Ex Parte Healthsouth Corp.
Decision Date | 24 August 2007 |
Docket Number | 1060296. |
Citation | 978 So.2d 745 |
Parties | Ex parte HEALTHSOUTH CORPORATION. In re HealthSouth Corporation v. Jefferson County Tax Assessor, Dan Weinrib, and Jefferson County Tax Collector, J.T. Smallwood. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Joseph B. Mays, Jr., Bruce P. Ely, and Marc James Ayers of Bradley Arant Rose & White, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner.
Charles S. Wagner, asst. county atty., Birmingham, for respondents.
Troy King, atty. gen., Kevin Newsom, deputy atty. gen., and G. Ward Beeson III, asst. Atty. gen., for amicus curiae State of Alabama, in support of the respondents.
On Application for Rehearing
The opinion of May 4, 2007, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.
HealthSouth Corporation appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Probate Court in favor of Dan Weinrib, the Jefferson County tax assessor, and J.T. Smallwood, the Jefferson County tax collector ("the taxing authorities"). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the probate court. HealthSouth Corp. v. Jefferson County Tax Assessor, 978 So.2d 737 (Ala. Civ.App.2006). HealthSouth then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, and we granted HealthSouth's petition to review two issues presented by this case. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
For the tax years 2001, 2002, and 2003, HealthSouth submitted personal-property tax returns to the Jefferson County tax assessor on which it intentionally listed numerous fictitious items of personal property and assigned fabricated values to those items.1 HealthSouth paid taxes for the years 2001 and 2002 based on the submitted returns. Before paying the amount due for 2003, however, HealthSouth amended its tax return for that year to remove the fictitious assets. The Jefferson County tax assessor allowed the adjustment as to 2003. HealthSouth then amended its 2001 and 2002 returns and filed petitions for a refund of the portion of ad valorem personal-property taxes it claims it overpaid as a result of listing the fictitious items of personal property on its tax returns for 2001 and 2002. The Jefferson County tax collector requested an opinion from the attorney general, who determined that no refund was due. The tax collector then denied the petitions for a refund of the taxes HealthSouth had paid for 2001 and 2002 on the fictitious property.
HealthSouth filed an action in the Jefferson Probate Court challenging the tax collector's refusal to grant its petitions for the refund of ad valorem taxes paid on personal property for the years 2001 and 2002. When the probate court denied the petitions for refund, HealthSouth appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment of the probate court. The Court of Civil Appeals held that § 40-10-160, Ala.Code 1975, providing for tax refunds based upon a mistake or an error, did not permit a refund when the taxpayer's overpayment resulted from the taxpayer's intentionally false statements as to the value of nonexistent assets. The Court of Civil Appeals further held that "HealthSouth's violation of its duty to provide correct and truthful information on its tax returns did not abrogate the tax assessor's authority to affix values for assessment purposes to the property listed on HealthSouth's tax returns." 978 So.2d at 744. This Court granted certiorari to consider two questions of first impression: whether the term "error" has a meaning different from the term "mistake," specifically whether the former term is broad enough to encompass intentional dishonest conduct; and whether an intentional misrepresentation by a taxpayer in reporting property on a tax return can create a right in the taxing authorities to collect and retain taxes on nonexistent property so that no refund of taxes collected because of such an error can be had under § 40-10-160, Ala.Code 1975.
Section 40-10-160 provides:
"Any taxpayer who through any mistake, or by reason of any double assessment, or by any error in the assessment or collection of taxes, or other error, has paid taxes that were not due upon the property of such taxpayer shall be entitled, upon making proof of such payment to the satisfaction of the Comptroller, to have such taxes refunded to him if application shall be made therefor, as hereinafter provided, within two years from the date of such payment."
(Emphasis added.)
This Court's decision to grant HealthSouth's petition for the writ of certiorari was triggered by the pivotal issue of the significance, if any, of the legislature's choice of two words—"error" and "mistake"—in its refund statute and its linking those words with the disjunctive conjunction "or." The parties have wrestled mightily with parsed definitions from various sources that might afford a separate field of operation for each term. Of course, HealthSouth contends that "error" can embrace an intentional act and therefore that its fraudulent inclusion on its personal-property tax returns of assets that did not exist constitutes the type of activity for which it is entitled to relief pursuant to § 40-10-160 in the form of a refund of taxes paid. HealthSouth does not contend that "mistake" embraces its activities. The taxing authorities,2 on the other hand, argue that neither "error" nor "mistake" includes deliberate, intentional acts of the character committed by HealthSouth.
The Court of Civil Appeals, after citing definitions for each word, concluded:
"Although HealthSouth may be correct that the plain meaning of the word `mistake' is slightly different from the plain meaning of the word `error,' we are clear to the conclusion that an intentional misrepresentation is not included in the plain meaning of either word."
We conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals was correct. While nuanced definitions of the two words could considerably lengthen this opinion, there is ample authority for the proposition that neither "error" nor "mistake" contemplates dishonest activity. This Court considered the significance of a legislative choice of "clerical error" and "other mistake of the clerk" in Ford v. Tinchant & Brother, 49 Ala. 567, 571 (1873). Although the Ford Court concluded that each of the terms had a separate field of operation, a limitation in its holding is significant to the issue in this case. This Court in Ford stated:
"The legislature cannot be held to have been so careless of language, as to have used the expressions `clerical error,' and `other mistake of the clerk,' in exactly synonymous sense, in view of the liability to mistake in the entries and record of causes; or to have excluded from amendment the manifest oversights and inaccuracies of the counsel, not calculated to mislead, in permitting the correction of `any error in fact in the process.'"
(Emphasis added.) Thus, in Ford this Court qualified the field of operation of "clerical error" and "other mistake of the clerk" by embracing only conduct that was "not calculated to mislead."
In Alabama & Georgia Lumber Co. v. Tisdale, 139 Ala. 250, 36 So. 618 (1903), the amount of the judgment enforcing a mechanic's lien was less than the amount that had previously been claimed in the statement of lien filed in the office of judge of probate. The validity of the lien was challenged on the basis of the discrepancy. The applicable statute provided: "[N]o error in the amount of the demand or in the name of the owner or proprietor shall affect the lien...." 139 Ala. at 255, 36 So. at 619. The Court observed:
139 Ala. at 256-57, 36 So. at 620. Later, in Fleming v. McDade, 207 Ala. 650, 651, 93 So. 618, 619 (1922), this Court was required to resolve the question left unanswered in Alabama & Georgia Lumber Co. This Court stated:
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