Ex parte Jackson

• Decision Date: 20 February 2004
• Citation: 886 So.2d 155
• Parties: Ex parte Hayden Jerome JACKSON. (In re Hayden Jerome Jackson v. State of Alabama).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

886 So.2d 155

Ex parte Hayden Jerome JACKSON.

(In re Hayden Jerome Jackson v. State of Alabama).

1021472.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 20, 2004.

Glenn L. Davidson of Collins, Davidson, L.L.C., Mobile, for petitioner.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Nathan A. Forrester, deputy atty. gen., and Michael B. Billingsley, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

On March 13, 2002, a Mobile County jury convicted Hayden Jerome Jackson of first-degree unlawful possession of marijuana, a violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-12-213(a)(1).¹ The trial court sentenced him, as a habitual offender, to 15 years in prison. Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-9(b)(1). It then split the sentence and ordered him to serve three years; the balance of the sentence was suspended and he was placed on supervised probation for five years. The trial court also imposed a $2,000 fine pursuant to the Demand Reduction Assessment Act, § 13A-12-280 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Jackson's conviction and sentence without an opinion. Jackson v. State, 886 So.2d 153 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). Jackson petitioned this Court for certiorari review. We granted the petition to review whether the roadblock-type stop conducted by the Mobile County Sheriff's Department, which resulted in Jackson's arrest, was a valid stop or an invalid seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment. We hold that the roadblock-type stop was a valid stop that did not violate the United States Constitution, and we affirm.

Facts

The Mobile Housing Authority entered into a contract with the Mobile County Sheriff's Department pursuant to which the sheriff's department is permitted to enter housing areas governed by the housing authority at the request of the housing authority and performs such policing activities as rolling patrols, foot patrols, community policing, and safety checkpoints to establish some sort of "police presence." Pursuant to that contract, the Mobile County Sheriff's Department entered the R.V. Taylor housing project in Mobile on the evening of May 10, 2001, to set up what they called a "safety checkpoint" at a major intersection in the housing community. The housing authority had made no particular request for a roadblock-type stop in this instance; a captain in the sheriff's department made the decision to set up the roadblock-type stop. The officers checked driver's licenses, automobile insurance documentation, and vehicle "safety devices," e.g., seat belts, child restraints, etc., at the roadblock-type stop. They put in place seven marked sheriff's department vehicles at the intersection and stopped every vehicle that came through the intersection. They followed guidelines established by the sheriff's department while conducting the roadblock-type stop; those guidelines required that they perform no random searches and that the officers' activities be supervised by superior officers in the sheriff's department.

An officer stopped Jackson's vehicle at the roadblock. The officer discovered marijuana and two rolls of cash on Jackson's person; a larger quantity of marijuana in the console between the driver's seat and the passenger's seat; hidden under the tire cover in the trunk of Jackson's vehicle was an "Old Navy" store shopping bag that contained more marijuana, scales, and numerous plastic sandwich bags.

At trial, Jackson filed a motion to suppress the marijuana found on his person and in his vehicle on the basis that the roadblock-type stop was an unreasonable seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.² After his conviction for first-degree unlawful possession of marijuana, Jackson filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced Jackson, as a habitual offender, to 15 years in prison; that sentence was split, and Jackson was ordered to serve 3 years in prison and 5 years' supervised probation. In his appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Jackson argued that the trial court erred on the basis that the roadblock-style stop was an unreasonable seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed without an opinion. We affirm.

Standard of Review

The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.

"`Where evidence is presented to the trial court ore tenus in a nonjury case, a presumption of correctness exists as to the court's conclusions on issues of fact; its determination will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. Odom v. Hull, 658 So.2d 442 (Ala.1995). However, when the trial court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment. Ex parte Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Mobile, 636 So.2d 415 (Ala.1994).'

"[Ex parte Agee,] 669 So.2d [102,] at 104 [(Ala.1995)]. `Where the evidence before the trial court was undisputed the ore tenus rule is inapplicable, and the Supreme Court will sit in judgment on the evidence de novo, indulging no presumption in favor of the trial court's application of the law to those facts.' Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala.1980) (citations omitted)."

State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala.1996).

Jackson contends that the trial court, in determining not to grant his motion to suppress, misapplied the law to the facts, which were undisputed; therefore, we review de novo the trial court's decision to not suppress the evidence. However, Jackson also contends that the evidence, specifically an officer's testimony with regard to both the purpose of the roadblock-type stop and the contract between the housing authority and the Mobile County Sheriff's Department, proves that the officers' intent was to use the roadblock-type stop not just to check driver's licenses and safety devices but to perform a general law-enforcement roadblock-type stop, thus making the stop an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The State contended, and the trial court agreed, that the roadblock-type stop was conducted solely to check driver's licenses and safety devices.

Analysis

Jackson contends that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum conflicts with its decisions in Hagood v. Town of Town Creek, 628 So.2d 1057 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), and Cains v. State, 555 So.2d 290 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). In Jackson's case, the Court of Criminal Appeals found in its unpublished memorandum that the roadblock-type stop was valid because

"its primary purpose was to check for driver's licenses and safety equipment; that purpose could reasonably be advanced by a roadblock; the officers conducted the roadblock pursuant to department guidelines that allowed for very little discretion on the part of the officers conducting the roadblock; the roadblock was set up at a four-way stop in a highly visible area; there were seven marked vehicles parked around that location; and a typical stop lasted approximately one minute."

Based on that finding, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the stop was reasonable and valid, and it affirmed the trial court's judgment. Jackson argues that the roadblock failed the "purpose" prong for determining whether such a stop is constitutional.

The United States Supreme Court has established criteria for determining whether a roadblock-type stop is constitutional. "The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). In circumstances like the seizure here, courts must "weigh[] the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual." 428 U.S. at 554,96 S.Ct. 3074. "[S]ome quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure." 428 U.S. at 560,96 S.Ct. 3074. A suspicionless roadblock-type stop is a seizure.

"[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a `seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

However, the Supreme Court has made an exception to the suspicion requirement with respect to the routine roadblock-type stop:

"The [routine roadblock-type] stop does intrude to a limited extent on motorists' right to `free passage without interruption,' Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925), and arguably on their right to personal security. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which

"`"[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document...."' United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, [422 U.S. 873], at 880 [(1975)]."

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-58, 96 S.Ct. 3074. The Court reasoned:

"[T]his objective intrusion — the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection — also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion — the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers — is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In [United States v.] Ortiz, [422 U.S. 891 (1975),] we noted:

"`[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he

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