief in district court seeking a reduction in the amount of the bail. Id. Rather than reducing the amount of the bail, the district court, upon the State's oral motion, ordered the appellant held without bail. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that there was no showing than an indictment had been returned; therefore, the justice court still had jurisdiction over the cause. Id. at 795. The court then held:
The filing of the habeas corpus petition invoked the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the District Court, which permitted such court to remand, after hearing, if the court found the applicant to be legally restrained, or to reduce the bond of [sic] bail set if it was excessive, but the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the District Court did not give it jurisdiction to order that bail be denied (or increased) on oral motion of the State when another court still retained jurisdiction of the cause.
Reading the three opinions consistently, if another court has set the amount of bail and an application for habeas relief is filed seeking a reduction in the amount, it would appear the district court would have jurisdiction to deny the requested relief or reduce the amount of bail; however, the district court would not have jurisdiction to vacate the bail originally set or increase it. Although there is no evidence in our record of which court set the original bail in the instant case, we hold that the filing of the application for habeas relief invoked the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the 187th, which then had jurisdiction to deny the reduction. Ex parte Mapula, 538 S.W.2d at 795.
In addition to the support found in Ex parte Mapula, this holding is consistent with the result reached in other cases. For example, in Ex parte Williams, the appellant was charged by information in the county criminal court at law for unlawfully carrying a weapon and filed an application for habeas relief contending the statute was unconstitutional. 786 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet ref'd). The State contended the district court was without jurisdiction because the application should have been filed in the county criminal court at law. Id. at 782. The Houston appellate court asserted that if the State's contention was accepted, the appellant would be precluded from obtaining relief from illegal confinement if he could not get relief from the judge hearing the case. Id. The court further stated:
Merely because the county court at law has jurisdiction of a case does not mean that only the county court can grant an applicant habeas corpus relief. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that any judge of the district court has the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus. This means that a district judge may hear a writ of habeas corpus and grant relief even though an indictment for the offense is pending in the county court.
Id. If a district court has habeas jurisdiction when an indictment is pending in another court, it follows that a district court has habeas jurisdiction when a mere complaint is pending in another court as must have been the status of the case when appellant filed his application.
Finally, in Garber v. State, 667 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1984, no pet.), an indictment was pending in the 34th District Court, and a petition for habeas relief was filed and assigned to the 41st District Court. The 41st District Court heard the petition and granted relief, dismissing the indictment. Id. Subsequently, the 41st District Court granted a Motion for Reinstatement, and the 34th District Court denied a motion to dismiss the cause based on the prior dismissal by the 41st District Court. Id. The El Paso appellate court considered the jurisdiction of the 41st District Court to initially hear the petition and grant relief. Id. at 612-13. The court noted that while article 4.16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "provides that the first court in which an indictment or complaint is filed shall retain jurisdiction of a case over which two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction," the statute does not "preclude or oust the jurisdiction of the other court or courts." Id. at 613. The court asserted that even if mandatory priority of jurisdiction existed in one court, such jurisdiction could be waived in favor of another court with potential jurisdiction over the territory of the offense, the level of the offense and the person of the defendant. Id. The court noted that the State appeared at the hearing before the 41st District Court and did not object to the court's jurisdiction. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that the State's failure to object constituted a waiver of any jurisdictional priority between the two district courts. Id.
Similarly, the State appeared at the evidentiary hearing in the instant case and did not object to the court's jurisdiction. Assuming that the complaint had been filed and bail set by another district court, the State's failure to object at the evidentiary hearing waived any jurisdictional priority between the two courts.
Therefore, we hold the State's contention regarding the trial court's jurisdiction is without merit. Rather than...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Zarate v. State
...increased, until an indictment has been returned. See Ex parte Mapula , 538 S.W.2d 794, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) ; accord Ex parte Chavfull , 945 S.W.2d 183, 184–85 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.). When that discretion is perverted by a bribe that results in special treatment of one......
-
In re Piper
...323, 324 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam); Ex parte McCullough, 993 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Chavfull, 945 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no Piper tends to show that Judge Neill has a mandatory duty to issue the writ, but does not show th......
-
Ex parte Turner
...corpus, the district court was the proper venue in which to file an application for writ of habeas corpus. See id.; see also Ex parte Chavfull, 945 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (if district court has habeas jurisdiction when indictment is pending in another court, i......
-
Milner v. State
...$600,000 bail for capital murder when appellant charged with brutal and violent crime and posed a threat to community); Ex parte Chavfull, 945 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding that $750,00 bail is not excessive for defendant charged with murdering an individual with......