Ex parte Harrington
| Decision Date | 26 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | 288.,No. AP-76,AP-76 |
| Parties | Ex parte Alan Eugene HARRINGTON, Applicant. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Brian Roark, Austin, for Appellant.
Philip L. Hall, Crim. Dist. Atty., Bastrop, Jeffrey L. VanHorn, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
The issue in this case is whether post-conviction habeas-corpus relief is available under Article 11.071 if an applicant has discharged his sentence, but continues to suffer collateral consequences arising from the conviction. We hold that it is.
In this case, applicant contends that habeas corpus lies because his plea was involuntary due to counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to investigate a prior DWI conviction used to enhance applicant's misdemeanor DWI charge to a felony charge.2 He claims that he is confined as a result of his conviction and is thus entitled to habeas relief. We find that because applicant currently suffers collateral consequences arising from his conviction, he is "confined" for the purpose of seeking habeas relief under article 11.07. We also adopt the trial judge's Agreed Findings of Fact (which are supported by the record) and his recommendation to grant relief on applicant's involuntary-plea claim.
Applicant was arrested in Bastrop County for DWI in February 2006 and was indicted for Felony DWI.3 The indictment listed two prior DWI convictions as reflected in applicant's criminal-history report for the purpose of enhancement: the first, in Austin County in 1986; the second, in Travis County in 2003. In May 2006, upon the advice of his attorney, applicant pleaded guilty to the felony DWI and received probation. Applicant's probation was later revoked, and he was sentenced to two years in prison and a $2,500 fine.
Prior to entering his guilty plea, applicant told his appointed attorney that the 1986 conviction did not belong to him and was mistakenly listed on his criminal-history report. The conviction actually belonged to Jesse Armistead, a man who had dated applicant's sister and had stolen applicant's driver's license. Armistead was arrested for DWI, presented applicant's driver's license and identified himself as applicant to police. He was convicted of DWI under applicant's name.4 Although applicant had given his attorney this information, that attorney failed to investigate the prior conviction and advised applicant to plead guilty to the felony DWI. According to applicant, his attorney told him "that the District Attorney would just refile the case and that he would be found guilty anyway." Applicant followed his attorney's mistaken advice. Seven days later, the Austin County Criminal District Attorney sent applicant a letter confirming applicant's version of the 1986 DWI.5
In July 2008, the Austin Police Department conducted a fingerprint analysis, which confirmed that applicant was not the person attached to the 1986 conviction. In 2009, applicant filed a habeas-corpus application under article 11.07, seeking relief from the 2006 conviction. He contended that his plea was not voluntary because it was the fruit of ineffective assistance of counsel. We remanded this case to the trial court to determine (1) if applicant had discharged his sentence; and (2) whether he was suffering any specific collateral consequences as a result of the 2006 conviction. After an evidentiary hearing, and with the agreement of the State, the trial court entered its findings and conclusions, including the following:
In sum, the trial court found, and the record supports, that applicant lost his long-time job with the Texas Workforce Commission as a result of his felony conviction. He testified that he attempted to find new employment at the University of Texas in the Information Technology field, but once he admitted that he had a felony DWI conviction, he was not allowed to continue with the application process. He is currently a construction worker. Applicant also testified that, if the 2006 felony conviction remains on his record, he will continue to be prevented from obtaining other jobs for which he would otherwise be qualified. The trial judge further found that applicant was wrongfully convicted of felony DWI and recommended setting the conviction aside. The State agreed that applicant was entitled to relief.
Under Article 11.07, a person who files a habeas-corpus application for relief from a final felony conviction must challenge either the fact or length of confinement.6 In this case, the question is whether a person who has discharged his sentence prior to filing an application, but who continues to suffer collateral consequences arising from the challenged conviction, is entitled to seek post-conviction habeas relief under Article 11.07.
Article 11.07, which sets forth the procedure for non-death-penalty felony cases, provides that "it shall be the duty of the convicting court to decide whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant's confinement."7 Prior to 1995, the statute did not define "confinement." In 1987, this Court held, in Ex parte Renier, that an applicant who alleges only that he is under "restraint," but who is not "in custody" at the time of filing, is precluded from seeking relief under Article 11.07.8 We concluded that, "unless an applicant is confined pursuant to a commitment for a felony conviction, a postconviction application for habeas corpus relief from collateral consequences of another conviction will not lie under Article 11.07."9
But in 1995, the statute was amended to eliminate Ex parte Renier's construction of "confinement" as requiring literal confinement.10 Article 11.07, § 3(c), now explicitly provides that "confinement means confinement for any offense or any collateral consequence resulting from the conviction that is the basis of the instant habeas corpus."11 Thus, a showing of a collateral consequence, without more, is now sufficient to establish "confinement" so as to trigger application of art. 11.07. That an applicant is not in the actual physical custody of the government at the time of filing does not preclude his application nor deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider it.12
The trial judge is the original factfinder in habeas corpus proceedings.13 Although this Court is the ultimate factfinder, "in most circumstances, we will defer to and accept a trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law when they are supported by the record."14 We similarly defer to any implied findings and conclusions supported by the record.15
The trial judge found that applicant suffers current and potential future consequences arising from his 2006 conviction, including the loss of his job and other suitable employment opportunities; loss of his right to run for public office; loss of his right to possess firearms; enhanced penalties for any future convictions; and potential impeachment of his credibility in future judicial hearings. The record supports the trial judge's findings concerning the adverse consequences to applicant's present and future employment opportunities. We agree with the trial judge's finding that applicant is "confined" for purposes of article 11.07.16 Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claim.
Applicant argues that his plea was involuntary because of unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.17 He claims that, but for his attorney's failure to investigate the alleged prior convictions used to enhance the offense, he would not have pleaded guilty to the felony charge.
A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in guilty-plea proceedings.18 To obtain habeas-corpus relief for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, an applicant must show that his counsel's performance was unconstitutionally deficient and "that there is a `reasonable probability'—one sufficient to undermine confidence in the result—that the outcome would have been different but for his counsel's deficient performance."19 Specifically, when a person "challenges the validity of a plea entered upon the advice of counsel, contending that his counsel was ineffective, `the voluntariness of the plea depends on (1) whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and if not, (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counse...
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