Ex parte Dangerfield
Decision Date | 14 May 2010 |
Docket Number | 1090276. |
Citation | 49 So.3d 675 |
Parties | Ex parte Efé DANGERFIELD et al. (In re Forrest Frost et al. v. Efé Dangerfield et al.). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Glenmore P. Powers II and John J. Breckenridge, asst. counsel, Alabama Department of Revenue; and George Beck, Jr., and Terrie Scott Biggs of Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioners.
J. Mark White, William M. Bowen, Jr., Andrew C. Allen, and Hope S. Marshall of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C., Birmingham, for respondents.
Efé Dangerfield, Lisa McKniqht, Carol Murphy, and Charles Crumbley, defendants in an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court, petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to grant their motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to quash subpoenas issued in the case. We grant the petition in part and deny it in part.
On August 6, 2009, a complaint was filed in the Montgomery Circuit Court by (1) Crown Motors, Inc. ("Crown"); (2) Forrest Frost, a director, shareholder, and officer of Crown; and individuals who were employees of Crown at the time of the events made the basis of this action, namely, (3) Marie Hatcher, (4) Donald Reuger, (5) Kevin Roden, and (6) Theresa Schoonover. Hatcher, Reuger, Roden, and Schoonover were "service advisor," "service manager," "body-shop manager," and "office manager for the body shop," respectively. Named as defendants in the complaint were certain officials of the Alabama Department of Revenue ("the Department"), namely, (1) Carol Murphy, (2) Special Agent Efé Dangerfield, (3) Sales, Use, and Business Tax Supervisor Lisa McKnight, and (4) Investigations Divisions Director Charles Crumbley. The complaint contained the following factual allegations:
Crown sells new and used automobiles at dealerships located in Gadsden, Anniston, and Fort Payne. The Gadsden dealership is owned and operated by Frost. For approximately two years immediately preceding the events made the basis of this action, Murphy, on behalf of the Department, had been auditing Crown's sales-tax reports.
On the morning of May 14, 2009, Dangerfield obtained a warrant to search the premises of Crown's Gadsden dealership.At around noon on May 14, approximately 35 representatives of various governmental agencies, including the Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, converged on the premises of the Gadsden dealership. According to the complaint:
(Footnote omitted.) A few days later, the Department obtained and executed another search warrant at the Gadsden dealership. Pursuant to this warrant, all documents in the attic of the main building of the dealership were seized.
On June 3, 2009, Crown "attempted to file a Motion for Return of Property" withthe Department, seeking the return of the seized documents. However, the Department disallowed the filing, asserting that there was "no pending case" with which to associate it. When Crown attempted to file the motion in the district court and the circuit court of Etowah County, its attempts were met with the same response.
The complaint contained 11 counts. All the defendants were sued in both their individual and official capacities. Count 1 (alleging a violation of due-process rights) alleged that Dangerfield, McKnight, Murphy, and Crumbley "acted willfully, wantonly, maliciously, in bad faith, beyond their authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and intentionally," in order to deny the "plaintiffs their contractual and property rights without Due Process of law." Compensatory damages were sought under count 1.
Count 2 (alleging unlawful search and seizure) was brought solely on behalf of Frost and Crown. It alleged that the defendants "acted willfully, wantonly, maliciously, in bad faith, beyond their authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and for the purpose of interfering with, destroying and denying ... Frost's and Crown's rights" in conducting an unlawful search of the premises of the dealership. Relief sought in count 2 included compensatory damages, punitive damages, and "return of all property illegally seized."
Count 3 alleged intentional interference with business and contractual relations and was brought solely on behalf of Crown. Under that count, Crown sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and "return of all property illegally seized."
Count 4 alleged conversion and was brought solely on behalf of Crown. It alleged that the defendants "acted willfully, wantonly, maliciously, in bad faith, beyond their authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law and for the purpose of converting Crown's property," that is, "virtually every scrap of paper, every computer and every flash drive within its possession." Relief sought under count 4 included compensatory damages, punitive damages, and "return of all property illegally converted."
Count 5 (seeking return of chattels in specie ) was brought on behalf of Crown and sought the recovery of Crown's property.
Count 6 (class claims alleging unlawful detention) was brought on behalf of Hatcher, Reuger, Roden, Schoonover, and "all others similarly situated." It alleged that the defendants "acted willfully, wantonly, maliciously, in bad faith, beyond their authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and for the purpose of falsely imprisoning Hatcher, Reuger, Roden and Schoonover and others similarly situated." Relief sought under count 6 was compensatory damages and punitive damages. Count 7 contained a similar class claim alleging false arrest, and count 8 alleged conspiracy.
Count 9 sought a judgment declaring (1) that the search warrants under which the Department conducted the searches of the premises of the dealership were "null, void, and without any effect whatsoever and were issued without authority and in violation of the law"; (2) that the "defendants' acts and omission" were in violation of the law; (3) that the defendants' acts or omissions interfered with and denied Crown's contractual/property rights and business relationships; and (4) that the defendants' acts or omissions "constitut[ed] the false imprisonment, detainment, and arrest of Hatcher, Reuger, Roden, and Schoonover and all others similarly situated."
Count 10 sought to enjoin "the enforcement of any future search warrants," aswell as all further actions in alleged violation of the plaintiffs' rights in contract, property, and liberty.
Finally, count 11 (request for return of property) was on behalf of Crown only. It sought, pursuant to Rule 3.13, Ala. R.Crim. P., the return of all property that was removed from the Gadsden dealership. Rule 3.13 provides, in pertinent part:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Teplick v. Moulton (In re Moulton)
...in their official capacities. Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep't of Human Res., 835 So.2d 131, 132–33 (Ala.2002).’ Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d [675,] 681 [ (Ala.2010) ].”Ex parte Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 88 So.3d 837, 842 (Ala.2012). In Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc.,......
-
Perryman v. Wilcox Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (Ex parte Wilcox Cnty. Bd. of Educ.)
...immune under § 14 from the state-law claims filed against them insofar as those claims seek monetary damages"); and Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d 675, 681 (Ala. 2010) (observing that "[i]t is settled beyond cavil that State officials cannot be sued for damages in their official capacities"......
-
Barnett v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
...of Educ., 88 So.3d at 841 (quoting Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep't of Human Res., 835 So.2d 131, 132–33 (Ala.2002) ); Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d 675, 681 (Ala.2010) (claims against a State official in his or her official capacity seeking damages are barred by the doctrine of immunity). T......
-
Collar v. Univ. of S. Ala. (Ex parte Aull)
...in their official capacities. Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep't of Human Res., 835 So.2d 131, 132–33 (Ala.2002).” Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d [675,] 681 [ (Ala.2010) ].’“Ex parte Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 88 So.3d 837, 842 (Ala.2012). In Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc.......