Ex Parte Hamilton

• Decision Date: 22 December 2006
• Docket Number: 1041750.
• Citation: 970 So.2d 285
• Parties: Ex parte S.K. HAMILTON. (In re Ex parte S.K. Hamilton).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

970 So.2d 285

Ex parte S.K. HAMILTON (In re Ex parte S.K. Hamilton).

1041750.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

December 22, 2006.

Mark S. Nelson, Talladega; and Geroge C. Douglas, Jr., Birmingham, for petitioner.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Kevin C. Newsom, deputy atty. gen., and Stephanie N. Morman, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.

SMITH, Justice.

This petition for a writ of certiorari seeks review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' denial, without an opinion, of S.K. Hamilton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which Hamilton asserted that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

The petitioner, S.K. Hamilton, is a defendant in the Talladega Circuit Court charged with capital murder. Hamilton was arrested on November 13, 2002, and appears, based on the materials before us, to have been held in the Talladega County jail without bond since that date. The relevant dates and events are as follows:

November 12, 2002: A warrant was issued for Hamilton's arrest.

November 13, 2002: Hamilton was arrested and placed in the Talladega County jail.

February 19, 2003: Counsel was appointed to represent Hamilton, and the case was continued by agreement until March 19, 2003.

March 19, 2003: The case-action-summary sheet indicates that the case was continued until August 2003.

May 12, 2003: Hamilton filed, among other things, a motion requesting a preliminary hearing and a motion requesting a speedy trial.

June 18, 2003: A preliminary hearing was held, and Hamilton was bound over to the grand jury for indictment.

September 11, 2003: While awaiting indictment, Hamilton filed a motion requesting dismissal of the charges against him for want of prosecution.

February 18, 2004: Hamilton filed a "renewal" of his motion seeking a dismissal for want of prosecution.

June 29, 2004: Hamilton filed in the trial court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he had not yet been indicted despite the fact that he had been held without bond in the Talladega County jail since his arrest 19 months earlier. Hamilton asserted specifically that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.

August 4, 2004 and August 6, 2004: The trial court conducted hearings on Hamilton's habeas petition. The matter was continued until March 9, 2005.

August 23, 2004: Hamilton was indicted for two counts of capital murder.

October 18, 2004: Hamilton was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court set the case for a "special status" conference on March 9, 2005.

November 15, 2004: Hamilton requested a continuance to prepare additional filings. The trial court allowed Hamilton 30 days in which to file further pleadings, and the case was continued until the next "criminal status call docket" on January 24, 2005.

January 24, 2005: The case was continued until the next "criminal status call docket" on February 23, 2005.

February 23, 2005: The case-action-summary sheet indicates that the case was continued "by agreement" until the next "criminal status call docket" on March 21, 2005.

March 10, 2005: The trial court denied Hamilton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Among other things, the trial court held that the State had not deliberately delayed Hamilton's indictment or trial. The trial court also held that "the delay in [Hamilton's] case is not sufficiently lengthy to be presumptively prejudicial, and it is not therefore necessary for the Court to consider the other [speedy-trial] factors as set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)."

April 20, 2005: Hamilton asserts that on this date the trial court denied his motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's denial of Hamilton's habeas petition.

July 19, 2005: The Court of Criminal Appeals denied, without opinion, Hamilton's habeas petition. Ex parte Hamilton (No. CR-04-1751), 945 So.2d 1105 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (table).

August 2, 2005: The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Hamilton's application for rehearing.

Hamilton then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari.¹ This Court granted the petition to address Hamilton's contention that the no-opinion denial of Hamilton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with several of this Court's decisions setting forth the principles of a defendant's right to a speedy trial.

Standard of Review

Review of Hamilton's petition involves only an issue of law and the application of the law to undisputed facts; therefore our review is de novo. Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d 259, 262 (Ala.2005) ("Walker's case involves only issues of law and the application of the law to the undisputed facts. Thus, our review is de novo.").

