Ex parte Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 6 Div. 357.
Decision Date | 21 January 1947 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 357. |
Citation | 28 So.2d 808,32 Ala.App. 609 |
Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Parties | Ex parte INGALLS SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION. |
London & Yancey, of Birmingham, for petitioner.
Dryer & Dryer, of Birmingham, for respondent.
On February 22, 1946, J. H. Cahela, a former employee of the Ingall Shipbuilding Corporation (which we will denote herein as the corporation), agreed with the latter on the terms of a settlement of a claim for compensation on account of an alleged personal injury. The papers were duly prepared and presented to Honorable C. B. Smith, Judge of the Circuit Court, who on the date just indicated approved the settlement agreement. Title 26, Sec. 278, Code 1940.
On March 22, 1946, Mr. Cahela filed a petition addressed 'To The Honorable Judges of said Court' in which he prayed that the former order entered by Judge Smith be set aside and vacated. In this original petition and amendments thereto it is claimed that fraud was practiced on petitioner by an agent of the corporation, and without aid of advice of counsel he relied upon said misrepresentations and was induced to and did enter into the settlement agreement.
Considerable oral testimony was taken on the hearing on the petition, and at the conclusion thereof Judge Smith vacated and set aside his former approval order.
On August 8, 1946, the corporation filed in this court a petition for writ of mandamus to Honorable C. B. Smith. Appropriate remedy was invoked. Burger-Phillips Co. v Phillips, 234 Ala. 563, 176 So. 181; Sovereign Camp W. O. W., v. Gay, 20 Ala.App. 531, 104 So. 899. Rule nisi was issued and made returnable to this court on October 29, 1946. Respondent made answer in response thereto. We will set it out in full.
'Now comes C. B. Smith, as Judge of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, at Birmingham, Alabama, and in answer to the alternative Writ of Mandamus, heretofore issued by the Honorable Court of Appeals of the State of Alabama, directing him to show cause in said Honorable Court why the Writ of Mandamus should not issue as prayed in the above styled cause and says:
'As the record before this Honorable Court contains no copy of the petition or motion to reopen this cause and grant a new trial or any of the amendments thereto, I believe that this Honorable Court will presume that there were sufficient allegations in the original motion and in the amendments thereto to warrant my action in granting a new trial in this case. It is further my opinion that the court will also presume that all amendments to the original motion were germane.
'In spite of this I desire to state to this Honorable Court my reasons for setting aside this settlement and granting a new trial to this employee.
'In reaching a conclusion in this case, I took into consideration the fact that there is a wide difference between motions for a new trial filed within thirty days and those filed under the four months statute, or under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Title 26, Section 278, Code of 1940) wherein a settlement may be vacated for fraud, undue influence, or coercion, within six months after the date of settlement, and I was governed in making this distinction by the opinion rendered by this Honorable Court in Reese & Reese v. Burton & Watson Undertaking Co., 28 Ala.App. 384, 184 So. 820, 824 in which the following statements are made:
'I was reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the plaintiff, J. H. Cahela, suffered substantial disability as a result of his injury while employed by Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation on or about September 15, 1944, at which time he fell fifteen to eighteen feet and landed on his back on the bottom of a steel barge. I was further reasonably satisfied by the testimony that the employer furnished medical treatment, not merely examinations for the information of the employer, over a long period of time continuing as late as July or August, 1945, which, being a part of the compensation provided by the Act, tolled the running of the Statute of Limitation contained in the Act.
'I was further reasonably satisfied by the evidence that the said J. H. Cahela was lulled into a sense of security, as if the employer's representative had said to him, 'We are taking care of your medical expense and treatment, and as soon as the doctors determine your disability, we will pay whatever compensation is due.' After these tactics had continued until the expiration of more than one year from the date of the injury, which the employer fixes as the 31st day of October, 1944, the said J. H. Cahela was then induced to accept a settlement for $400.00 (the Settlement Petition reciting that the claim was barred by the Statute of Limitation) whereas previous discussions of settlement were at figures as high as $1000.00. I approved the settlement believing his claim was barred by the Statute of Limitation. Had I known all the circumstances, I would not have approved the settlement made on February 22, 1946.
We give this answer a prominent place in the opinion for, if it is not controverted, Title 7, Sec. 1073, Code 1940, its contents must be considered as true. Ex parte Schoel, 205 Ala. 248, 87 So. 801; Ex parte Apperson, 217 Ala. 176, 115 So. 226.
On the required date the attorneys representing the parties appeared in person before this court. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for petitioner stated that the petition for mandamus theretofore presented was not supported by a duly authenticated transcript of all the procedure in said cause and in order to supply the deficiency he was at that time filing amendment thereto. The record indicates this was done.
This court, through its presiding judge, suggested that the matter be passed to November 26, 1946, at which time the regular call of the Sixth Division would be had. The minutes of the court carry this order. On the last-named date the attorneys again came before the court and, before argument, attorney for respondent filed a motion to strike the record and the proposed amendment thereto on the principal ground that the petition was not supported by a complete and authenticated record of the proceedings in the trial court.
Our examination of the record, as amended, brings us to the conclusion that the petition is now supported by a properly authenticated transcript of the proceedings below, which is sufficiently complete to enable us to give...
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