Ex Parte Kneedler

• Citation: 147 S.W. 983
• Parties: Ex parte KNEEDLER.
• Decision Date: 01 June 1912
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

147 S.W. 983

Ex parte KNEEDLER.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 1, 1912.

1. WITNESSES (§ 293)—PRIVILEGE—SUBJECTION TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

Act March 9, 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 328) § 12, providing that any person operating a motor vehicle, who, knowing that injury has been caused to a person or property, leaves the place without stopping or giving his name, residence, and operator's license, shall be guilty of a felony, is a valid police regulation, not in violation of the constitutional provision that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause, the statute at most only affording a means of identification which might be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution; and so, even if, in a particular case, the constitutional privilege warranted the withholding of the information, that privilege might be set up as a defense to a prosecution under the statute, although it would not generally invalidate the statute.

2. HIGHWAYS (§ 169)—USE OF HIGHWAY— AUTOMOBILES.

The right to operate a motor vehicle is not an unrestricted right, but is a privilege which can be exercised only in accordance with the legislative restrictions fixed on the privilege.

Ex parte petition by Forrest E. Kneedler for a writ of habeas corpus directed to Louis Nolte, Sheriff of the City of St. Louis. Petition denied, and petitioner remanded.

Kent Koerner and Glendy B. Arnold, for petitioner. Seebert G. Jones and Forrest G. Ferris, for respondent.

FERRISS, J.

Habeas corpus to discharge petitioner from the custody of the sheriff of the city of St. Louis, who holds petitioner under a capias issued on an information based upon the following statute: "Whoever operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing that injury has been caused to a person or property, due to the culpability of the said operator, or to accident, leaves the place of said injury or accident, without stopping and giving his name, residence, including street and street number, and operator's license number to the injured party, or to a police officer, or in case no police officer is in the vicinity of place of said injury or accident, then reporting the same to the nearest police station, or judicial officer, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for a term of two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and if any person be convicted a second time of either of the foregoing offenses, he shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years and not more than five years. A conviction of a violation of this subdivision shall be reported forthwith by the trial court or the clerk thereof to the secretary of state, who shall, upon recommendation of the trial court, suspend the license of the person so convicted, or if he be an owner, the certificate of registration of his motor vehicle, and, if no appeal therefrom be taken, or if an appeal duly taken be dismissed, or the judgment affirmed, and upon notice thereof by said clerk, the secretary of state shall revoke such license, or in the case of an owner the certificate of registration of his motor vehicle, and shall order the license or certificate of registration delivered to the secretary of state, and shall not reissue to him said license or certificate of registration or any other license or certificate of registration unless the secretary of state in his discretion, after an investigation or upon a hearing, decides to reissue or issue such license or certificate." Laws 1911, p. 328, § 12.

The information charges in the first count that one Ernest Combs was in charge and control of, and operating and managing, an automobile upon a street in the city of St. Louis, and then and there, by accident, struck, run over, injured, and killed one Frank Farrar with such automobile, and that he, knowing that such injury had been caused, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously leave the place of such accident without stopping and giving his name, residence, and license number; and, further, that the petitioner, before said Combs left the place of the accident, did unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly incite, procure, aid, counsel, hire, and command the said Combs to do and commit said felony of feloniously leaving the place of said accident in the manner and form aforesaid. The second count of the information contains the same charge, except that, instead of charging the injury to have been accidental, the information charges that said Combs did then and there "feloniously, carelessly, recklessly, and with culpable negligence" throw and cast the said Farrar to the pavement and drive the automobile over him, causing his death, making the same charge against the petitioner as to inciting Combs to leave the place of injury. A demurrer was filed to this information in the circuit court and overruled, whereupon petitioner applied in this court for a writ of prohibition against Hon. James E. Withrow, judge of the circuit court before whom the cause was pending, which application was denied. He then sued out this writ of habeas corpus.

The only...