Ex Parte Heffron

• Decision Date: 31 December 1913
• Citation: 179 Mo. App. 639,162 S.W. 652
• Parties: Ex parte HEFFRON et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

162 S.W. 652

179 Mo. App. 639

Ex parte HEFFRON et al.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 31, 1913.

Rehearing Denied January 20, 1914.

1. INJUNCTION (§ 101) — SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION —INJURY TO TRADE OR BUSINESS.

A number of persons confederated together in combination, as through a conspiracy, may be restrained from interfering with the business of another so as to entail a substantial injury upon him, as by persuading his patrons, against their will, or by violence or threats preventing them from having beneficial business intercourse with the person against whom the unlawful conspiracy is directed.

2. HABEAS CORPUS (§ 94) — SCOPE OF INQUIRY.

While the circuit court had jurisdiction of a suit in equity for injunctive relief against an unlawful conspiracy such as a boycott, and while all necessary presumptions are indulged in favor of the proceedings of such court when it has jurisdiction, and while a habeas corpus proceeding by persons committed for contempt in violating a temporary injunction was a collateral attack on the judgment adjudging them guilty of contempt, the question of the court's jurisdiction to make the particular judgment would nevertheless be reviewed.

3. HABEAS CORPUS (§ 94)—SCOPE OF REVIEW — COMMITMENT — REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY.

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 2472, relative to habeas corpus directing the court to remand the petitioner when restrained for any contempt, specially and plainly charged in the commitment, and section 3884, providing that, when any person shall be committed for any contempt specified in that chapter, the particular circumstances of the offense shall be set forth in the order or warrant of commitment, in a habeas corpus proceeding by persons committed for violating an injunction, whether the court had jurisdiction to make the commitment must be determined from the commitment itself, which is conclusively presumed to set forth the facts on which it rest, and no presumptions nor intendments

will be indulged to aid the commitment, since section 3884 applies to civil contempts, which are provided for in that chapter, and which are regarded as criminal so far as the judgment and process of commitment are concerned.

4. HABEAS CORPUS (§ 27)—PROCEEDINGS REVIEWABLE —COMMITMENTS FOR CONTEMPT.

One imprisoned as for contempt for violating an order which the court had no authority to make may be released on habeas corpus.

5. INJUNCTION (§ 101) — SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION —INJURY TO TRADE OR BUSINESS.

An injunction restraining striking employés from, singly or in numbers, stationing themselves or congregating upon the sidewalk adjoining and in front of the employer's place of business for the purpose of distributing cards or circulars, or of addressing remarks concerning the employer or its business to persons passing along the sidewalk, was beyond the power of the court, since it could not restrain parties from so using the sidewalk, unless they did so with a view of interfering with the employer's business, its employés or patrons, through threats, violence, intimidation, or by persuading persons desiring to patronize the employer to desist therefrom against their will, or unless the free ingress or egress were thereby impeded.

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 671) — OBSTRUCTING SIDEWALK — NUISANCES — REMEDIES OF PRIVATE PERSONS.

While an obstruction or interference with the free use of sidewalks is a public nuisance, an abutting proprietor cannot restrain such nuisance, unless he suffers damages peculiar to him, different in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by other members of the public.

7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 671) — OBSTRUCTING SIDEWALK — REMEDIES OF PRIVATE PERSONS.

The proprietor or occupant of a building abutting on a street may enjoin others from so using the sidewalk as to prevent free ingress and egress to and from the building, since, though the obstruction of the street constitutes a public nuisance, it also involves a private nuisance inflicting a peculiar injury on him, different in kind and not merely in degree from that sustained by the members of the community at large.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 90)—FREEDOM OF SPEECH—INJURY TO TRADE OR BUSINESS.

Striking employés could not be enjoined from distributing cards or circulars or addressing remarks concerning the employer's business to persons passing along the sidewalk near its place of business, at least where it did not appear that such cards, circulars, and remarks were detrimental in character and used to injure the employer's business, since the constitutional provision assuring the right of free speech implies that the right is to be enjoyed by every citizen subject only to his liability in damages for its abuse.

