Ex parte McIver
Decision Date | 11 April 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 2,No. 60072,60072,2 |
Citation | 586 S.W.2d 851 |
Parties | Ex parte Alton McIVER, Jr |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
A. Deniz Tor, J. Douglas Tinker, Corpus Christi, for appellant.
Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before DOUGLAS, ROBERTS and ODOM, JJ.
This is a post-conviction application for habeas corpus relief. The applicant did not present any evidence at the hearing in the convicting court, but we have a record of papers filed in the cause. It appears that on May 6, 1975, a jury found the applicant guilty of felony possession of marihuana. The issue of punishment was submitted to the jury with instructions which included six verdict forms. These verdict forms would permit the jury to assess, respectively:
1. confinement with probation recommended;
2. confinement with probation recommended, and a fine;
3. confinement with probation recommended, and a fine with probation recommended;
4. confinement;
5. confinement, and a fine; or
6. confinement, and a fine with probation recommended (only on the fine).
The applicant alleges two grounds for relief. The first ground is that the verdict, judgment, and sentence are void because they make the applicant liable for confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of 15 years, which is more than the maximum prescribed punishment of 10 years (Texas Revised Civil Statutes, Article 4476-15, Section 4.05(b)(1)). We cannot agree that these instruments can be construed to impose 15 years' confinement. It seems clear that the sentence of confinement is limited to 5 years and that the 10 years' probation (which began "now," i. e., on sentencing day), if revoked, would result only in imposition of a $5,000 fine, not in additional penitentiary time.
We do agree that the verdict, judgment, and sentence are void because they impose a punishment not authorized by law.
At the time when the applicant was tried and sentenced, Section 3a of the Adult Probation, Parole, and Mandatory Supervision Law (Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 42.12) provided (in part): Therefore, the first sentence gives the jury the option either to recommend probation of the punishment it has assessed (as in verdict forms 1 and 3 submitted in this case), or to refrain from such recommendation (as in forms 4 and 5). Effective September 1, 1975 (after the applicant was sentenced), the Legislature added a second sentence 1 to the section, specifically authorizing the jury to assess a fine even though it has recommended probation of other punishment (as in form 2). Neither before nor after this amendment did Section 3a specifically authorize the jury to do the opposite: to assess other punishment (such as confinement) even though it has recommended probation of a fine which it has assessed (as in form 6, which the jury used in this case). Specific authority being absent, can authority for such a verdict be implied from the general probation authority given the jury by the first sentence of the section? We hold that it cannot.
The act of the Legislature adding specific authority for the jury to impose a fine in addition to probated confinement implies that the general probation authority in the first sentence of Section 3a did not authorize such a verdict. This also implies that the general probation authority would not authorize a verdict like the one in this case which probates some, but not all, of the assessed punishment.
Prior decisions of this Court, construing a similar statute, reached the same conclusion. Like the first sentence of Section 3a of Article 42.12, the Misdemeanor Probation Law gives the jury a general authority to recommend probation. 2 We have held that the statute does not authorize the jury to assess confinement (without a recommendation of probation) and a fine with a recommendation of probation. Taylor v. State, 549 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). That is exactly what the jury did to this applicant. We also have held that the statute does not authorize the jury to impose a non-probated penalty to be exacted from the defendant, to be followed by a period of probation. Batten v. State, 549 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). This is essentially what the jury did to this applicant. The reasoning of those opinions equally applies to the felony probation statute, Section 3a of Article 42.12.
This conclusion is strengthened by evidence in other sections of Article 42.12 which imply that confinement followed by a probated fine was not contemplated by the Legislature. Section 2.b of Article 42.12 defines "probation" as "the release of a convicted defendant . . . ." (Compare Section 2(2) of Article 42.13, which is substantially the same.) This implies that release is an essential ingredient of probation. Release is an ingredient of every possible jury verdict granting felony probation except the kind of verdict returned in this applicant's case. Compare verdict forms 1, 2, and 3 with form 6, above.
We also note that Section 6.h of Article 42.12 provides that the court can order a defendant to pay his assessed fine, without a sentence, while his other punishment is probated. There is no corresponding provision for the court to order a defendant to the penitentiary, without a sentence, while his other punishment (such as a fine) is probated.
What would happen to the applicant if he violated a condition of his probation after he had completed his sentence of confinement? Presumably the court would order his probation revoked. Section 8(a) of Article 42.12 authorizes the revoking court to "reduce the term of imprisonment" for certain reasons, but it does not speak to reduction of a probated fine, which apparently was not contemplated.
Upon revocation, the court presumably would have to enter a sentence imposing the fine. Therefore, there would be two sentences in the cause, a procedure otherwise unknown in Texas.
For these reasons, we hold that a jury in a felony case is not authorized to assess a punishment of both confinement (without a recommendation of probation) and a fine with a recommendation of probation. Courts should not submit forms such as form 6 used in this case.
In his second ground for relief, the applicant argues that the jury intended to give him probation, and that therefore both the confinement and the fine should be probated. To the contrary, it is clear that the jury's verdict would probate only the fine. Courts have no power to change a jury verdict unless it is with the jury's consent and before they have dispersed. Smith v. State, 479 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 37.10. The jury also could have been retired again to deliberate. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 37.10; Jones v. State,511 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). We cannot change this clear verdict.
The true problem with this verdict is that, because it assesses confinement followed by probation, which is not authorized by law, it was "void at its inception." Smith v. State, 479 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The corresponding judgment and sentence also must be void. We will grant habeas corpus relief to a person in custody under a sentence which is void because the punishment is unauthorized. Ex parte Harris, 495 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
The applicant is ordered released from all forms of custody, including confinement, parole, and probation, imposed by the judgment or sentence in cause 2830 in the 24th Judicial District Court of Jackson County. He is ordered delivered to the Sheriff of Jackson County to answer the indictment pending in that cause.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON STATE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
A panel of this Court, in a decision which we are now asked by the State to reconsider, held that a jury does not have the authority under ...
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