Ex Parte Dillon

Decision Date22 July 1936
Docket NumberNo. 18808.,18808.
Citation96 S.W.2d 1095
PartiesEx parte DILLON et al.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Original proceeding in habeas corpus for discharge from imprisonment in the county jail for contempt brought by Harry C. Dillon and Mrs. Harry C. Dillon.

Motion to quash overruled, and writ of habeas corpus sustained, and petitioner ordered discharged.

Earl C. Borchers, of St. Joseph, Livengood & Weightman, of Maryville, and Randolph & Randolph, of St. Joseph, for petitioners.

Gaddy & Reed, of St. Joseph, for defendant Empire Trust Co. and Sheriff Edwin Wallace.

REYNOLDS, Judge.

Application for discharge from imprisonment in the county jail for contempt under writ of habeas corpus.

The return of the officer to the original writ of habeas corpus admits the custody of the petitioners under an order of court complained of by the petitioners in their petition for the writ and admits that such officer had been served with a true copy of the petition for the writ herein and that the exhibits, orders, and copies of all pleadings attached to such petition are true and correct.

Upon the filing of such return, the cause was submitted to the court upon the original writ, the petition therefor, the exhibits thereto annexed and filed therewith, and the return of the officer to said writ, without evidence and upon the officer's motion to quash the original writ of habeas corpus issued herein.

The case may be stated in about this way, to wit: That one Milan E. Hitchcock and his wife, Nina B. Hitchcock, as plaintiffs, filed their petition in the circuit court of Andrew county, Mo., against W. C. Gow, trustee, Empire Trust Company, a corporation, and Le Roy Mead, trustee in bankruptcy for H. S. Smith Investment Company, the object of which was to determine the title to a tract of 45 acres of land situated in Andrew county, Mo., fully described in said petition; that thereafter in said cause the defendant Empire Trust Company filed its answer and cross-petition, wherein and whereby it sought affirmative relief by a prayer for the appointment of a receiver to take in charge said real estate and a restraining order to enjoin and restrain the plaintiffs in said action from claiming or asserting any right, title, or right of possession to said property; that thereafter said cause was transferred from the said circuit court of Andrew county to the circuit court of Nodaway county, Mo.; that on June 2, 1936, the Honorable Thomas A. Cummins, judge of the circuit court of Nodaway county, made an order in said cause appointing one J. Dorr Ewing as the receiver for said property and decreeing that the plaintiffs in said action and any and all persons claiming under them as tenants, lessees, or successors in interest be restrained and enjoined from holding possession of said premises from said receiver and the Empire Trust Company pending the final disposition of the cause and requiring the Empire Trust Company to furnish a bond in the sum of $300 to be executed to plaintiffs Milan E. Hitchcock and Nina B. Hitchcock securing and indemnifying the plaintiffs up to the sum of $300 for all damages that might be occasioned by the temporary restraining order and to be conditioned that said Empire Trust Company should pay all sums of money, damages, and costs which might be adjudged against it in the event of the dissolution of the injunction; that thereafter, about June 16, 1936, a notice of the appointment of said receiver and the granting of said injunction was delivered to the petitioners herein; that the plaintiffs in said cause duly filed their motion to vacate and set aside the order so made by the Honorable Thomas A. Cummins, judge as aforesaid, which motion was overruled; that thereupon an appeal was allowed the plaintiffs from said judgment and decree; that, during the latter part of the month of June, 1936, the defendant Empire Trust Company filed an application for citation to Milan E. Hitchcock and Nina B. Hitchcock (the plaintiffs in said cause) and to the petitioners, Harry C. Dillon and Mrs. Harry C. Dillon, requiring said parties to appear before said court to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for a violation of the order of temporary injunction; that, in pursuance of said notice, the said Milan E. Hitchcock and Nina B. Hitchcock, together with the petitioners herein, did appear before said court and the judge thereof, and the petitioners herein, upon a hearing had, introduced evidence tending to show that they were...

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8 cases
  • Curtis v. Tozer, s. 31777
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 15 Enero 1964
    ...Southwest Bank, supra, 108 S.W.2d p. 635) which would not render the bond void. The petitioners rely heavily on the case of Ex parte Dillon, Mo.App., 96 S.W.2d 1095. In that case the Springfield Court of Appeals interpreted the statute to require the bond to run not only to the parties name......
  • Mechanic v. Gruensfelder
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 4 Diciembre 1970
    ...the statute that the bond run to interested parties, the court may read into the bond that provision of the statute.' (30). Ex parte Dillon, Mo.App., 96 S.W.2d 1095, relied on by petitioners was a civil contempt case. We can see some justification for the holding there that if the persons a......
  • State ex rel. George v. Mitchell
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 8 Mayo 1950
    ...issued without the bond being given is void and that the court that issues it is acting in excess of its jurisdiction. Ex parte Dillon, Mo.App., 96 S.W.2d 1095; State ex rel. American Bankers' Assur. Co. v. McQuillin, 260 Mo. 164, 168 S.W. 924; State ex rel. Jiner v. Foard, 251 Mo. 51, 157 ......
  • IN RE CURTIS'PETITION
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 31 Marzo 1965
    ...include the terms of the statute. It, therefore, did not find it necessary to rule, as did the Springfield Court of Appeals in Ex parte Dillon, 96 S.W.2d 1095, on the point of whether the designation of the parties to whom or in whose favor the bond was executed was properly worded. By adop......
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