Ex parte Cromwell, 2

• Decision Date: 12 July 1963
• Docket Number: No. 2,2
• Citation: 192 A.2d 775,232 Md. 305
• Parties: Ex parte In the Matter of Dwight CROMWELL. Ex parte In the Matter of Reva Dinez WHITE. Misc.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 305

232 Md. 305

192 A.2d 775

Ex parte In the Matter of Dwight CROMWELL Ex parte In the Matter of Reva Dinez WHITE.

Misc. No. 2.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 12, 1963.

Juanita Jackson Mitchell, Baltimore, for petitioners.

Robert C. Murphy, Deputy Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and C. Burnam Mace, State's Atty. for Dorchester County, Cambridge, for the State.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT, HORNEY, MARBURY and SYBERT, JJ.

HENDERSON, Judge.

The appellants in these cases were charged in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County with being juvenile delinquents, found so on June 10, 1963, by the court sitting as a juvenile court and committed, respectively, to the Maryland Training School for Boys and the Montrose School for Girls, the State training schools for delinquent children. Appeals were entered in this Court on June 13, 1963, and on June 18, 1963, petitions were filed in this Court praying that each child be released to the custody of their respective mothers, pending the final determination of the appeals. By agreement between counsel for the petitioners and the Attorney General of the State and the State's Attorney for Dorchester County we heard arguments on the petitions on June 27, 1963, at which time documentary evidence was submitted on both sides, in the form of letters from the trial judge, ministers, school teachers and other persons.

Code (1957), Art. 26, sec. 65, provides that 'Any interested party aggrieved by any order or decree of the judge, [sitting as a juvenile court], may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals. * * * The pendency of any such appeal * * * shall not suspend the order of the judge regarding such child, nor shall it discharge such child from the custody of the person, institution or agency to whose care such child shall have been committed by the judge, under § 61, unless the Court of Appeals shall so order.' (Emphasis supplied.) This language has not heretofore been construed by this Court, but we have no hestitation in holding that it recognizes, if it does not directly confer, the authority of this Court to entertain petitions similar to those in the case at bar, pending the determination of an appeal. Cf. State Board of Public Welfare v. Myers, 224 Md. 246, 250, 167 A.2d 765. We think, however, that the power should be sparingly exercised, because of the wide discretion conferred upon the trial judge by section 61, and the power therein reserved to him to alter at any time an initial placement, as he deems to be for the best interests of the child. It has been held in other states that reversal should only be for clear error of law or abuse of discretion. See 31 Am.Jur. Juvenile Courts, § 87, and cases cited.

Section 61 of our statute also provides that 'No adjudication by the judge upon the status of any child shall operate to impose any civil disabilities, nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication.' It is clear that the statute is aimed at the protection and rehabilitation of the child, not its punishment. Cf. Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914. The power exercised by the State is that of parens patriae. See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 7. The Maryland statutes are not unique in this respect. See Pee v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 274 F.2d 556 and cases cited. The fact that parents may be deprived of the custody of their own children presents no constitutional problem. Cf. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463. The test is what is best for the child.

The petitions allege that Dwight aged fifteen and Dinez aged fifteen, Negro children residing in Cambridge, Maryland, were arrested from three to six times for participation in peaceful protests against racial segregation. It is asserted that the findings of delinquency were based entirely upon this, and that the infant petitioners were thereby deprived of their Constitutional rights to free speech in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

We think it is far from clear that the infant petitioners have the same Constitutional rights to participate in protests as are enjoyed by adults. Children are under recognized disabilities in many respects. They do not enjoy the right to vote, to enlist in the military forces, or to operate motor vehicles (under the age of sixteen). Because of their lack of mature judgment they are subject to the continuing control and supervision of parents or guardians until they become of age or are emancipated. Nor does the record show that this finding of delinquency was based entirely on the fact that the petitioners engaged in...