9. INJUNCTION (§ 204) — ORDER OR WRIT— CERTAINTY—INJURY TO TRADE OR BUSINESS —"PATROLLING."

An injunction restraining striking employés either singly or in numbers from patrolling the sidewalk adjoining the employer's place of business was too vague and indefinite, since, while "patrolling" involves the idea of walking to and fro as a guard, it in and of itself implies nothing unlawful.

10. INJUNCTION (§ 101) — SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION —INJURY TO TRADE OR BUSINESS.

Striking employés were properly enjoined from preventing or attempting to prevent persons from patronizing the employer's place of business by force, violence, threats, menaces, or intimidation, and from compelling or attempting to compel other employés to fail to perform their duties by threats, intimidation, force, or violence.

11. INJUNCTION (§ 230) — VIOLATION — COMMITMENT —REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY.

Where an injunction restrained striking employés from assaulting or exercising violence on any person patronizing the employer's place of business or any of its employés, a judgment and commitment for contempt, stating that an employé committed an assault upon P. within a short time after he had left the employer's place of business, and that the assault was unprovoked and in violation of the injunction, without any finding that P. was a patron or employé of the employer, failed to show a violation of the injunction; the statement that it was a violation being a conclusion.

Original habeas corpus proceeding by William H. Heffron and others. Petitioners discharged.

This is an original proceeding instituted in this court through suing out a writ of habeas corpus. There are three of the petitioners who invoke the writ, viz., William H. Heffron, George Ringler, and Oscar Close. Though it does not fully appear, it is to be inferred that these petitioners, with a number of others, were defendants in an injunction suit instituted by the St. Louis Catering Company against Hubert C. Wade and others in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis with a view of restraining them from levying and pursuing a boycott against the plaintiff catering company and its business. However, a boycott involves the idea of a conspiracy and unlawful confederation on the part of several to injure the business of another, and nothing of that kind appears on the record before us, unless it is to be presumed that the circuit court gave judgment sustaining the injunction on that ground.

It is to be inferred from the record that the petitioners are waiters and members of a waiters' union, and it may be that they had a grievance against the catering company, but this does not fully appear from the judgment and commitment under which they are restrained of their liberty. It appears the three petitioners, together with a number of others, were charged with contempt for having violated a restraining order against them. On a hearing of the charge of contempt after notice, the court found a number of the defendants not guilty of the charge, but entered a judgment of contempt against the three petitioners and one Hooper. By this judgment a fine was assessed against each, and they were committed to jail for its nonpayment. Hooper's fine was afterwards paid and he was, therefore, discharged. The three petitioners, Heffron, Ringler, and Close, after having been confined in jail several days, sued out the writ of habeas corpus involved here. The jailer of the city of St. Louis, in making his return to the writ, exhibits the commitment, which purports to be a copy of the judgment under which the petitioners are confined in jail. Such commitment, revealing a certified copy of the judgment, is as follows:

"State of Missouri, City of St. Louis—ss.:

"To the Sheriff of the City of St. Louis, Greetings:

"Whereas, on the tenth day of November, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirteen, at our circuit court in the city of St. Louis and state of Missouri, before Honorable J. Hugo Grimm, one of the judges sitting in division No. 1 thereof, William H. Heffron, George Ringler, Thomas Hooper, and Oscar Close were convicted of contempt of court as more fully appears from the judgment thereof and made a part of this commitment, entered in Record 270, at page 352, in words and figures as follows, to wit:

                         "`Monday, November 10th, 1913
                

"`St. Louis Catering Company, a Corporation, vs. Hubert C. Wade et al. 86496-A.

"`Now, at this day the citation for contempt heretofore issued in the above-entitled cause against defendants Hubert C. Wade, Thomas Hooper, C. J. Griffin, George Ringler, John B. Carpenter, John T. Green, James Scully, William Heffron, James Furlong, Herman Ball, John Kroeger, Vincent Hagan, Oscar Close, Frank Bush, James Allen, and Frank Murray, coming on to be heard, comes the plaintiff by its attorney, come also all of the respondents excepting respondents C. J. Griffin, John Kroeger, and Frank Murray, by their respective attorneys, and submit this matter to the court upon the pleadings, the evidence, and the proof adduced; and the court, having heard and duly considered the same, and being fully advised in the premises, doth find that on September 12, 1913, an order to show cause and temporary restraining...