Ex parte Gonzales

• Decision Date: 03 June 2015
• Docket Number: 40,541–04
• Citation: 463 S.W.3d 508 (Mem)
• Parties: Ex parte Michael Dean Gonzales
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

463 S.W.3d 508 (Mem)

Ex parte Michael Dean Gonzales

40,541–04

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 3, 2015

Katherine C. Black, P.O. Box 2223, Houston, Texas 77007, Mandy Welch and Richard Burr, P.O. Box 525, Leggett, Texas 77350, for appellant.

District Attorney Ector County, Bobby Bland, 300 North Grant, Room 305, Odessa, Texas 79761, Edward L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for the State.

ORDER

Per curiam.

This is a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, § 5.

Applicant was originally convicted of the offense of capital murder in 1995. The jury answered the special issues submitted under Article 37.071, Tex. Code Crim. Proc ., and the trial court, accordingly, set punishment at death. This Court affirmed applicant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Gonzales v. State, No. AP–72,317 (Tex. Crim. App. June 3, 1998). This Court denied relief on applicant's post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Gonzales, No. WR–40,541–01 (Tex. Crim. App. March 10, 1999).¹ Applicant's federal petition for habeas corpus relief was denied as to his conviction but granted as to punishment, and the case was remanded for a new punishment hearing.

Gonzales v. Cockrell, No. MO–99–CA–073 (W. D. Tex. December 19, 2002). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's judgment. Gonzales v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2006).

The trial court held a new punishment hearing in May 2009. Based on the jury's answers to the special issues, the trial court sentenced applicant to death on May 7, 2009. On May 8, 2009, the trial court determined that applicant was indigent and asked whether he desired the appointment of counsel for the purpose of filing an application for writ of habeas corpus. Applicant stated that he wanted no appeals filed on his behalf and no attorneys appointed. Because direct appeal cannot be waived, the trial court appointed counsel to represent applicant on direct appeal. For the purpose of Article 11.071, the trial court found that applicant was proceeding pro se on habeas.

This Court affirmed the judgment and sentence on direct appeal. Gonzales v. State, 353 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When applicant failed to timely file a postconviction application for writ of habeas corpus, this Court issued an order stating in pertinent part:

Because of applicant's expressed desire to waive habeas, the lack of any vacillation of that waiver appearing in the record, and applicant's failure to timely file an application, we hold that applicant has waived his right to the review of an initial Article 11.071 habeas application. Any writ application filed hereafter by applicant or on applicant's behalf will be labeled a subsequent application and reviewed under Article 11.071 § 5.

Ex parte Gonzales, No. WR–40,541–03 (Tex. Crim. App. November 10, 2010).

The record reflects that applicant is currently challenging his conviction in Cause No. 7:12–cv–00126, styled Michael Dean Gonzales v. Rick Thaler, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Midland Division. The record also reflects that the federal district court entered an order staying its proceedings for applicant to return to state court to consider his current unexhausted claims. Applicant thereafter filed the instant post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court on September 9, 2014.

Applicant presents four allegations in the instant application. We have reviewed the application and find that applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071, § 5(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the application as an abuse of the writ without considering the merits of the claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 3rd DAY OF JUNE, 2015.

Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alcala, J., joined. Newell, J., not participating.

Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Alcala, J., joined.

This Court treats this—Applicant's first—post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus as a subsequent writ application and rejects it as abusive under Article 11.071, Section 5(a). Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071, § 5(a). It does so because Applicant, proceeding pro se, “waived” his right to habeas review by failing to file a timely initial writ application. See Ex parte Reynoso, 257 S.W.3d 715, 720 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ( “Although Article 11.071 does not expressly provide that an applicant can waive his right to pursue habeas relief, neither does the statute provide for automatic habeas review. [citation omitted.] Thus, we [have] implicitly held that an applicant may ‘waive’ his right to habeas review. However, because an applicant can waffle in his decision until the day the application is due, a ‘waiver’ is not truly effective until after that day has passed.”). The Court accepts the convicting court's finding that Applicant intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to state post-conviction habeas proceedings.

Applicant argues that we should treat the present writ application as an original—not a subsequent—post-conviction application because, even though he was incompetent to waive his right to pursue state post-conviction proceedings, neither the convicting court nor this Court made any inquiry into his competency at any time before the period elapsed for filing an initial application.¹ The Court does not address that contention in its order today. I would file and set the cause to do so. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

BACKGROUND

Applicant was originally convicted of capital murder in 1995. His death sentence was overturned during the course of federal habeas corpus proceedings in 2002. Gonzales v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir.2006).² A second Texas jury once again assessed the death penalty in 2009. During the retrial on punishment, Applicant refused to cooperate with his trial counsel, cursing and yelling and making obscene gestures in the courtroom. He insisted on testifying, inviting the jury to “fucking kill me. Makes no fucking difference. Pass the witness.” The day after being sentenced to death in open court, Applicant insisted that he wanted to waive his appeals and be executed posthaste. When the trial court explained that he also had a right to pursue post-conviction remedies and to the appointment of counsel for that purpose, he replied, “I don't want no appeals filed on my behalf,” and “I don't want no attorney, period.” In reply to inquiries from this Court why the convicting court had appointed no attorney to represent Applicant in post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings under Article 11.071, Sections 2(a) and (b), the convicting court informed us that Applicant “refused to accept a writ of habeas corpus attorney” and that his “election not to accept an appointed attorney and proceed pro se was intelligent and voluntary.”See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071, § 2(a) (“An applicant shall be represented by competent counsel unless the applicant has elected to proceed pro se and the convicting trial court finds, after a hearing on the record, that the applicant's election is intelligent and voluntary.”).³ When the time expired for Applicant to file an initial writ application with no application being filed, this Court issued an order stating, “Because of applicant's expressed desire to waive habeas, the lack of any vacillation of that waiver appearing in the record, and applicant's failure to timely file an application, we hold that applicant has waived his right to the review of an initial Article 11.071 habeas application.” Ex parte Gonzales, No. WR–40,541–03 (Tex.Crim.App.del. Nov. 10, 2010) (not designated for publication) (slip op. at 2).⁴ We went on to declare that “[a]ny writ application filed hereafter by applicant or on applicant's behalf will be labeled a subsequent application and reviewed under Article 11.071 § 5.” Id. We made no mention of competency.

COMPETENCY TO WAIVE POST–CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS

In this proceeding, Applicant raises four claims, including that he was incompetent to stand trial at the punishment retrial and that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise an issue of his competency to stand trial at the punishment retrial. Applicant does not presently try to satisfy the criteria of Article 11.071, Section 5. Instead, he argues that we should treat this application as an initial writ application because he was also incompetent to have waived his initial writ application. He argues that due process will not countenance such a waiver. I believe that the Court should address that question.

A little over a month ago, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that, at least for purposes of the waiver of federal habeas corpus proceedings stemming from a capital murder conviction and death sentence in state court, a petitioner must be competent to make the waiver. Lopez v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 524 (5th Cir.2015). In 2000, the Fifth Circuit explained, “[A] habeas court must conduct an inquiry into the defendant's mental capacity, either sua sponte or in response to a motion by petitioner's counsel, if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to his competency.” Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 330 (5th Cir.2000). The Fifth Circuit further explained:

the procedures employed must satisfy basic due process concerns. In sum, if the evidence before the district court raises a bona fide issue of petitioner's competency to waive collateral review of a capital conviction and death sentence, the court can afford such petitioner adequate due process by ordering and reviewing a current examination by a qualified medical or mental health expert, allowing the parties to present any other evidence relevant to the question of competency and, on the record and in open court, questioning the

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