Ex Parte Jackson

• Decision Date: 10 May 1923
• Docket Number: (No. 3990.)
• Citation: 252 S.W. 149
• Parties: Ex parte JACKSON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 149

252 S.W. 149

Ex parte JACKSON.

(No. 3990.)

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 10, 1923.

Original application for a writ of habeas corpus on the relation of Murray Jackson. Application dismissed.

Wood & Wood, of Granger, W. C. Wofford, of Taylor, and Llewellyn B. Duke, of Georgetown, for petitioner.

Dan Moody, Dist. Atty., and Critz & Lawhon, all of Taylor, and Wilcox & Graves, J. F. Taulbee, and W. H. Nunn, all of Georgetown, for the State.

CURETON, C. J.

The relator is confined in the jail of Williamson county under a commitment issued out of the criminal district court of that county. Prior to commitment he had been called as a witness before the grand jury, which was engaged in investigating criminal charges against certain persons. He declined to testify before the grand jury, and was brought before the district court. He persisted in his refusal to testify, and the court adjudged him guilty of contempt, fixed his punishment at a fine of $100, and committed him to the custody of the sheriff of Williamson county until he should pay the fine, and until "he shall have fully and truthfully answered the questions" propounded to him. Upon the order of the court a commitment issued, and relator is confined in jail by virtue thereof.

We are asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus, admit the relator to bail, and upon final hearing to discharge him from confinement.

We have concluded that we have no jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus in this case, and therefore cannot inquire into the legality of relator's confinement.

The jurisdiction of this court to grant writs of habeas corpus is defined in Revised Statutes, art. 1529, which confers power upon this court "to issue writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person is restrained in his liberty by virtue of any order, process or commitment, issued by any court or judge, on account of the violation of any order, judgment or decree, theretofore made, rendered or entered by such court or judge in any civil cause." It is by virtue of this statute that this court issues writs of habeas corpus. Ex parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 417, 239 S. W. 1101; Ex parte Lytle, 99 Tex. 405, 406, 89 S. W. 956.

It appears therefrom that our jurisdiction to issue the writ is limited to those instances where the confinement is by virtue of an order, process, or commitment issued on account of the violation of some order, judgment, or decree entered by a court or judge in the trial of a civil case. We have no general jurisdiction to grant the writ, as has the Court of Criminal Appeals, for the reason that this statute limits our power in the language just stated; that is, we may inquire only into the restraint brought about by an order or process of the court issued because of the violation of some order, judgment, or decree in a civil case. Ex parte Zuccaro, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 214, 162 S. W. 844, 846; Ex parte Aldarete, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 358, 203 S. W. 763; Ex parte Duncan, 78 Tex. Cr. R. 447, 182 S. W. 313, 2 A. L. R. 222; State v. Clark, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 559, 187 S. W. 760, 766.

Duncan's Case illustrates the limited jurisdiction of this court. Hon. John T. Duncan was attorney in a certain civil case tried in the district court of the Twenty-Second district. The case was appealed, and Judge Duncan filed a brief for one of the parties. Objection was made to a portion of the language used in this brief, and for which the trial court held him in contempt. He thereupon applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was refused without a written opinion. One of the judges, however, indorsed on the application that this court declined to issue the writ for lack of jurisdiction. 78 Tex. Cr. R. 447, 182 S. W. 313, 2 A. L. R. 222. It is apparent that Judge Duncan was held in contempt by the trial court, not for violating any order made by the court in a civil case, but because of certain language used in a brief filed in the case. From this statement it appears that, although the alleged contempt arose out of a civil case, yet, since it did not arise by reason of a violation of the court's order, the Supreme Court declined to take jurisdiction. The Court of Criminal Appeals, as shown by the report of the case, did take jurisdiction, and discharged the relator,

In Ex parte Aldarete, cited above, Presiding Judge Morrow of the Court of Criminal Appeals, after referring to the statutes giving that court jurisdiction, and the constitutional provision relating to this court, correctly states the rule as to the jurisdiction of this court as follows:

"The effect of these constitutional and statutory provisions, as the writer understands them, is that the Court of Criminal Appeals is vested with authority to issue writs of habeas corpus in all cases where a person is illegally restrained of his liberty, and that the act of the Legislature vesting in the Supreme Court authority to issue such writs where restraint grows out of a civil case gives the Supreme Court concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Criminal Appeals in such cases."

Since...