Ex parte Kamilewicz
Decision Date | 18 July 1997 |
Citation | 700 So.2d 340 |
Parties | Ex parte Dexter J. KAMILEWICZ, et al. (In re Daniel A. EDELMAN, et al. v. WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON, et al.). 1960890. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Edward B. McDonough, Jr., Keith S. Miller, and Kevin D. Graham of Edward B. McDonough, Jr., P.C., Mobile, for petitioners.
C. Knox McLaney III and Angela L. Kimbrough of McLaney & Associates, P.C., Montgomery; and James E. Atchison and Mona Vivar of Hess & Atchison, Mobile, for respondents.
Dexter J. Kamilewicz, Gretchen L. Kamilewicz, and Martha E. Preston petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss claims against them alleging malicious prosecution, breach of contract, and abuse of process. We grant the writ.
Daniel Edelman and his law firm, Edelman & Combs ("Edelman"), filed an action in the Mobile Circuit Court against the law firm of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon ("Wildman"); each of the partners in Wildman, individually; the law firm of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis ("Schnader"); each of the partners in Schnader, individually; the Kamilewiczes; and Preston, seeking damages against all of the defendants for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The complaint also stated a claim against the Kamilewiczes and Preston for breach of contract; and it stated a claim of tortious interference with a contract against every defendant except the Kamilewiczes and Preston. Edelman's office is in Chicago, Illinois. Wildman has its principal office in Chicago and another office in New York. Schnader has its principal office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and other offices in New York City; Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Cherry Hill, New Jersey; and Harrisburg and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Kamilewiczes reside in Maine; Preston resides in Wisconsin.
This action arose out of a class action that Wildman and Schnader filed on behalf of the Kamilewiczes, Preston, and others against Edelman and others in a federal district court in Chicago ("the Kamilewicz action"). The Kamilewicz action was based on allegations that Edelman and others had engaged in wrongdoing in obtaining a substantial attorney fee award in a class action styled Hoffman, et al. v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., et al. ("the Hoffman action"), which had been filed in the Mobile Circuit Court. The complaint in the Kamilewicz action alleged, among other things, that Edelman, who had participated as class counsel in the Hoffman action, had committed a fraud on the trial court in the Hoffman action by failing to apprise the trial court that approval of the settlement in that case would result in an out-of-pocket loss for the plaintiff class (of which the Kamilewiczes and Preston were members.) 1 The federal district court dismissed the Kamilewicz action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Edelman then filed the present action, alleging 1) that the Kamilewicz action had been filed in an improper and malicious attempt to relitigate matters that had been settled in the Hoffman action (the malicious prosecution claim); 2) that improper discovery had been attempted in the Kamilewicz action, in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ( ); 3) that the Kamilewiczes and Preston had, by filing the Kamilewicz action, breached an agreement not to challenge the settlement reached in the Hoffman action (the breach of contract claim); and 4) that Wildman and Schnader had improperly induced the Kamilewiczes and Preston to file the Kamilewicz action (the tortious-interference-with-a-contract claim). The Kamilewiczes and Preston moved to dismiss the claims pertaining to them, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and, in the alternative, that dismissal was appropriate under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-430 ( ). The trial court denied the motion.
The requirements for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant are set out in Rule 4.2(a)(2), Ala.R.Civ.P.:
Service of process under Rule 4.2(a)(2) has been held to be as far-reaching as due process permits. However, the constitutional guaranty of due process precludes a court from asserting jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state. Murray v. Alfab, Inc., 601 So.2d 878 (Ala.1992). In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181-84, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), the United States Supreme Court stated:
(Emphasis in original.)
These due process requirements were recently echoed by this Court in Ex parte United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO...
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