Ex parte Iratacable

• Decision Date: 07 March 1934
• Docket Number: 3043.
• Citation: 30 P.2d 284,55 Nev. 263
• Parties: Ex parte IRATACABLE.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

30 P.2d 284

55 Nev. 263

Ex parte IRATACABLE.

No. 3043.

Supreme Court of Nevada

March 7, 1934

Original proceeding in habeas corpus on application of John Iratacable.

Proceeding dismissed, and petitioner remanded to custody of officer.

L. D Summerfield and Platt & Sinai, all of Reno, for petitioner.

Gray Mashburn, Atty. Gen., and W. T. Mathews and Julian Thruston Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

Henderson & Marshall, of Las Vegas, amici curiae.

COLEMAN Justice.

The petitioner was arrested on a charge of operating, without a license, as a private motor carrier of property, for profit for Nevada Packing Company, a corporation, engaged in wholesale distribution of meat on the public highways of this state, and running between the city of Reno, in Washoe county, and Carson City, in Ormsby county, and eleven miles south of the city of Reno; thereupon he sued out a writ of habeas corpus.

The Legislature of this state, at its last session, enacted a law regulating the use of the public highways of the state, providing a license for the operation of motor vehicles thereover, and matters connected therewith, being chapter 165, Statutes of Nevada of 1933.

Section 1 of the act reads: "It is hereby declared to be the purpose and policy of the legislature in enacting this law to confer upon the public service commission of Nevada the power and authority, and to make it its duty to supervise, regulate and license the common motor carrying of property and/or passengers for hire, and to supervise for licensing purposes the contract motor carrying of property and/or of passengers for hire, and to supervise for licensing purposes the private motor carrying of property when used for private commercial enterprises on the public highways of this state, hereinafter defined, so as to relieve the existing and all future undue burdens on such highways arising by reason of the use of such highways by motor vehicles in a gainful occupation thereon, and to provide for reasonable compensation for the use of such highways in such gainful occupations, and enable the State of Nevada, by a utilization of the license fees hereinafter provided, to more fully provide for the proper construction, maintenance and repair thereof, and thereby protect the safety and welfare of the traveling and shipping public in their use of the highways. ***"

Section 2 reads: "(a) The term 'motor vehicle' when used in this act means any automobile, automobile truck, trailer, automobile tractor and semitrailer, motor bus, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled or motor driven vehicle, except hearses and ambulances, used upon any public highway of this state for the purpose of transporting persons or property. (b) The term 'common motor carrier of property' when used in this act shall mean any person engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of property for hire as a common carrier conducting fixed route or on-call route operations. (c) The term 'contract motor carrier of property' when used in this act shall be construed to mean any person not a common motor carrier of property engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of property for hire. (d) The term 'private motor carrier of property' when used in this act shall be construed to mean any person engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of property, when engaged in wholesale occupations and/or the distribution, receiving and delivery of property in producing and commercial enterprises. (e) The term 'common motor carriers of passengers' when used in this act shall mean any person engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of passengers or express for hire as a common carrier conducting fixed route or on-call route operations. (f) The term 'contract motor carrier of passengers' when used in this act shall be construed to mean any person not a common motor carrier of passengers engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of passengers or express for hire. (g) The term 'public highway' when used in this act shall mean every public street, road or highway or thoroughfare of any kind used by the public, but shall not include that portion of highways under construction or reconstruction. ***''

Section 3 reads: "None of the provisions of this act shall apply to any motor vehicle operated wholly within the corporate limits of any city or town in the State of Nevada; nor to city licensed taxicabs operating within a ten-mile radius of the limits of a city or town; nor to the city or town draymen and private motor carriers of property operating within a two-mile radius of the limits of a city or town, nor to the transportation of live stock and/or farm products to market by the producer thereof, or such producer's employee, or merchandise and/or supplies for his own use in his own motor vehicle; nor to the transportation of children to and from school; nor to the transportation of highway contractor's own equipment in his own motor vehicle from job to job wholly within the confines of this state; nor to the transportation of ore or minerals in the producer's own vehicle; provided, however, only one vehicle with an unladened weight not exceeding 10,000 pounds, or two vehicles whose combined unladened weight does not exceed 10,000 pounds, shall be exempted for the transportation of ore or minerals or mining supplies; nor to the operation of a privately owned truck in personal services as distinguished from those using the highways in a gainful occupation shall be exempted; provided, however, this exemption shall be limited to one such vehicle not exceeding an unladened weight of five thousand pounds."

Section 4 provides that no common motor carrier of property or passengers, contract motor carrier of property or passengers, or private motor carrier of property shall operate any motor vehicle for transportation of either persons or property for compensation on any public highway except in accordance with the provisions of the act.

Section 5 provides that all "common motor carriers of property and/or of passengers," as defined in the act, are declared to be common carriers within the meaning of the public utility laws of this state, and subject to the act in question and laws of the state.

Section 6 vests the public service commission with authority to license, supervise, and regulate every common motor carrier in all matters affecting the relationship between such carriers and the traveling and shipping public over and along the public highways of the state.

Section 7 provides that no common motor carrier of intrastate commerce shall operate without first obtaining from the public service commission a certificate of convenience, and paid all license fees and filed an indemnity bond.

Section 8 provides that no common motor carrier of interstate commerce shall operate within this state without paying a license fee and furnishing a liability policy.

Section 10 requires the public service commission to license and supervise for license purposes all "contract motor carriers of property and/or of passengers" and all "private motor carriers of property" either engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, and such carriers are to obtain a license before doing business.

Section 17 provides that every person operating a motor vehicle in the carrying of persons or property for hire, or as a private carrier, shall procure a license to so operate, and section 18 fixes the basis for the license fees.

Section 16 requires that in issuing licenses provided for in section 18 the public service commission shall require the licensee to file an obligation to pay the compensation for injuries to third persons or their property resulting from the negligent operation of such carrier.

The act provides that all moneys paid pursuant to its terms shall go into the state highway fund for construction, maintenance, and repair of the public highways of the state. A violation of the act is made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.

Counsel for petitioner urge several reasons to support their contention that the act in question is unconstitutional, the chief of which are: That it deprives petitioner of the equal protection of the law; that it violates the due process clause of the Constitution; that it is arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminatory; that it deprives petitioner of his liberty and freedom in the selection of his business and in the acquisition and protection of his property; that it is violative of the state Constitution, in that it is not general and uniform in its operation over the state; that the title of the act is violative of article 4, § 17, of our state Constitution, in that it embraces more than one subject. It is also contended that the act is unintelligible and uncertain. No contention is made that the act violates any interstate commerce provision.

In disposing of this case we shall not refer to the many decisions cited in the briefs, because we feel that, in view of the existing condition, the reasoning and conclusions stated in Continental Baking Co. et al. v. Woodring (D. C.) 55 F. (2d) 347, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 286 U.S. 352, 52 S.Ct. 595, 76 L.Ed. 1155, 81 A. L. R. 1402, must control as to the main questions presented.

In considering some of the questions involved it is well, too to bear in mind that the conditions in Nevada greatly accentuate the reasoning of the opinions in the case just cited. For instance, while Kansas has an area of 82,000 square miles, with a population of about 2,000,000, with many cities much larger than any in Nevada, and one with a population greater than the entire state of Nevada, Nevada's 90,000 population is scattered over an area of 40,000 square miles in excess of that of Kansas. From this statement it is...