Ex parte Duncan
| Decision Date | 21 January 1994 |
| Citation | 638 So.2d 1332 |
| Parties | Ex parte Joe Cecil DUNCAN, Jr. (In re State of Alabama v. Joe Cecil Duncan, Jr.). 1921874. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Philip Henry Pitts and J.L. Chestnut, Jr., Selma, for petitioner.
Edgar W. Greene, Asst. Dist. Atty., Selma, and H. William Wasden, Mobile, for respondent.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Robin Blevins, Deputy Atty. Gen., on rehearing, for respondent.
The petitioner, Joe Cecil Duncan, Jr., seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the recusal of a circuit court judge on the ground that he is biased and prejudiced.
Duncan was convicted of the capital murder of Elizabeth Cobb in Dallas County; the jury returned a verdict of life without parole. 1 The trial court overrode the jury's verdict and sentenced Duncan to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing on the question whether the principles of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), had been violated in the selection of the jury. Duncan v. State, 575 So.2d 1198 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). On remand, the trial court held that there had been no Batson violation. On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Duncan v. State, 612 So.2d 1304 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). Duncan then moved the trial judge to recuse; the judge refused to do so. Subsequently, Duncan petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial judge to recuse, but that court denied the petition, on September 8, 1993, without an opinion. --- So.2d ----.
Duncan maintains that the trial judge displayed personal bias, prejudice, and hostility by finding, among other things, that the aggravating circumstance that the capital offense was especially atrocious, heinous, or cruel was applicable even though the state did not seek to use that factor and even though, he says, the trial judge knew that that finding could not be sustained. The judge stated:
Duncan also maintains that the trial judge demonstrated blatant personal bias toward Duncan by determining, on his own, that the crime for which Duncan was convicted was premeditated, a factor not listed in the statute and not to be considered as an aggravating circumstance. At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated:
According to Duncan, these statements evidence such bias and prejudice as to mandate the trial judge's recusal in this case--these statements, Duncan says, evidence that the trial judge's impartiality is reasonably in question.
This Court recognizes the importance of judicial impartiality:
Ex parte Large, 501 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Ala.1986).
Under Canon 3(C)(1), Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, recusal is required when "facts are shown which make it reasonable for members of the public or a party, or counsel opposed to question the impartiality of the judge." Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.1982). Specifically, the Canon 3(C) test is: "Would a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position knowing all of the facts known to the judge find that there is a...
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