Ex parte Haney

Decision Date15 November 1955
Docket NumberNo. 8364,8364
Citation77 Idaho 166,289 P.2d 945
PartiesApplication of Willie HANEY For a Writ of Habeas Corpus to Obtain Bail.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Vernon K. Smith, Boise, for petitioner.

Graydon W. Smith, Atty. Gen., T. J. Jones, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Blaine F. Evans, Pros. Atty., Boise, for respondent.

KEETON, Justice.

Petitioner Willie Haney was taken into custody as a fugitive from justice from Washington by the sheriff of Ada County, July 27, 1955, on an executive warrant issued by the Governor. He is still confined in the Ada County jail. Subsequent to his arrest and imprisonment he filed a petition in the District Court, Ada County, for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Sec. 19-4510, I.C., in which petition he challenged the sufficiency and legality of the proceedings taken which resulted in his arrest and present confinement. He is charged in Washington with second degree burglary, alleged to have been committed on or about July 3, 1955.

At the conclusion of the District Court hearing before the Honorable Merlin S. Young, District Judge, petitioner was ordered remanded to the custody of the sheriff to be delivered and surrendered to an agent of the State of Washington pursuant to the Governor's warrant. From this order petitioner appealed to this Court and made application in the District Court for a certificate of probable cause and filed a motion to be admitted to bail pending appeal. The trial judge issued a certificate of probable cause and stayed further proceedings pending disposition on appeal, but denied bail on the ground that the trial court is without power to admit petitioner to bail pending appeal where the matter involves interstate extradition.

The petition for habeas corpus filed here is pursuant to Sec. 19-4218, I.C., which reads:

'When a person is imprisoned or detained in custody on any criminal charge, for want of bail, such person is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of giving bail, upon averring that fact in his petition, without alleging that he is illegally confined.'

and is for the sole purpose of giving bail. The question now presented is whether petitioner is entitled to give bail pending his appeal and a final determination of the issues.

In support of petitioner's contention that he is entitled to be released on giving sufficient and satisfactory bail pending the appeal, and until the matter presented on appeal has been finally determined by this Court, he cites: Secs. 19-4218, 19-4505, I.C.; Art. 1, Sec. 6, Constitution of Idaho; the 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; Winnick v. Reilly, 100 Conn. 291, 123 A. 440; Farrell v. Hawley, 78 Conn. 150, 61 A. 502, 73 L.R.A. 686; Morgan v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 200, 296 S.W. 312; People ex rel. Meeker v. Baker, 139 App.Div. 471, 124 N.Y.S. 47. See also Ex parte Anderson, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 589, 113 S.W.2d 551, not cited by petitioner.

Conversely, the attorney general and the prosecuting attorney of Ada County, on behalf of the sheriff, contend that Art. 1, Sec. 6, of the Constitution, which in substance provides that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great has no application to persons arrested on a governor's warrant and held in custody as fugitives from justice from another state; and further contend that the provisions relating to criminal proceedings in the state courts have application only to crimes over which the authorities of the State have jurisdiction by virtue of their having been committed in the State of Idaho, and cite numerous authorities in support of the contention, of which In re Amundson, N.D., 19 N.W.2d 918; Waller v. Jordan, Ariz., 118 P.2d 450; State ex rel. Stringer v. Quigg, 91 Fla. 197, 107 So. 409; Ex parte Thompson, 85 N.J.Eq. 221, 96 A. 102; Ex parte Campbell, 147 Neb. 382, 23 N.W.2d 698; State ex rel. Rheinstrom v. Ronald, 106 Wash. 189, 179 P. 843, are illustrative.

22 Am.Jur. 272, Sec. 33, reads:

'A distinction has also been noted between cases of arrest and examination for commitment to await extradition demand and warrant and cases arising on habeas corpus after arrest on executive warrant for extradition, bail being refused in the latter case, if not in the former. Some states have statutes which provide for bail or else strictly deny it in extradition proceedings. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act provides in substance that the prisoner may be admitted to bail unless the offense with which the prisoner is charged is one punishable by death or life imprisonment.'

and 35 C.J.S., Extradition, § 19, p. 347 reads:

'Although bail may be permitted in th discretion of the court where accused is held pending the arrival of a requisition, it is generally the rule, in the absence of contrary statute, that bail may not be given for a prisoner held under warrant of rendition.'

Our Codes, Sec. 19-4515, I.C., provide that where one is charged with being a fugitive from justice that:

'* * * the judge or magistrate must commit him to jail by a warrant reciting the accusation for such a time specified in the warrant as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused give bail as provided in the next section, or until he shall be legally discharged.'

Sec. 19-4516, I.C. relative to bail in extradition proceedings reads:

'Unless the offense with which the prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment under the laws of the state in which it was committed, the judge or magistrate must admit the person arrested to bail by bond or undertaking, with sufficient sureties, and in such sum as he deems proper, for his appearance before him at a time specified in such bond or undertaking, and for his surrender, to be arrested upon the warrant of the governor of this state.'

It will be noted that the above statutory provisions, providing for bail under prescribed conditions, apply to one being a fugitive from justice, before the executive warrant authorizing the arrest and...

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18 cases
  • Vigil v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • April 26, 1977
    ...N.E.2d 589; Rendel v. Mummert, 1970, 106 Ariz. 233, 474 P.2d 824; State v. McLeod, 1957, 131 Mont. 478, 311 P.2d 400; Exparte Haney, 1955, 77 Idaho 166, 289 P.2d 945; State v. Teeter, 1948, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P.2d 657.3 Amendment VIII, United States Constitution, provides:Excessive bail shall......
  • Petition of Upton
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • September 2, 1982
    ...generally recognized their authority to grant bail during habeas corpus challenges to rendition proceedings. See Application of Haney, 77 Idaho 166, 171, 289 P.2d 945 (1955) (relying on State Constitution and statute to allow bail, including bail pending appeal from denial of writ); Ruther ......
  • Beauchamp v. Elrod
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 26, 1985
    ...Carino v. Watson (1976), 171 Conn. 366, 370 A.2d 950; Ruther v. Sweeney (1956), 75 Ohio Abs. 385, 137 N.E.2d 292; Application of Haney (1955), 77 Idaho 166, 289 P.2d 945.) These courts reached their decision by reasoning that because courts have the inherent power to set bail the right to b......
  • State v. J.M.W.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • October 14, 2005
    ...Carino v. Watson (1976), 171 Conn. 366, 370 A.2d 950; Ruther v. Sweeney (1956), 75 Ohio Abs. 385, 137 N.E.2d 292; Application of Haney (1955), 77 Idaho 166, 289 P.2d 945.) These courts reached their decision by reasoning that because courts have the inherent power to set bail the right cont......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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