Ex parte Gray

• Decision Date: 31 October 1882
• Parties: EX PARTE GRAY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

77 Mo. 160

EX PARTE GRAY.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1882.

Habeas Corpus.

WRIT GRANTED.

J. P. McCaminon, W. D. Hubbard and Edwards & Davison for petitioner.

D. H. McIntyre, Attorney General, for the Warden.

The order of the 18th of December setting aside the judgment regularly made on the 22nd of September previous, at another and different term, was void and of no effect after the term had elapsed at which final judgment was taken; the court possessed no further control or jurisdiction over the case; and the entire proceeding at the November term was coram non judice. Danforth v. Lowe, 53 Mo. 217. There is no error patent of record, and if there be any irregularity, of which there is no pretense, it could not be shown by matters de hors the record. Phillips v. Evans, 64 Mo. 17; Ex parte Kaufman, 73 Mo. 588. The court had unquestionably lost jurisdiction over the person of the prisoner, which by the statute had been transferred to the custody of the warden, and there is no method known to the law by which any process, order or authority of that court could bring the person under the jurisdiction of the court at the time when it is pretended that the judgment of the court was set aside. Neither had the court any jurisdiction of the subject matter.

NORTON, J.

This is a proceeding by habeas corpus, the purpose of which is to procure the release of petitioner from his present imprisonment in the penitentiary. It appears from the petition and return to the writ that petitioner, on the 22d of September, 1882, at a special term of the Greene county circuit court, pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with the crime of grand larceny, and was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for four years, and that he is now in the State's prison under such sentence. It further appears that at the November term, 1882, of said circuit court, petitioner filed his motion to set aside the said judgment sentencing him to imprisonment in the penitentiary, for the reason alleged therein that at the time of said sentence he was under the age of eighteen years. On the hearing of said motion it was made to appear by evidence satisfactory to the court, that the fact alleged therein was true, and thereupon the court set aside and revoked the sentence of September 22nd, 1882, in order that defendant might be sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail as prescribed by section 1666, Revised Statutes, which is as follows: “Whenever any person shall be convicted of a felony committed while under eighteen years of age, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, instead of imprisonment in the penitentiary as provided by...