Ex parte Leal
| Decision Date | 12 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-13-00633-CR,No. 04-13-00634-CR,04-13-00633-CR,04-13-00634-CR |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | EX PARTE Martin Guadalupe CAMPOS LEAL |
From the County Court at Law No. 1, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. W-2513 & W-2514
The Honorable John D. Fleming, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Appellant, Martin Guadalupe Campos Leal, a legal permanent resident, appeals the trial court's orders denying his "Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Withdraw Plea" filed in two trial cause numbers, in which he alleged his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to properly advise him of the immigration consequences of his no contest pleas as required under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). We disagree with appellant that competent counsel would have advised appellant that a single conviction for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana would have subjected him to mandatory deportation. However, we agree with appellant that counsel should have advised him that a second conviction for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana would have subjected him to mandatory deportation. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant is a non-US citizen who has resided in the United States since 1994, when he was brought to this country by his family as a young child, and has been a legal permanent resident since 2012. Shortly after acquiring legal permanent resident status, appellant was arrested for possession of marijuana. He was appointed counsel and pled no contest to a single count of possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121(b)(1) (West 2010) (Class B misdemeanor). Several months later, appellant was arrested a second time for the same offense. Appellant retained counsel and after consulting with his attorney, pled no contest to the second offense. As a result, appellant now faces deportation.
After learning of his impending deportation, appellant filed two applications for writ of habeas corpus and motions to withdraw plea. Appellant argued his court-appointed attorney in the first case and retained counsel in the second case provided ineffective assistance because they failed to explicitly advise him that he would be deported as a result of entering no contest pleas, and consequently, his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Appellant claimed he relied on his attorneys' erroneous advice when he pled no contest to the charges that rendered his deportation mandatory, and asserted that, but for his attorneys' erroneous advice, he would have insisted on going to trial. The trial court held a hearing on the applications for writ of habeas corpus and motions to withdraw plea where both attorneys testified to the plea bargaining process and admonishments given to appellant prior to entering into the agreements with the State. The trial court concluded both attorneys complied with the requirements of Padilla and denied appellant's applications for writ of habeas corpus and motions to withdraw plea. Appellant then filed these interlocutory appeals asserting the trial court abused its discretion.
A trial court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A defendant who claims his plea was not knowing and voluntary must prove that claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. We review the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and must uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id. However, we apply a de novo review when the facts are uncontested and the trial court's ruling does not turn on the credibility or demeanor of witnesses. Ex parte Ali, 368 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref'd).
A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel when entering a plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Exparte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (). To be entitled to habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Badillo v. State, 255 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Davis v. State, 278 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, he would not have entered a plea and would have gone to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
The United States Supreme Court set forth the proper guidelines for assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the sufficiency of the legal advice regarding immigration consequences in Padilla v. Kentucky. There, Padilla pled guilty to transporting alarge amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. As a result of his conviction, federal immigration law mandated that Padilla be deported. See id. at 368 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). Padilla then sought post-conviction habeas corpus relief alleging his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of the risk of deportation as a result of his guilty plea. Id. at 356.
In assessing Padilla's ineffective assistance claim, the Court recognized that "[i]mmigration law can be complex" and that there would be "numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain." Id. at 357. The nature of the advice to be given is dependent on the certainty of the applicable immigration law. Id. at 358. The Court also recognized that if a noncitizen commits a deportable offense under contemporary immigration law, "his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel [deportation] for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses." Id. at 363-64 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). The Court stated that when the relevant immigration law "is not succinct and straightforward" as to whether a plea will result in deportation, Id. at 369 (). The Court concluded the relevant immigration statute was "succinct, clear, and explicit" in defining Padilla's deportation as mandatory and determined his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Padilla of such. Id.
In this appeal, we must decide whether appellant's trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to comply with Padilla.
Appellant contends his first attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him that he would be subject to mandatory deportation as a result of pleading no contest to a single charge of possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. Appellant acknowledges his attorney advised him of the potential for adverse immigration consequences; however, he argues this advice was insufficient because "the law was abundantly clear that any controlled substance violation, no matter how small the quantity of drugs, was a deportable offense." Appellant contends advising only of adverse immigration consequences was insufficient because it was clear that a single conviction for possession of marijuana would result in mandatory deportation. In support of his argument, appellant cites to section 1182 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Padilla. We do not agree that either section 1182 or Padilla supports appellant's contention that possessing any amount of a controlled substance results in mandatory deportation.
Section 1182 does not apply to deportation. Instead, its application is limited to "[c]lasses of aliens ineligible for visas or admission." 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Specifically, section 1182(a)(2)(A)(II) renders an alien with a controlled substance violation inadmissible, as opposed to deportable. Cf. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364-65 (). Therefore, unlike the relevant statute in Padilla, the terms of section 1182 are not "succinct, clear, and explicit" in defining deportation as a consequence of appellant's first conviction.
Appellant also argues Padilla stands for the proposition that possessing any amount of a controlled substance results in mandatory deportation. We do not agree. Padilla pled guilty to transporting a large amount of marijuana. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. The federal immigration statute applicable in Padilla's case provided that any violation relating to a controlled substance, except a single offense involving possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana for one's own use,results in deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Thus, it was clear Padilla would be deported based on the nature of the distribution offense. Id. In contrast, it was not clear in this case that appellant would be deported as a result of a single...
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