Ex Parte Chesser

Decision Date19 March 1927
Citation93 Fla. 590,112 So. 87
PartiesEx parte CHESSER.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

En Banc.

Motion on the part of Rufus Chesser for a stay of execution of death sentence. Stay denied.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

After sentence to death, trial court may inquire into convict's sanity, although conviction has been affirmed. When it is suggested before the court in which a person has been tried convicted, and sentenced to capital punishment that subsequent to sentence such convict has become and is insane to such a degree that he is unable to understand the nature purpose, and effect of the process about to be executed upon him, the trial court may inquire into the question of the present sanity vel non of the convict, even though the judgment of conviction has been affirmed by the appellate court.

There being no statute, common law applies to procedure by trial court in inquiry as to sanity of convict sentenced to death. In this state there is no statute regulating the procedure to be followed by the trial court in inquiring into the sanity vel non of a convict who is alleged to have become insane sabsequent to the judgment and sentence. The principles of the common law therefore apply.

Trial court, having reasonable doubt of sanity of one sentenced to death, may proceed to determine question of present sanity in trial court's determination of sanity of one sentenced to death, convict is not entitled, as of right, to jury trial, which is not essential to due process. When a sentence to capital punishment has been pronounced upon a convict, and thereafter the trial court entertains a reasonable doubt of the convict's sanity after sentence, such court may proceed to determine the question of the present sanity vel non of the convict. In the determination of such matter the convict is not entitled, as of right, to a trial by jury, nor is a jury trial essential to due process.

One sentenced to death has no right to demand or compel inquiry into present sanity; in inquiry as to sanity of one sentenced to death, rights of convict as offender on trial are not involved. A convict under sentence of capital punishment has no legal right to demand or compel an inquiry into his present sanity since the pronouncement of sentence. The rights of the convict as an offender on trial for an offense are not involved.

Purpose of inquiry into present sanity of one sentenced to death is to satisfy trial court as to whether execution should take place. The purpose of an inquiry into the present sanity of a convict under sentence of death, upon a claim on behalf of the convict that he has become insane since the sentence, is to satisfy the trial court upon that question so that such order may be made with reference to the execution of the death warrant as the dictates of humanity, public policy, and the law shall require.

Inquiry into present sanity of convict sentenced to death does not refer to validity or enforceability of conviction. A proceeding after judgment and sentence for the purpose of inquiring into the present sanity of a person under sentence of capital punishment is purely collateral, and has no reference to the validity or ultimate enforceability of the judgment of conviction.

Trial court's determination of convict's present sanity after sentence to death is conclusive. When it is claimed on behalf of a person who has been convicted and sentenced to capital punishment that he has subsequently become insane, a determination by the trial court of the question of the convict's present sanity is conclusive, and in this state such determination is not subject to review under the principles of the common law, nor is it allowed by statute.

Inquisition on present insanity of convict sentenced to death is not 'case' or 'cause' of which Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction (Const. art. 5,§ 5). The words 'case' or 'cause,' when used as legal terms are generally understood as meaning a judicial proceeding for the determination of a controversy between parties wherein rights are enforced or protected, or wrongs are prevented or redressed. [Ed. Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Case (In Practice); Cause (In Practice).]

There must be final judgment and sentence to support writ of error in criminal case (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 2901, 2902, 2905, 6146). There must be a final judgment and sentence to support a writ of error in a criminal case.

Determination by trial court as to present sanity of convict sentenced to death is not 'final judgment and sentence,' reviewable by Supreme Court on writ of error (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 6146). The determination of the trial court upon the question of the present sanity of a convict under sentence of death upon an inquiry after judgment and sentence have been pronounced is not 'a final judgment and sentence,' as contemplated by section 6146, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920. [Ed. Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Final Decree or Judgment.]

COUNSEL

James H. Bunch, or Jacksonville, for petitioner.

OPINION

STRUM J.

Upon a trial in the circuit court for Clay county, Rufus Chesser was adjudged guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to death. The defense principally relied on at the trial was insanity. On writ of error the judgment of conviction was affirmed. Chesser v. State (Fla.) 109 So. 599. Subsequently, a petition for writ of error coram nobis was denied. Chesser v. State (Fla.) 109 So. 906. Pursuant to the statute, a warrant for Chesser's execution was issued by the Governor, and the date of execution was set for February 18, 1927.