Discussion

"An accused's right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Art. I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution, 1901.... [A]n evaluation of an accused's speedy-trial claim requires us to balance the four factors the United States Supreme Court set forth in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)]: `[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of [her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.' 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted)."

Walker, 928 So.2d at 263 (footnotes omitted).

The trial court's order denying Hamilton's habeas petition reveals that, at most, the trial court made findings addressing only two of the four Barker factors in examining Hamilton's speedy-trial claim. First, the trial court's order partially addresses the reason for the delay, the second Barker factor, in that the trial court specifically found "that there was not a deliberate delay by the office of the District Attorney during investigation or by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science relative to testing." Second, the trial court addressed the first Barker factor — the length of the delay — and specifically found that the delay in Hamilton's case "is not sufficiently lengthy to be presumptively prejudicial." The court concluded, therefore, that "it is not necessary ... to consider the other [Barker] factors."

Hamilton contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the delay in Hamilton's case is not "presumptively prejudicial." We agree. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court should have concluded that the delay is presumptively prejudicial and therefore should have examined and balanced the remaining three Barker factors in evaluating Hamilton's speedy-trial claim.

In Walker, this Court noted that the first Barker factor involves a "`double enquiry.'" 928 So.2d at 263 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)). "The first inquiry under this factor is whether the length of the delay is `presumptively prejudicial.'" 928 So.2d at 263.²

"A finding that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial `triggers' an examination of the remaining three Barker factors. 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (`[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, "presumptive prejudice" does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.'). See also Roberson v. State, 864 So.2d 379, 394 (Ala.Crim.App.2002).

"In Alabama, `[t]he length of delay is measured from the date of the indictment or the date of the issuance of an arrest warrant — whichever is earlier — to the date of the trial.' Roberson, 864 So.2d at 394. Cf. § 15-3-7, Ala.Code 1975 (`A prosecution may be commenced within the meaning of this chapter by finding an indictment, the issuing of a warrant or by binding over the offender.'); Rule 2.1, Ala. R.Crim. P. (`All criminal proceedings shall be commenced either by indictment or by complaint.'). The length of the delay in [Walker's] case was approximately 50 months: Walker was indicted on January 14, 2000, and she pleaded guilty on March 25, 2004. See [Ex parte] Carrell, 565 So.2d [104,] 107 [ (Ala.1990) ] (calculating the length of delay from defendant's indictment until his plea of guilty). The State concedes (and both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held) that the 50-month delay in Walker's case was presumptively prejudicial. A finding here of presumptive prejudice is supported by Alabama caselaw, see, e.g., Ex parte Taylor, 720 So.2d 1054, 1057 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (more than 60-month delay); Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 290 (Ala.Crim. App.1997) (42-month delay); Mansel v. State, 716 So.2d 234, 236 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (26-month delay); Ingram v. State, 629 So.2d 800, 802 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State, 455 So.2d 253, 254 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (16-month delay); Broadnax v. State, 455 So.2d 205, 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (more than 26-month delay); but see Ex parte Apicella, 809 So.2d 865, 869 (Ala.2001) (14-month delay not presumptively prejudicial); Campbell v. State, 709 So.2d 1329, 1334 (Ala.Crim. App.1997) (26-month delay not presumptively prejudicial); and by federal cases that generally hold that a delay of approximately one year or more is presumptively prejudicial, see Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (`Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay "presumptively prejudicial" at least as it approaches one year.') (citing 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2, p. 405 (1984); Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 Fordham L.Rev. 611, 623 n. 71 (1980) (citing cases))."

Walker, 928 So.2d at 263-65 (footnotes omitted).

For purposes of this petition, we measure the delay from the date of the issuance of a warrant for Hamilton's arrest, November 12, 2002, until April 20, 2005, which Hamilton asserts is the date the trial court entered its order denying his motion to alter, amend, or vacate its earlier order denying Hamilton's habeas...