Ex parte Gurganus
Citation | 603 So.2d 903 |
Parties | Ex parte Danny GURGANUS and Sandra Gurganus. (In re Danny GURGANUS, et al. v. CONTINENTAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.) 1910452. |
Decision Date | 19 June 1992 |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Kenneth Lee Cleveland of Cleveland & Cleveland, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioners.
Michael D. McKibben of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for respondents.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether a writ of mandamus should issue directing the Honorable William J. Wynn, judge of the Jefferson County Circuit Court, to vacate his order striking Danny and Sandra Gurganus's demand for a trial by jury on their claim against Continental American Life Insurance Company ("Continental") for medical benefits, pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 1
It is well settled that a writ of mandamus is proper to compel the granting of a trial by jury, when that right exists, Ex parte Rush, 419 So.2d 1388 (Ala.1982); therefore, resolution of this case depends on whether the Gurganuses are entitled to have a jury hear their claim against Continental--a claim that, as previously noted, is based on the denial of medical benefits allegedly due under an ERISA-regulated plan.
Section 1132(a)(1)(B) provides the sole mechanism by which rights arising under ERISA are enforced in state courts. § 1132(e). That section provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] civil action may be brought ... by a participant or beneficiary ... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." ERISA is silent as to whether a plan participant or beneficiary has a right to a jury trial under this section. See Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 737 (January 1983). The Gurganuses contend, however, that, although there is no statutory grant of a right to trial by jury in actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B), they are entitled under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution to have their claim tried to a jury. Relying on Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959), and its progeny, the Gurganuses argue that their claim is analogous to a common law claim for breach of contract and that a breach of contract claim, being legal in nature, has historically carried with it the right to a trial by jury. Continental takes the position that the Gurganuses' claim is analogous to an equitable claim by the beneficiary of a trust against the trustee for breach of a fiduciary duty. Continental argues that, historically, an action against a trustee to compel performance under the terms of the trust agreement has been tried to the court, not to a jury.
We have not been cited to, and our independent research has failed to discover, a controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court. We note that the Gurganuses' reliance on Haywood v. Russell Corp., 584 So.2d 1291 (Ala.1991), is misplaced. In Haywood, this Court phrased the issue as follows:
"The sole issue presented for our review is whether Haywood's fraud claim, which is based on allegations that Russell interfered with Haywood's right to receive benefits under the company's group disability insurance claim, was preempted by ERISA."
Finding the facts in Haywood virtually indistinguishable from those in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), this Court concluded that Haywood's fraud claim, which was based on allegations that she was entitled under state law to recover compensatory and punitive damages, was preempted by ERISA. However, based on the holding in Ingersoll-Rand, where a unanimous Court held that McLendon's damages claim was cognizable under § 1132(a) upon removal to a federal district court, we reversed the summary judgment for the Russell Corporation and remanded the case to "permit [Haywood] to attempt to state a claim under § 510, ERISA." Stating that the Ingersoll-Rand Court had "[recognized] the possibility of recovery of tort-like damages in ERISA cases," this Court speculated that "this leads inexorably to the right of trial by jury in these ERISA cases." As previously stated, however, it must be kept in mind that state court jurisdiction in ERISA cases is limited to enforcement actions brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Neither Haywood nor Ingersoll-Rand addressed the precise issue that is before us in the present case--whether there is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial under § 1132(a)(1)(B), the statutory basis for the Gurganuses' claim for benefits under ERISA. Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered this issue and held that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial under § 1132(a)(1)(B). In Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of America, 906 F.2d 1525, 1526-27 (11th Cir.1990), the court stated:
See, also, Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir.1990) ( ); Anthony v. Texaco, Inc., 803 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.1986) ( ); Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.1987) ( ). The United States Supreme Court has held that it is the responsibility of the federal courts to construe ERISA and, thereby, to develop a " 'federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated...
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