On February 17, 1927, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to this court alleging that since the judgment and sentence aforesaid Chesser had become insane; the purpose for which the writ was sought being to obtain an inquiry into the question of Chesser's sanity as of thea time. The petition was denied. Ex parts Rufus Chesser, 111 So. 720, decided at the January term, 1927, opinion filed February 18, 1927. In denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus, this court said:

'Whatever may be the power of this court in the premises, a proper judicial procedure is not an attack on the judgment of conviction, but an application to the trial court for a stay of execution of its judgment and sentence until that court can inquire into and adjudicate the question of the petitioner's sanity or insanity, since the judgment of conviction.'

Thereupon, on February 18, 1927, the day set for the execution, Chesser's parents, in his behalf, suggested before the circuit court for Clay county, in which the judgment against him had been rendered, that Chesser had become insane since the judgment of conviction, and was unable to appreciate the seriousness and effect of the process of the court about to be executed upon him, and moved that court to inquire into, and determine, the question of Chesser's sanity or insanity since the judgment of conviction, and that pending such determination the execution of the judgment of conviction be stayed. The motion was granted.

The circuit Court for Clay county then proceeded to an inquiry into the question of Chesser's sanity subsequent to the judgment of conviction. No jury was impanelled. The matter was considered by the judge of said court upon affidavits submitted with the motion aforesaid, upon the testimony of witnesses taken at three hearings, and upon an examination of Chesser himself by the judge.

On March 2, 1927, the circuit court aforesaid, amongst other things, found and ordered in the inquiry 'that said defendant (Rufus Chesser) was on February 18, A. D. 1927 (the day previously set for his execution) and that he is now, sufficiently sane to understand the nature and seriousness of the processes of this court; it is thereupon, on consideration, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the stay of the execution of the sentence of this court and the warrant of the Governor of this state based upon the judgment and sentence of this court be, and the same is hereby, brought to an end, and that said judgment and sentence and warrant be, and they are hereby, held to be in full force and effect, as if the stay thereof hereinbefore referred to had not been made.'

On March 4, 1927, Chesser caused to be issued by the clerk of the circuit court for Clay county what purports upon its face to be a writ of error, which is presumably addressed to the order of said circuit court of March 2, 1927, and on March 16, 1927, an order of insolvency was entered by that court. The purported writ of error is returnable to this court on May 27, 1927.

On March 9, 1927, the Governor issued a further warrant, by which it is ordered that Chesser be executed pursuant to law in the week beginning Monday, the 21st day of March, 1927, a day prior to the return day of the purported writ of error.

Chesser now seeks an order from this court staying his execution pursuant to the Governor's warrant of March 9, 1927, until disposition by this court of the purported writ of error.

Since there is this state no statute governing the question before us, the principles of the common law apply Ex parte Rufus Chesser (Fla.; decided February 18, 1927) 111 So. 720.

The rule of the common law is stated in Hammond's Blackstone's Commentaries, book 4, c. 2, pp. 24, 25, and in Cooley's Blackstone (4th Ed.) vol. 2, pp. 1230, 1231, as follows:

'If after he (the defendant) be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses, before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced, and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed; for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory he...

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13 cases
  • Ford v. Wainwright
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • January 17, 1985
    ...continued to reaffirm the English common law rule of preventing the execution of the presently insane. See, e.g., Ex Parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 594, 112 So. 87, 89 (1927); Hawie v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 216-18, 83 So. 158, 159, 160 (1919); In re Grammer, 104 Neb. 744, 746-49, 178 N.W. 624,......
  • State Road Dept. v. Crill
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • May 5, 1930
    ... ... Wilson River R. Co., 49 Or. 309, ... 89 P. 958, 959; Vols. 1 and 3 Bouv. Law Dict.; Anderson Law ... Dict.), and this court in Ex parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 597, ... 112 So. 87, has held that the words 'case' or ... 'cause,' when used in legal terms, are generally ... understood ... ...
  • Comminwealth v. Moon
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • October 4, 1955
    ...Colo. 187, 156 P. 800; Darnell v. State, 24 Tex.App. 6,5 S.W. 522; State ex rel. Lyons v. Chretien, 114 La. 81, 38 So. 27; Ex parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87. People v. Ross, 344 Ill.App. 407, 101 N.E.2d 112; in People v. Cornelius, 332 Ill.App. 271, 74 N.E.2d 900; and in Crocker v. ......
  • People ex rel. Best v. Eldred
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • December 21, 1938
    ... ... 4 Blackstone's ... Commentaries, p. 395; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S ... 398, 18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515; People v. Preston, supra; Ex ... parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87 ... This ... collateral proceeding was merely an appeal to the humanity of ... the court to postpone ... ...
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