Ex parte Land
| Decision Date | 02 June 2000 |
| Citation | 775 So.2d 847 |
| Parties | Ex parte Michael Jeffrey LAND. (In re Michael Jeffrey Land v. State). |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
J. Drew Colfax, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Michael B. Billingsley, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
On Application for Rehearing
The opinion of August 6, 1999, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
Michael Jeffrey Land petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge James H. Hard IV, of the Jefferson Circuit Court, to grant a portion of his motion for discovery filed in regard to his petition for postconviction relief. We grant the petition in part and deny it in part, and issue the writ.
Land first petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for this relief; that court, on July 2, 1998, denied his petition, with an opinion. See Ex parte Land, 775 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.1998). Land then filed an application for rehearing with the Court of Criminal Appeals, but later withdrew that application and filed a petition in this Court. His petition is before this Court pursuant to Rule 21(e), Ala. R.App. P., which provides that a decision by a court of appeals on an original petition for the writ of mandamus may be reviewed de novo by this Court, and that an application for rehearing below is not a prerequisite for such review.1
In December 1993, Land was convicted of two counts of capital murder for the murder of Candace Brown, on the basis that that murder was committed during a burglary and during a kidnapping. See Ala.Code 1975, §§ 13A-5-40(a)(1) and (a)(4). The circuit court sentenced Land to death by electrocution. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See Land v. State, 678 So.2d 201 (Ala. Crim.App.1995), aff'd, 678 So.2d 224 (Ala.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 933, 117 S.Ct. 308, 136 L.Ed.2d 224 (1996).
In October 1997, Land petitioned the Circuit Court of Jefferson County (the trial court in which he had been convicted) for postconviction relief, pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., requesting that his conviction and sentence be set aside. Land based his Rule 32 petition on several claims, only a few of which are relevant to this petition for the writ of mandamus. The State filed motions asking the circuit court to dismiss many of the claims in Land's petition. On April 20, 1998, the circuit court dismissed most of Land's claims because they either had been raised on the direct appeal or could have been raised on the direct appeal, and it dismissed the other claims for failure to meet the specificity requirement of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. However, the circuit court did allow Land to amend his petition as it related to the claims lacking specificity. In his petition, Land contends that his principal Rule 32 claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective at the guilt and penalty stages of his trial. For the most part, the various subparts of Land's Rule 32 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel remain pending before the circuit court, and the majority of the discovery he seeks relates to his ineffective-assistance claim. Land also seeks discovery relative to claims pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); the State contends those claims have been dismissed.
Soon after filing his Rule 32 petition, Land filed two discovery motions in the circuit court. In his first motion, Land sought access to the complete files of the Jefferson County district attorney's office related to the case, and the complete files of all other agencies involved in the investigation of the charges against him, including the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, the Birmingham Police Department, the Jefferson County coroner's office, the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, and the Alabama Department of Youth Services. In his second discovery motion, Land sought access to his institutional records, as generated by several state agencies. The State wrote a letter to the trial court stating its opposition to Land's motions, and it orally opposed the motions at a status conference.
The trial court entered an "Order Regarding Discovery of Prosecution Files," which stated:
Although in its order the trial court did not mention Land's other discovery requests, it did, in a letter to the parties, state that the rest of what Land "is seeking by way of discovery is irrelevant to the issues framed by the Petition for Relief." Land moved for a "reconsideration," but the trial court denied the motion.
In his mandamus petition, Land alleges that the trial court erred in denying him access to his penal-institution records, his mental-health records, and his juvenile records, and in denying him access to records of the Birmingham Police Department's investigation regarding other suspects in Candace Brown's murder. Land argues that these materials support his claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and his claim alleging that the State committed a Brady violation.
We begin with the rule that "mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued only when there is: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Horton, 711 So.2d 979 (Ala.1998) (citations omitted). This Court has held that a petition for the writ of mandamus is the proper means for seeking appellate review of a trial court's discovery order. Ex parte Monk, 557 So.2d 832 (Ala.1989). As noted above, Land has complied with Rule 21, Ala. R.App. P., and the State has refused to produce the materials he sought. Therefore, the only issues to be resolved are (1) whether the State has an imperative duty to give Land access to the materials requested and (2) whether Land has shown a clear legal right to the discovery order he seeks. In determining whether Land has shown a clear legal right, we limit our review to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Land's discovery motion. Horton, 711 So.2d at 983.
Land maintains that the State has an imperative duty to give him access to the materials and that he has shown a clear legal right to the relief requested because, he says, he presented the trial court with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were meritorious on the face of the petition. He says he alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle him to relief. Land points us to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court held that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove (1) that counsel did not provide reasonably effective assistance and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Land also points us to the standard for showing prejudice as stated in Strickland, in which the Supreme Court held: 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Land argues that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland without the requested discovery. He maintains that in order to show the trial court a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, he must obtain actual proof in the form of records to show that evidence was available to his trial counsel at the time of the trial and that there was a reasonable probability that that evidence would have affected the outcome. Land says:
(Petition for Mandamus, p. 6.)
As for the documents relating to his claim that the State committed a Brady violation, Land maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting...
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