Ex parte Malone

Decision Date29 March 1990
Docket NumberNo. 01-90-00181-CV,01-90-00181-CV
Citation788 S.W.2d 411
PartiesEx parte Edward James MALONE, Relator. (1st Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Robert B. Peltier, Houston, for relator.

Patsy Young, Houston, for respondent.

Before WARREN, COHEN and DUNN, JJ.

OPINION

WARREN, Justice.

Our opinion of March 14, 1990 is withdrawn and the following substituted in its place.

The 309th District Court of Harris County held EDWARD JAMES MALONE in contempt for not paying court ordered child support of $20 per week. The court ordered him jailed for 180 days, and thereafter, until he paid $3200 in child support arrearage, $1,237.50 in attorney fees, and $202 in court costs.

Relator asserts his confinement is illegal because: (1) the divorce decree is not specific; (2) his duty of support has terminated; and (3) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the child support order.

Relator contends the decree is not specific enough to uphold a contempt charge because it does not state when the child support payments were to begin. The decree states that payments begin on "November 9." While no year is stated, we hold that the normal meaning of this language is that the payments were to start immediately.

Relying on Ex parte Griffin, 712 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1986, orig. proceeding), relator contends the divorce decree is not specific enough because it does not order him to pay child support to a specific person. We rejected this contention in Ex parte Mulkey, 776 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Griffin is distinguishable because the decree did not appoint a managing conservator.

The divorce here names Bernice Malone managing conservator and recites that relator

is to pay TWENTY AND NO NO/100 [sic] ($20.00) DOLLARS a week beginning on Friday the 9th day of November and a like amount each succeeding Friday thereafter until the child reaches age eighteen (18) years, or until further orders of the Court, payable through the Harris County Probation Department.

We hold that the decree adequately informs relator what he must do and when he must do it. See Ex parte Conoly, 732 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding) (designation of county child support office as place to make payments is sufficiently specific).

Relator's first and second points of error are overruled.

In his third and fourth points of error relator asserts that the duty of support imposed by the divorce decree terminated under its own terms, and the trial court lost jurisdiction because the managing conservator did not file her motion for contempt within six months of the court losing its jurisdiction.

The trial court had twice previously held relator in contempt for failure to pay child support. Relator contends that the previous contempt orders were "further orders of the court" relieving him of the obligation to pay any further child support. He further contends that, because his duty of...

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4 cases
  • Ex parte Johns
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 22 d2 Janeiro d2 1991
    ...ambiguous, we view the decree as a whole. See Ex parte Linder, 783 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Malone, 788 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding); Ex parte McManus, 589 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1979, orig. ......
  • Ex parte Acker
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 9 d3 Julho d3 1997
    ...what duties and obligations are imposed upon him." Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex.1995). Sherman, relying on Ex parte Malone, 788 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding), argues that, where no year is specified, the court should construe the obligation......
  • Ex parte Tanner
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 27 d4 Julho d4 1995
    ...obligation, rather than the more specific obligation to pay a particular amount, such as under the divorce decree here. See Ex parte Malone, 788 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Thus, we construe Section 14.40(b)(2) to refer to the time at which the on......
  • In Re John Tsertos, 01-11-00170-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 14 d1 Março d1 2011
    ...sufficient certainty. In Ex parte Malone, a precise year was omitted from the date of the obligation stated in the underlying decree. 788 S.W.2d 411, 411 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). This court considered the "normal meaning" of the language used, held that the o......

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