Wainwright ex rel. Sterne Agee Grp., Inc. v. Holbrook (In re Sanderson)
Decision Date | 09 February 2018 |
Docket Number | 1160832,1160824 |
Citation | 263 So.3d 681 |
Parties | EX PARTE Jon S. SANDERSON et al. (In re: Harold L. Wainwright, derivatively on behalf of Sterne Agee Group, Inc. v. James S. Holbrook, Jr., et al.) James S. Holbrook, Jr., and William K. Holbrook v. Harold Lowell Wainwright, derivatively on behalf of Sterne Agee Group, Inc. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Ed R. Haden, Lee H. Zell, Will Hill Tankersley, and Michael P. Taunton of Balch & Bingham LLP, Birmingham, for petitioners Jon S. Sanderson, Eric B. Needleman, Sal A. Nunziata, Robert G. Nunziata, Walter S. Robertson III, Walter A. Ruch III, Henry S. Lynn, Jr., Linda M. Daniel, Jay W. Carter, and Joe R. Roberts, Jr.
Bruce L. Gordon and John G. Dana of Gordon, Dana & Gilmore, LLC, Birmingham, for appellants James S. Holbrook, Jr., and William K. Holbrook.
Thomas E. Baddley, Jr., Jeffrey P. Mauro, and John Parker Yates of Baddley, Mauro & Yates, LLC, Birmingham; and Andrew P. Campbell, Stephen D. Wadsworth, and Yawanna McDonald of Campbell, Guin, LLC, Birmingham, for respondent/appellee Harold L. Wainwright.
Carole G. Miller and Matthew I. Penfield of Bressler, Amery & Ross, PC, Birmingham, for respondent Sterne Agee, LLC.
Marc James Ayers, David G. Hymer, and Tiffany J. deGruy of Bradley, Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, for respondents Stifel Financial Corp. and Saban Successor Subsidiary, LLC.
James S. Holbrook, Jr., and William K. Holbrook ("the Holbrooks") filed a notice of appeal from a postjudgment order of the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") that reinstated Harold Lowell Wainwright's claims against them, which the trial court had previously disposed of by granting the Holbrooks' motion to dismiss as to certain claims and their motion for a summary judgment as to others. Jon S. Sanderson; Eric B. Needleman; Sal A. Nunziata; Robert G. Nunziata; Walter S. Robertson III; Walter A. Ruch III; Henry S. Lynn, Jr.; Linda M. Daniel; Jay W. Carter; and Joe R. Roberts, Jr. ("the non-Holbrook directors"), who are codefendants with the Holbrooks in Wainwright's action, petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its postjudgment order that reinstated Wainwright's claims against them, which the trial court had previously disposed of by entering a summary judgment for the non-Holbrook directors.
On July 2, 2014, Traci Salinas and Sharon Lee Stark, as shareholders of Sterne Agee Group, Inc. ("SAG"), a Delaware corporation, filed a shareholder-derivative action, on behalf of nominal defendant SAG, against the Holbrooks and the non-Holbrook directors, who together composed the SAG board of directors. Salinas and Stark alleged that the Holbrooks had breached their fiduciary duty to the SAG shareholders by misusing, misappropriating, and wasting corporate assets and that the non-Holbrook directors had knowledge of, and had acquiesced in, the Holbrooks' alleged misconduct.
On March 31, 2015, Wainwright, then a SAG shareholder, executed the release agreement and received in exchange for his shares of SAG stock $281,573.22 in cash and 18,994 shares of Stifel common stock, which were valued in the aggregate at approximately $1.09 million. The merger was completed on June 5, 2015. Approximately three months later, Salinas and Stark amended their complaint to add Wainwright as a plaintiff and to dismiss Stark as a plaintiff.
On September 4, 2015, the Holbrooks filed a motion for a summary judgment in which they argued that, under Delaware law, when a plaintiff in a shareholder-derivative action ceases to be a shareholder of the corporation on whose behalf the action was brought, the shareholder is divested of standing to continue prosecuting the derivative action. Thus, the Holbrooks argued, because Salinas and Wainwright were no longer SAG shareholders following the merger, they lacked standing to prosecute their derivative action and, the argument continued, the Holbrooks were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In response, Salinas and Wainwright amended the complaint to allege that the Holbrooks' and the non-Holbrook directors' alleged misconduct asserted in the original complaint constituted "a snowballing pattern of fraudulent conduct" that allegedly forced the sale of SAG "at a significantly depressed value" in an allegedly fraudulent attempt "to cover massive wrongdoing." Salinas and Wainwright argued that a merger "cannot absolve fiduciaries from accountability for fraudulent conduct that necessitated the merger." Rather, they maintained, "such conduct gives rise to a direct claim that survives the merger, as the injury caused by such misconduct is suffered by the shareholders rather than the corporation, and thereby supports a direct cause of action." (Emphasis added.) Thus, given their allegations of fraud, Salinas and Wainwright asserted, in addition to the original derivative claims, direct claims of breach of a fiduciary duty; negligence; and intentional, reckless, and innocent misrepresentation and suppression. Subsequently, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal in which they dismissed Salinas from the action, leaving Wainwright as the sole plaintiff.
The Holbrooks filed a motion to dismiss Wainwright's amended complaint in which they asserted that Wainwright's direct claims were actually derivative claims, regardless of how Wainwright labeled them, and that, as such, the claims were due to be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the Holbrooks' motion for a summary judgment. Subsequently, the non-Holbrook directors filed a motion for a summary judgment in which they asserted the release agreement executed by Wainwright as a defense to Wainwright's claims, whether derivative or direct. Thereafter, the Holbrooks supplemented their motion to dismiss to assert the release agreement as a bar to Wainwright's claims.
In response to the Holbrooks' motion to dismiss and the non-Holbrook directors' motion for a summary judgment, Wainwright argued that the release agreement was unenforceable because, he said, it had been procured by fraud in that, he said, the Holbrooks and the non-Holbrook directors failed to make adequate disclosures regarding material terms of the merger. Wainwright further argued that the release agreement was unenforceable because, he said, it was not supported by consideration. Although Wainwright undisputedly received merger consideration, he argued that the merger consideration he received could not constitute consideration for the release agreement. According to Wainwright, payment for his shares of SAG stock was a preexisting duty owed to SAG shareholders by virtue of the merger, and, thus, Wainwright contended, Delaware law precluded SAG from conditioning payment for his shares of SAG stock upon an additional obligation, i.e., the execution of the release agreement.
On January 6, 2017, Judge Peyton C. Thetford entered a judgment ("the January judgment") dismissing Wainwright's derivative claims on the basis that, under Delaware law, Wainwright did not have standing to prosecute those claims after the merger because he was no longer a SAG shareholder. As to Wainwright's remaining claims, Judge Thetford determined that the Holbrooks and the non-Holbrook directors were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the basis that the release agreement precluded those claims. Judge Thetford rejected Wainwright's argument that the release agreement was not supported by consideration and also determined that, even if the release agreement was unsupported by consideration, Wainwright's failure to return the merger consideration he received for his SAG stock precluded him from challenging the validity of the release agreement on the basis that it had been procured by fraud.1
On February 6, 2017, Wainwright filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the January judgment. See Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. On April 19, 2017, the trial court, then under the direction of Judge Brendette Brown Green, held a hearing on Wainwright's motion. Subsequently, on May 8, 2017, Judge Green entered an order ("the May order") in which she concluded that Judge Thetford's rulings "rest[ed] upon a manifest...
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