Ex parte Clara Beal Stanfield

• Decision Date: 28 November 1910
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: EX PARTE CLARA BEAL STANFIELD, a minor, by MRS.E. D. STANFIELD ET AL., next of kin

53 So. 538

98 Miss. 214

EX PARTE CLARA BEAL STANFIELD, a minor, by MRS.E. D. STANFIELD ET AL., next of kin

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 28, 1910

October 1910

APPEAL from the chancery court of Holmes county, HON. J. F. MCCOOL Chancellor.

Application by Clara Beal Stanfield, a minor, by E. D. Stanfield and others, next of kin, for removal of disabilities of minority. From a decree in term time vacating a decree of partial removal made in vacation, appellant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed.

Tackett & Elmore, for appellant.

While there are a number of assignments of error in the record to the action of the court below, the substance of the whole may be stated briefly.

We venture to state the proposition thus:

"Has the chancellor sitting in term time the legal power to set aside and vacate two several decrees of different dates removing the disabilities of a minor in part, which decrees have been granted by the chancellor in vacation in conformity to the statute and prior to the term, upon the informal application of the guardian to have such decree annulled and vacated, and of which application no notice has been given to the minor, nor to her surviving parent, nor to any one who was a party to the petition and decree removing the minor's disabilities, nor to any one else whose rights would be prejudiced by such action of the court, and that too, upon incompetent testimony of whose taking no notice had been given?" We affirm that no such power is vested in the chancery court either at common law or by statute, and that, in consequence, the decree rendered by the chancellor at the May term, last, and of which we complain, is absolutely void.

With some few exceptions, inherent in the nature of the court, the basis of chancery jurisdiction in this state has always been in the Constitution; with some few exceptions of the same character, the basis of its procedure has lain in the statute. This is true even when the statute adopts the common law procedure.

Much of its present jurisdiction was unknown to the common law; most of the statutory procedure is adopted from the common law; where the procedure varies from the common law, or provides for the additional jurisdiction unknown to the common law, it is of equal and binding force on the court.

There can be, surely, no decree nor distinctions in the exercise by the court of any of its several constitutional powers, nor can any one of them be said, with reason, to be of inferior order or lower in dignity to any one other.

Any branch of the general constitutional jurisdiction of a court of record of recognized general jurisdiction is general jurisdiction. See Ames v. Williams, 72 Miss. 770.

The rules governing its exercise must accordingly be the same. Ibid.

Much of this general jurisdiction is exercised by the chancellor in person in vacation or at chambers as distinctive from his action in term. Its constitutional validity is not questioned.

Our contention is that this status is exactly that of all other decrees of the chancery court, which are final in their nature, with all the incidents that attach to such decrees, and are beyond the power of the chancery court, or any other court, to controvert, contravene, alter, amend, vacate, annul or modify in any respect, except as provided by law and in the manner provided by law.

A final decree, as I understand the term, as distinguished from other decrees, is that nothing remains to be done by the court in that particular proceeding for the relief of the relator, though ministerial agencies may be put in motion thereby. Humphries v. Stanford, 71 Miss. 135.

Irregularities in the proceedings do not render the order or decree removing the infant's disabilities a nullity, nor is such order or decree subject to collateral attack. 22 Cyc., page 519, latter part par. C. Also see whole par. C., pages 518-519.

This rule, pari passu, must apply to a partial removal of disabilities, as in the case now before the court.

Marks v. McElroy, 67 Miss. 545, is cited in the notes in connection with the general text of par. C. above.

If this action of the chancellor in vacation is to be construed as that of a limited court, as said in Marks v. McElroy, ante, then the two decrees are protected by the doctrine applied to those courts. Sagory v. Bayless, 13 Smedes & Mar. 153; Hardy v. Gholson, 26 Miss. 72; Ward, Admr., etc. v. State, 40 Miss. 108.

Wiggle v. Owen, 45 Miss. 693 (delivered after probate courts had passed out of existence), and citing Sagory v. Bayless, and Hardy v. Gholson, as settling principle as to probate courts. Harvey v. Miles, 1 Miss. Dec. 135, and notes.

This is true, also, as to boards of police or supervisors. Carroll v. Board of Police, 6 Cush. 48.

This is, measureably, true even of a justice of the peace. Leavenworth v. Crittenden, 62 Miss. 573; Swain v. Gilder, 61 Miss. 667.

As to the status of the decree of the chancery court, or that of the chancellor, when synonymous with the court, and the manner of calling such decree in question, there is but one voice in the long line of our supreme court opinions. Hoggatt v. Hunt, Walker 216; Hardy v. Gholson, 4 Cush. 72; Sagory v. Bayless, 13 S. & M. 153; Bank v. Lewis, Id. 226; Enoch v. Harrellson, 57 Miss. 468, by Mr. Justice Campbell, who cites Justice Story, who cites Bacon's Ordinances as the foundation of the rule. Hall v. Weddill, 78 Miss. 43; Armstead v. Barbee, 82 Miss. 792; also 16 Cyc. 505, par. B, 507, 512, 521, par. 6, 523, 526, § 9, 532, par. d.

It can be called in question only by appeal, by bill of review, or in the nature of review for fraud.

This rule only applies in favor of a party to the suit, or a privy thereto, nor he, unless injuriously affected. Authorities above.

Our court long since held that a decree of the previous term could not be set aside on motion or petition. Wiggle v. Owen, 45 Miss. 693 and authorities there cited; Harvey v. Miles, 1 Miss. Dec. 135 and note.

The same principle applies to the law courts. Railway Co. v. Bolding, 69 Miss. 255.

In effect, also, to the supreme court. Lane v. Wheeless, 46 Miss. 666; Leblanc v. Railroad Co., 73 Miss. 463.

Boothe & Pepper, for appellee.

We contend that these decrees were absolutely null and void, because they were made in vacation.

If the chancellor had been authorized by law to render the decrees in vacation, the...