Ex parte Morgan
Decision Date | 22 April 1994 |
Citation | 641 So.2d 840 |
Parties | Ex parte Joseph MORGAN. (Re Joseph Morgan v. State). 1921253. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Michael A. Dasinger, III of Hoiles & Dasinger, P.C., Robertsdale, for petitioner.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Gail I. Hampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
We granted certiorari review in order to determine whether the certain evidence seized following a warrantless arrest was admissible.
The defendant, Joseph Morgan, was found guilty of kidnapping in the first degree, possession of obscene material, two counts of enticement, and indecent exposure. At trial, Morgan argued that his arrest was improper and that evidence found following that arrest was inadmissible because of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant's arrest was proper and that evidence found pursuant to that arrest was admissible.
The Court of Criminal Appeals set out the facts in Morgan v. State, 641 So.2d 834 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). However, we feel it necessary to recite the facts as found by that court in order to better present the issue in this case:
Morgan moved to suppress the evidence found in his hotel room, arguing that it had been obtained upon an illegal warrantless arrest. The trial court denied the motion and admitted the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the police had arrested Morgan for being a fugitive from justice, but had failed to obtain a fugitive from justice warrant required by § 15-9-40, Ala.Code 1975. Under § 15-9-41, an officer may arrest a person without a warrant upon reasonable information that the person is charged with a crime punishable by death or by life imprisonment in another state. Here, even though Morgan was charged in Florida with crimes that were punishable by life imprisonment, the police, at the time of Morgan's arrest, were unaware that the charges were punishable by life imprisonment, according to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that sufficient probable cause existed to arrest Morgan for sexual offenses occurring in Alabama, and, therefore, that the warrantless arrest and subsequent search were proper.
Morgan argues that the warrantless arrest was invalid under § 15-9-40 and § 15-9-41. Morgan contends that the officers saw certain incriminating material in "plain view" when they arrested him and that part of their basis for the subsequent search warrant was the material that they had seen during the illegal arrest. On the premise that the arrest was invalid, Morgan further argues that the subsequent search and seizure of evidence inside his motel room were illegal and that the evidence was therefore inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
We agree that the warrantless arrest was invalid; it did not meet the requirements of § 15-9-40 and § 15-9-41, because the police did not have a fugitive from justice warrant before making the arrest and did not know before the arrest that the crimes Morgan was charged with were punishable by life imprisonment. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that under the facts of this case probable cause alone was enough to justify the warrantless arrest and the subsequent search. That holding is incorrect.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The United States Supreme Court held in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1971-72, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970), that a warrantless search of a home cannot be justified on probable cause alone. The exception to the requirement of a search warrant is the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Payton. The protection against warrantless searches and seizures in regard to a dwelling has been extended to motel rooms. United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 166, 98 L.Ed.2d 120 (1987).
On these facts, we must conclude that the State failed to show that the search and seizure were justified by probable cause plus exigent circumstances. However, the search and seizure in this case fall under the protection of the "good faith" exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The good faith exception provides that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate need not be excluded from the State's case-in-chief even if the warrant is ultimately found to be invalid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The officers' reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant the magistrate issued must be objectively reasonable. Leon.
"[ ]The exclusionary rule [of the Fourth Amendment] is neither intended nor able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered,' " but rather "operates as 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect [of preventing subsequent police misconduct].' " Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412. The deterrent effect must be balanced against the "substantial social cost" the rule imposes. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907, 104 S.Ct. at 3412.
"[W]hen law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred [by the exclusionary rule] on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system."
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 104 S.Ct. at 3412.
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