Ex parte Larkins

Decision Date07 February 1891
PartiesEx parte LARKINS
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Habeas corpus.

¶0 1. TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE--Powers--Under Organic Act Okla. T. § 6, providing that the legislative power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the laws and constitution of the United States, it is competent for the legislature to continue in force, after the adjournment of the First legislature, the Criminal Code of Nebraska, extended to the Territory by the organic act, § 11, until the adjournment of the first session of the legislature.

2. EX POST FACTO LAW--Act 1st. Assem. Okla. T., § 1, continuing in force the Criminal Code of Nebraska, which, by the organic act, was extended to that Territory till the adjournment of the first session of the legislature, is valid, and not ex post facto, as to offences already committed, but not prosecuted and punished.

Thurston & Merrick, for petitioner.

Chas. Brown and C. B. Freeman, for the Territory.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GREEN, C. J.:

¶1 This is a petition in this court for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was issued, directed to the sheriff of Logan county, who brought the body of the petitioner into court, together with the cause of his caption and detention.

¶2 It appears from the petition and return, that the petitioner was indicted by the grand jury of Logan county, at the September term, 1890, of the district court, for the crime of incest and rape upon the person of his daughter, Della Larkin, and that he was taken upon a capias issued on that indictment, and, in default of bail, was committed to the common jail to await his trial.

¶3 The ground upon which his discharge from imprisonment is asked is, that the indictment is for an offense against the criminal code of the state of Nebraska, which was extended to and put in force in the Territory of Oklahoma, by the organic act, until after the adjournment of the first session of the legislative assembly of said Territory, which occurred at the close of the 24th day of December, 1890; and, inasmuch as the law creating the offense has expired, there can be no trial, conviction and judgment upon the indictment; and that the legislative assembly had no power to continue the law in force as to crimes already committed against it and prosecutions pending therefor.

¶4 Before the adjournment of the first session of the legislative assembly, an act was passed and approved, which provides, inter alia, as follows:

"SEC. 1. That as to all offenses committed in this Territory against the laws of Nebraska, while in force in this Territory, said laws so offended against shall continue in force, until the apprehension and prosecution, and until the punishment and penalty is (are) imposed upon such offenders.
"SEC. 2. That as to all offenses mentioned in the preceding section, in which prosecutions are now pending, the laws of criminal procedure of the state of Nebraska, now and heretofore in force in this Territory, shall continue in force for the purpose of prosecuting such offenses, but for no other purpose.
"SEC. 3. That as to all offenses mentioned in section one of this act, where prosecutions have not yet been commenced, such offenses shall be prosecuted under the procedure in force in this Territory after the adjournment of the first session of the legislative assembly."

The last section of the act provides, that it shall take effect, and be in force, from and after the adjournment of the first session of the legislative assembly.

¶5 Section eleven of the organic act, which extends to and puts in force, in the Territory of Oklahoma, the criminal code of the state of Nebraska, so far as necessary to be stated, has the following provisions:

"That the following chapters and provisions of the compiled laws of the state of Nebraska, in force November first, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, in so far as they are locally applicable, and not in conflict with the laws of the United States or with this act, are hereby extended to and put in force in the Territory of Oklahoma, until after the adjournment of the first session of the legislative assembly of said Territory."

But no saving clause, or provision, is made in the organic act, as to crimes committed and prosecutions pending, at and before the adjournment of the first session of the legislative assembly.

¶6 It is very clear, upon principle and authority, that if the act of the legislative assembly, continuing in force the criminal code of Nebraska, as to all crimes committed, and prosecutions pending under it, has no validity to accomplish what was proposed by it, the petitioner cannot be further prosecuted for the crime charged against him in the indictment, and should be discharged from his imprisonment.

¶7 Sir Mathew Hale, in his history of the Pleas of the Crown, states the rule of the common law, that when an offense is made treason or felony by an act of Parliament, and then the act is repealed, the offenses committed before such appeal, and the proceedings thereupon, are discharged by such repeal, and cannot be proceeded on after such repeal, unless a special clause in the act of repeal is made, enabling such proceedings, after the repeal, for offenses committed before the repeal. (Pleas of the Crown, vol. 1, p 291.)

¶8 The law, as stated by this learned author, has been steadily adhered to in England and in this country; and has been held and applied in innumerable cases, a few only of which it is necessary to cite.

¶9 In the cases of Yeaton v. The United States, 5 Cranch 281, 3 L. Ed. 101, and The Schooner Rachel v. The United States, 6 id., 329, judgment of forfeiture upon proceedings in admiralty had been pronounced in the court of original jurisdiction, before the repeal of the statutes which gave the forfeiture, and both judgments were reversed, on account of such repeal, by the supreme court. In the first case, Chief Justice Marshall said:

"After the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that purpose by statute."
The result of all the authorities is briefly and clearly stated by Mr. Bishop:
"If the common or statutory law,
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4 cases
  • Higgins v. Brown
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • March 9, 1908
    ...certain laws of Arkansas to regulate and control, specially and mediately and directly, local conditions therein. Ex parte Larkin, 1 Okla. 53, 25 P. 745, 11 L. R. A. 418; Ex parte Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 14 S. Ct. 746, 38 L. Ed. 631; Cherokee Tobacco Co. v. United States, 78 U.S. 616, 20 L. ......
  • State ex rel. Reardon v. Hooker
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • May 10, 1910
    ...first session of the Legislature of Oklahoma Territory practically re-enacted ipsissimis verbis these Nebraska Laws. Ex parte Larkin, 1 Okla. 53, 25 P. 745, 11 L. R. A. 418; U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 14 S. Ct. 746, 38 L. Ed. 631. The only difference between said section 8 of chapter 2......
  • Ex parte Buchanen
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • April 15, 1908
    ...through the action of the President in issuing the proclamation admitting the state into the Union. In the case of Ex parte Larkin, 1 Okla. 53, 25 P. 745, 11 L. R. A. 418, it was decided that it was within the power of the Legislature of the territory of Oklahoma to continue in force after ......
  • Ex parte Larkins
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1891

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