Ex parte Maness

Decision Date25 July 1980
Citation386 So.2d 429
PartiesEx parte Jimmy MANESS and Wanda Maness. In re Jimmy MANESS and Wanda Maness v. WEOGUFKA VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, a corporation, et al. 79-536.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

James M. Sizemore, Jr., Sylacauga, for petitioner.

William W. Goodrich for Gaines, Cleckler, Robbins & Goodrich, Talladega, W. Lee Pittman for London, Yancey, Clark & Allen, Birmingham, for respondents.

SHORES, Justice.

Petitioners Jimmy and Wanda Maness filed suit in the Circuit Court of Talladega County against Weogufka Volunteer Fire Department, a domestic corporation not doing business in Talladega County; Steve Dyess, Harold G. Moore, and C. B. Culver, all residents of Coosa County; and James Jacks, a resident of Talladega County at the time of the commencement of suit. Jacks subsequently received a summary judgment in his favor, and the remaining defendants filed a motion for change of venue to Coosa County. The motion was granted. Petitioners then brought this petition seeking a writ of mandamus to be directed to the circuit judge in Talladega County ordering that the transfer be set aside or a writ of prohibition preventing the transfer to Coosa County. For the reasons discussed herein, we grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

Under ARCP 82(b)(1)(A), actions against resident individuals of the State of Alabama must be brought in the county where "any material defendant resides at the commencement of the action." Under ARCP 82(c), "(w)henever an action has been commenced in a proper county, additional claims and parties may be joined . . . as ancillary thereto, without regard to whether that county would be a proper venue for an independent action on such claims or against such parties." Rule 82(d) provides for transfer of actions where venue is improper, but the Committee Comments make it clear that this applies "only where the original venue was not proper." The Comments to subdivision (c) state that "(t)he correct principle seems to be that once venue is properly laid, other claims and parties may be joined as ancillary to the original action regardless of venue requirements."

Thus, a transfer is not authorized under the Rules unless venue was incorrect at the outset of the suit. If venue was proper as to defendant Jacks, a resident of Talladega County, then it would be proper as to the other defendants under the ancillary venue provisions of Rule 82. Respondents, however, contend that Jacks was not a "material defendant," in the language of the Rule, but merely a nominal party joined for the purpose of defeating the operation of the venue statute. They contend that this is established by the trial court's granting of Jacks's motion for summary judgment. This is a misinterpretation of the term "material defendant." For the purpose of establishing venue, a "material defendant" is one whose position is antagonistic to that of the plaintiffs because relief is sought against him. Alabama Youth Services Board v. Ellis, 350 So.2d 405 (Ala.1977).

Where there are several defendants and the residence of one is made determinative of the venue of the action, the complaint must state a cause of action against the said defendant; it must show that the resident defendant has an interest antagonistic to the plaintiff and the resident defendant must be a...

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17 cases
  • Ex parte Gauntt
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • February 9, 1996
    ...is whether the county in which the action was brought was a proper venue. Id.; Ex parte Wilson, 408 So.2d 94 (Ala.1981); Ex parte Maness, 386 So.2d 429 (Ala.1980). Whether Macon County is a proper venue for these cases depends on whether a complaint alleging both contract and tort claims ag......
  • Sperau v. Ford Motor Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1995
    ...because the question of proper venue is to be determined as of the time the action is filed. Rule 82(b)(1)(A), A.R.Civ.P.; Ex parte Maness, 386 So.2d 429 (Ala.1980); Ex parte Wilson, 408 So.2d 94 (Ala.1981); Ex parte Smith, 423 So.2d 844 (Ala.1982); Elmore County Com'n v. Ragona, 540 So.2d ......
  • Elmore County Com'n v. Ragona
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • January 27, 1989
    ...an attempt to defeat the right to transfer." Rule 82(d)(2)(A), Ala.R.Civ.P.; Ex parte Terrell, 503 So.2d 847 (Ala.1987); Ex parte Maness, 386 So.2d 429 (Ala.1980). Nationwide was a material defendant because of its refusal to pay uninsured motorist benefits; its interest was aligned with th......
  • Marshall County v. Uptain
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • December 23, 1981
    ...as to the remaining defendants, who were brought in under the ancillary venue provision of Rule 82(c)." Maness v. Weogufka Volunteer Fire Department, 386 So.2d 429 (Ala.1980). The appellants argue that the holding of this Court in Maness v. Weogufka Volunteer Fire Department, is not applica......
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