Ex parte Knapp

• Decision Date: 03 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. 7978,7978
• Citation: 73 Idaho 505,254 P.2d 411
• Parties: Ex parte KNAPP.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 411

254 P.2d 411

73 Idaho 505

Ex parte KNAPP.

No. 7978.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 3, 1953.

Vernon K. Smith, Boise, for petitioner.

Robert E. Smylie, Atty. Gen., Edward J. Aschenbrener and Leonard H. Bielenberg, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

THOMAS, Justice.

This is an original proceedings in this court on a writ of habeas corpus wherein petitioner seeks release and discharge from the penitentiary. Petitioner was committed and is confined under the authority of Section 18-2505, I.C.

Petitioner, while in custody on a charge of attempted first-degree burglary, effected an escape from the county jail in Lewis County, Idaho. He was later apprehended and charged with the commission of the crime of escape, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to the penitentiary for not more than five years.

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to his release and discharge for the reason that the above-designated statute, when considered with Section 18-2506, I.C., is constitutionally offensive because these statutes constitute an arbitrary and unnatural classification of offenses and, by such classification, deny to persons such as petitioner the equal protection of the law. In this respect, petitioner urges that the crime of escape when committed by one charged with or convicted of a felony constitutes a felony, while if committed by one charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor, it constitutes only a misdemeanor, and that such classification has no relation to, or any reasonable connection with, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of escape, but is made to depend on something which is entirely without relation to, and wholly disconnected with, the commission of the act itself; that two persons who commit the crime of escape are not only punished differently but one carries the stigma of a felon while the other the stigma of a misdemeanor, which results for both reasons in an arbitrary and unnatural classification and operates to deny equal protection of the law.

It is elementary that the power and authority rests in the legislature to define crimes and fix the punishment therefor.

Every person is entitled to equal protection of the law, and equal protection of the law means that equal protection and security shall be given to all under like circumstances in his life, his liberty and his property and in the pursuit of happiness, and in the exemption from any greater burdens and charges than are equally imposed upon all others under like circumstances.

It is uniformly recognized that the legislature in classifying crimes and fixing punishment therefor has great latitude; however, it is equally well recognized that in making such classifications the same must be natural, not arbitrary, and must be made with reference to the heinousness or gravity of the act or acts made a crime and not with reference to matters disconnected therewith. In re Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 1123.

Sec. 18-2505, I.C., in substance, provides that every prisoner charged with or convicted of a felony who escapes or attempts to escape shall be guilty of a felony, while Sec. 18-2506, I.C., provides that every prisoner charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor who escapes or attempts to escape shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Neither section above prescribes specific punishment upon such conviction. Hence, one convicted of an escape under Sec. 18-2505, I.C., would be punishable as a felon by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not to exceed five years or by a fine not to exceed $5000, or by both fine and imprisonment. Sec. 18-112, I.C. On the other hand, one convicted of an escape under Sec. 18-2506, I.C., would be punishable as a misdemeanant by confinement in the county jail not to exceed six months or by a fine of not to exceed $300 or by both fine and imprisonment. Sec. 18-113, I.C.

The petitioner relies on the case of In re Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102 P. 374, to support his contention. In 1909 the Supreme Court, in the above case, declared the then existing escape statute unconstitutional on the grounds, among others, that it denied the equal protection of the law and offended the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and also the Constitution of this state. We will consider the Mallon case at another point in this opinion.

The crime of escape, as well as the grade or degree of such crime and the punishment therefor, is now generally regulated by statute. Under some such statutes the offense of escape is classified and punished as a misdemeanor ¹ while in other states it is classified and punished as a felony. ² Several states, like Idaho, classify the crime of escape as a felony if the escapee at the time of escape is charged with or convicted of a felony, and as a misdemeanor if the escapee is charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor. ³

The real question presented here is whether the present statute adopts a reasonable classification when it provides that persons who commit an identical crime, that is, escape, are classified as felons if charged with or convicted of a felony at the time of escape, and classified as misdemeanants if charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor at the time of escape; the effect of this contention is that, both as to the status of the offender and the punishment imposed, the statute sets forth an arbitrary and unnatural classification without logic or any reference to the gravity of the act made criminal or to matters connected therewith, and that, hence, the penalty is wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of a community.

The law has long recognized that different punishment may be imposed upon different persons for the same offense provided that all who are similarly situated are treated alike. Such statutes dealing with habitual criminal acts, which are somewhat analogous to escape statutes, have been upheld against constitutional attack. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 32 S.Ct. 583, 56 L.Ed. 917; Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 16 S.Ct. 179, 40 L.Ed. 301; McDonald v. Mass., 180 U.S. 311, 21 S.Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542; Ingalls v. Wisconsin, 48 Wis. 647, 4 N.W. 785; People v. Sickles, 156 N.Y. 541, 51 N.E. 288; People v. Coleman, 145 Cal. 609, 79 P. 283.

It is strenuously urged by petitioner that the decision of this court in the case of In re Mallon, supra, is decisive and conclusive in the matter now before us. Under the then existing statute it was provided as follows:

'Every State prisoner confined in the state prison for a term less than for life, who escapes therefrom, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term equal in length to the term he was serving at the time of such escape; * * *.' Rev.Codes, § 6452.

This court held that the above statute was unconstitutional for the reasons, among others, that it denied the equal protection of the law and violated the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Idaho. It will be noted that in the present matter the same two grounds are urged to strike down the present statute that were invoked to strike down the earlier statute. Unless the statute considered in the Mallon case can be distinguished from the present statute upon fundamental grounds, it would be controlling here unless this court refused to follow it. A careful and critical analysis of the decision in the Mallon case disclosed that the statute was struck down because: (a) the classification for punishment was based upon the length of the sentence being served, hence was unnatural and abritrary; (b) the extent of punishment to be invoked was not committed to the discretion of the trial court within a stated minimum and maximum, but was mandatorily fixed.

Under the earlier statute, but not under the present statute, such escapee was punishable for a term equal to the length of the term for which he was originally sentenced, hence providing for as many grades for purposes of punishment as there were prisoners undergoing different sentences. Under the present act, all felons are subject to the same punishment.

Under the earlier act, the maximum punishment was arbitrarily fixed and made mandatory with no discretion vested in the court to fix the punishment at less than the maximum. Under the present act, the punishment in the case of a felon cannot exceed five years in the state prison and, in the case of a misdemeanant, cannot exceed six months in the county jail.

Under the earlier act, the offense of escape was not divided into grades, all were felonies; the punishment imposed for escape in effect provided as many grades for the punishment as there were prisoners undergoing different sentences. Under the present statute, there are but two grades or classes, that is, felons and misdemeanants, and all within either grade or class are subject to identical punishment. The Supreme Court, in the Mallon case, held that punishment for escape, based upon the length of time the escapee was imprisoned under the original offense, fixed an arbitrary and unjust punishment and that the punishment so imposed was not proportionate to the gravity of the offense. The present act is not subject to such criticism. The punishment is not based upon the length of time the prisoner was originally sentenced; it is based upon the crime for which he was imprisoned; the earlier act made no such distinction.

The character and nature of the offense of escape was not the basis upon which the crime was defined or the extent of punishment was fixed in the earlier act, nor is it necessarily so under the present act; the designation of the crime or the extent of punishment need not be based solely or in part upon the character or the nature of escape; there is broad latitude for classification in this respect when founded upon reason and logic; such classification is only prohibited when arbitrary, unnatural...