Ex Parte Jeffcoat
| Citation | 109 Fla. 207,146 So. 827 |
| Parties | Ex parte JEFFCOAT. |
| Decision Date | 23 March 1933 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Application by Elvin E. Jeffcoat for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petition denied.
COUNSEL Joseph W. Nichols, of Clearwater, Ed. R Bentley, of Lakeland, and L. Raymond O'Steen, of Jacksonville, for petitioner.
A petition was filed in this court for an order reversing an order of the circuit court for Union county denying to the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and to order the circuit judge to allow the writ, and that this court order a stay of the execution of the death sentence entered against the petitioner which is to be executed upon him on March 24, 1933, and for such other relief 'as the conditions require.'
We treat the petition filed in this court as an application for a writ of habeas corpus upon the same grounds as set forth in the petition filed in the circuit court for Union county on the 21st day of March, 1933.
The basis of the application for the writ of habeas corpus consists of the allegations that the record proper of the trial of Elvin E. Jeffcoat for murder fails to show that he was 'arraigned in person or that he ever pleaded to the indictment upon which he was convicted, or that the petitioner was ever in person before the court prior to or at the time of the said alleged arraignment and plea of not guilty as shown by the record proper in said cause.'
The contention is that because the record proper fails affirmatively to show such arraignment of the petitioner and plea to the indictment by him, or that he 'had been before the court in person, prior to the arraignment and plea of not guilty or at the time of said arraignment or plea that the judgment of conviction was absolutely void.' The petition also alleged that the superintendent of the state prison could not legally execute the petitioner because 'at ten o'clock A. M. March 24,' the hour and date set for the execution, 'the petitioner will not have been confined and kept securely in or adjacent to the permanent death chamber for five days prior to the time of the electrocution as required by the mandatory statute in such case made and provided.'
On February 14, 1933, this court on a writ of error to the judgment of the circuit court for Union county, taken by the petitioner, remanding him to the custody of the superintendent of the state prison for execution of the death sentence, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 146 So 588.
Elvin E. Jeffcoat, the petitioner, was indicted on October 28, 1930, for the murder of his wife, Fannie Jeffcoat. Three other persons were indicted as accessories. A severance was granted, and Elvin Jeffcoat was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. He took a writ of error to that judgment, and this court on November 12, 1931, affirmed the judgment. See Jeffcoat v. State, 103 Fla. 466, 138 So. 385.
On November 7, 1930, the four defendants moved for a change of venue. The motion was denied. On motion of the state, a severance was granted as to the three persons who were indicted as accessories, and counsel for Elvin Jeffcoat moved for a continuance, which was granted, and the cause was set for trial on December 8, 1930. He was convicted of murder in the first degree, as stated, and this court affirmed the judgment.
Jeffcoat was convicted largely upon his own confession of the murder. Several exceptions to the court's rulings on different phases of the case were taken, one of which was the overruling of the motion for a new trial based on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
The record proper in that case disclosed that on October 29, 1930, the
The word 'arraign' means to call a prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the matters charged upon him in an indictment. The word 'arraigned' means practically the same thing as being personally present at the time, for it could not be true that the defendant was in fact arraigned and pleaded to the indictment if not personally present. See 5 C.J. 372, and authorities cited.
The arraignment of...
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Harris v. Wainwright
...charge. Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 287 (Fla.1903). * * *" 5 In footnote 4 of Hamilton, the Supreme Court cited Ex parte Jeffcoat, 1933, 109 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827, as an example of a case construing arraignment statutes in a state where arraignment was not a critical stage. But Jeff......
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Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure., In re
...to counsel at the arraignment, if the arraignment be deemed a part of the trial, as apparently it is under Alabama law. In Ex parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827, the Supreme Court of Florida held the arraignment to be a mere formal preliminary step to an answer or plea. However, in S......
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Montgomery v. State, 33461
...792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. We need not discuss the question of whether an arraignment under our law, as it now exists (compare Ex Parte Jeffcoat, 1933, 109 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827, with our recent decision in Sardinia v. State, Fla.1964, 168 So.2d 674) is 'a critical stage' in all felony prosecution......
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Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 32
...In other States arraignment is not 'a part of the trial' but 'a mere formal preliminary step to an answer or plea.' Ex parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 210, 146 So. 827, 828. An arraignment normally, however, affords an opportunity of the accused to plead, as a condition precedent to a trial. ......