State v. Quigg
| Decision Date | 23 January 1926 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. STRINGER v. QUIGG, Chief of Police, et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; De Witt T. Gray, Judge.
Habeas corpus proceeding by the State, on the relation of Roy H Stringer, against H. Leslie Quigg, Chief of Police of Miami and another. Judgment dismissing the petition and the relator brings error. After denial of bail by the trial court, the realtor moves for an order fixing terms and conditions of a supersedeas bond, and releasing him from custody on bail, and to stay his removal from the state. After an order denying the motion, a petition was filed for rehearing.
Rehearing denied.
Syllabus by the Court
Extradition proceedings as between nations depend on treaty obligations and as between States on Constitution and statutes (Const U.S. art. 4, § 2; Rev. St. U.S. § 5278 [U. S. Comp. St. § 10126]; Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 6182. amended by Laws 1925, c. 10129). Proceedings in extradition are sui generis, finding their origin and existence, as between different nations, wholly in treaty obligations, and as between the states of this Union, wholly by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and effectuating statutes.
Constitutional provision relating to bail held not to apply in habeas corpus proceedings by person sought to be extradited (Declaration of Rights, § 9). The Declaration of Rights of the State of Flroida, section 9, which provides that 'all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great,' does not apply to one who is charged with an offense under the laws of another state, and who is before the courts of Florida by proceedings in habeas corpus for the sole purpose of determining the lawfulness of his detention under an executive warrant of extradition.
Right of accused to bail should be tested by laws of demanding state. Extradition laws are enacted upon the presumption that the demanding state will accord the fugitive his right to bail, and all other legal rights. After the fugitive has been arrested under executive warrant of extradition, his right to bail should be tested by the laws of the demanding state, where he is charged with crime, and where his guilt or innocence must be judicially determined and not by the laws of the asylum state, which holds him solely for the purpose of rendition.
Constitution and statutes held not to provide for bail in extradition proceeding; authority to admit to bail in extradition proceedings must be found in express provisions of Constitution or statutes, unless courts possess such authority as inherent power. Applicable organic and statutory law now existing makes no provision for bail in the extradition proceeding itself. That the Constitution and statutes of the United States do not forbid bail is not enough, for the authority to admit to bail in such proceedings, like the authority to apprehend, must be found in the express provisions of applicable organic or statutory law, unless courts possess that authority as an inherent power.
Inherent power of state courts, if it exists, to deal with custody of fugitive may be effectually exercised by regulating form and manner of such custody. If it be that state courts, in issuing writs of habeas corpus to test the legality of the custody of the fugitive who is held under an executive warrant of extradition, posses inherent power, independent of statutes, to deal with the custody of the fugitive after executive warrant has issued, such power, when exerted, may be effectually exercised by regulating the form and manner of the custody of the prisoner, as distinguished from releasing him from custody on bail.
Courts of asylum state may inquire within recognized limits into legality of detention of accused. The courts of the asylum state may inquire, within recognized limits, into the legality of the detention of a prisoner who is held upon an executive warrant of extradition.
After service of writ of habeas corpus in extradition proceedings, his custody is under control and direction of court before which habeas corpus is pending. After the service of a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of the detention of a fugitive under an executive warrant of extradition, the prisoner is then detained, not be the extradition process, but by authority of the writ of habeas corpus, and his custody is entirely under the control and direction of the court before which the writ of habeas corpus is pending.
On habeas corpus to test legality of detention under executive warrant of extradition, writ of error transfers cause and custody of accused to appellate court; on writ of error in habeas corpus proceedings to test legality of detention under executive warrant of extradition, removal of accused from asylum state is stayed pending final determination (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 3580). In habeas corpus proceedings brought to test the legality of detention of a fugitive under an executive warrant of extradition a properly perfected writ of error to the judgment or final order of the lower court remanding the fugitive to custody operates to transfer the cause to the appellate court. The writ of habeas corpus then continues in effect as the sole process under which the prisoner is held; the custody of the prisoner passes to the control and direction of the appellate court; and his removal from the asylum state is thereby stayed pending final determination of the writ of habeas corpus on writ of error.
Bart A. Riley, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., for defendants in error.
Plaintiff in error, hereinafter called the petitioner, was arrested by authority of a warrant of extradition issued by the Governor of Florida upon demand of the Governor of Minnesota. Shortly after his arrest, petitioner sued our a writ of habeas corpus, in support of which he contends that his arrest and detention are unlawful because he has not had a hearing before the Governor either prior or subsequent to the issuance of the warrant of extradition, to which hearing petitioner contends he is entitled, even after the executive warrant of extradition has issued.
The circuit judge before whom the writ of habeas corpus was returnable, upon hearing, dismissed the petition. Writ of error was allowed, but petitioner's application for the fixing of a supersedeas bond was denied by the judge of the circuit court, and petitioner was remanded to custody. The cause came before this court upon a transcript of the record, accompanied by a motion for an order fixing the terms and conditions of a supersedeas bond and releasing petitioner from custody pending determination of the writ of error. The purpose of the motion is to secure the enlargement of the prisoner upon bail pending determination of the writ of error, and meanwhile to stay his removal from the state of Florida. An order has been heretofore entered denying the motion, and the matter now comes before us upon petition for rehearing.
We will first consider whether petitioner is entitled to be enlarged upon bail pending the determination of the writ of error here.
If the authority to grant bail in such cases exists, it must arise either by virtue of the Constitution or laws of the United States the Constitution or laws of Florida, or from inherent authority in the courts independent of the express provisions of organic or statutory law.
No right to bail exists at common law in favor of one held in custody under a warrant of extradition, because extradition is not a proceeding according to the course of the common law. Proceedings in extradition are sui generis, finding their origin and existence, as between different nations, wholly in treaty obligations, and as between the states of the Union wholly by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and effectuating statutes. The Constitution of the United States, art. 4, § 2, provides:
'A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.'
The Act of Congress of February 12, 1793, re-enacted as section 5278, U.S. Rev. Gen. Stat. (Comp. Stat. § 10126) provides:
* * *'
The Florida statute, section 6182, Rev. Gen. Stat. 1920, chapter 10129, Laws of 1925, provides:
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...in custody for the purpose stated in such warrant. 2 Moore on Extradition, §§ 621, 622; State v. Chase (Fla.) 107 So. 541; State v. Quigg (Fla.) 107 So. 409; Ex Powell, 20 Fla. 806; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 25 S.Ct. 282, 49 L.Ed. 515; Hyatt v. People, 188 U.S. 691, 23 S.Ct. 456, 47 L......
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