Ex Parte Parker.
| Decision Date | 19 September 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 361.,361. |
| Citation | 35 S.E.2d 169,225 N.C. 369 |
| Parties | Ex parte PARKER. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Lenoir County; R. Hunt Parker, Judge.
Proceedings in the matter of the petition of Earl Parker for a writ of habeas corpus. To review an order denying the writ and remanding petitioner to custody of prison officials, petitioner brings certiorari.
Reversed.
Petitioner seeks, by certiorari, to have reviewed an order of Honorable R. Hunt Parker, Judge of the Superior Court, made in a Habeas Corpus Proceeding heard at May Term, 1945, of Lenoir Superior Court substantially upon the following facts:
At October Term, 1935, of Lenoir County Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of larceny of an automobile and sentenced to confinement in State's Prison for seven years. Minute Docket X, Clerk's office, Lenoir County Superior Court; Permanent Criminal Docket p. 279. At June Term, 1937, of Martin County Superior Court, the petitioner, who had meantime escaped from prison, was charged with larceny, pleaded guilty, and the following sentence pronounced:
At the June Criminal Term of Lenoir County Superior Court, petitioner pleaded guilty of breaking and entering and larceny, and was sentenced as follows: Docket Y, p. 219.
The prisoner was returned to custody of the State's Prison immediately after his trial at Lenoir Superior Court in June 1937, and resumed service of the sentences imposed.
It is conceded that unless the sentence imposed on petitioner in Martin County Superior Court June 17, 1937, does not in law begin at the expiration of the sentence imposed at the 1935 Term of Lenoir Criminal Court, but, on the contrary, runs concurrently therewith, the petitioner, at the time he sued out the writ of habeas corpus now under review, had completed the entire period of service under the several sentences imposed, and is entitled to his discharge.
At the hearing the petitioner introduced the records of the various criminal judgments involved, of dates and in substance as above stated.
In reply the respondent, over objections and exceptions of petitioner, introduced evidence aliunde the court records to explain the reference in the 1937 Martin County sentence to "case number CP. #31355, " and to connect it with the 1935 sentence imposed in Lenoir County. In part, this evidence was to the effect that the Lenoir County sentence had been duly certified to the State Prison authorities; and that in accordance with the custom of that institution, it was thereupon given upon the State Prison records a designating name and number for administrational purposes, to-wit: "Case No. 31355."
Further, respondent introduced the prison records of three commitments purporting to be upon the several sentences involved; and a letter of Mary G. Goldsborough, Principal General Clerk of the Prison Division, purporting to give the record of petitioner as a prisoner, and including prison data as to dates of conviction, offense, sentence; with much other matter concerning petitioner's prison record.
From the answer to the petition, it appears that at the request of Sheriff Roebuck, of Martin County, the prison authorities furnished him a copy of the prisoner's record, including a statement of the sentence imposed on petitioner, at October 1935 Term of Lenoir Court, designated on the prison record as "CP #31355."
Where necessary, other facts of record as may be pertinent to the decision will be referred to in the opinion.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the judge hearing the writ made his findings of fact, including inferences and conclusions of fact made from the evidence above summarized, and stated his conclusions of law. His Honor found, substantially, that the notation "CP 31355 means Central Prison 31355, and means the sentence imposed at the October, 1935, Term of the Superior Court of Lenoir County against the petitioner, Earl Parker, and that the reference to the sentence imposed at the October Term, 1935, of the Lenoir Superior Court is certain and definite, and that it was clearly the intention of the Judge who presided at the June Term, 1937, of the Superior Court of Martin County to make his sentence begin at the expiration of the sentence imposed at the October Term, 1935, of Lenoir County against this petitioner, and that his intent is clearly and definitely fixed in his judgment." He therefore found as a matter of law that the Martin County Sentence began at the expiration of the aforesaid sentence imposed in 1935 in Lenoir County, and that the sentence imposed against petitioner at June Term 1937 of the Superior Court of Lenoir County began at the expiration of the prison sentence imposed against petitioner at the June Term 1937 of the Superior Court of Martin County.
Concluding that there was no evidence before the Court that Parker has served in full the three prison sentences, as thus interpreted, the Court remanded petitioner into custody of the prison officials to be returned to the State's Prison until the sentences had been completely served in accordance with his judgment.
The petitioner, preserving his objections and exceptions, brings the case here for review by proper writ.
J. A. Jones, of Kinston, for petitioner, appellant.
George B. Patton, of Raleigh, for respondent, appellee.
The question presented upon this appeal is whether the sentence imposed upon the petitioner at the June 1937 term of Martin Superior Court has the legal effect of causing that sentence to run consecutively with a prior sentence of seven years imposed upon him at Lenoir Superior Court in 1935. It is conceded that if the Martin County sentence runs concurrently with the Lenoir sentence referred to, petitioner has "paid his debt to society"—at least as far as may be done by completing his penal servitude under all the sentences imposed— and is now entitled to his discharge.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, and unless it sufficiently appears otherwise in the sentence itself, it is generally presumed that sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction, to be served at...
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...are to be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the citizen. State v. Jordon, 227 N.C. 579, 42 S.E. 2d 674; In re Parker, 225 N.C. 369, 35 S.E.2d 169; State v. Campbell, 223 N.C. 828, 28 S.E.2d 499; State v. Ingle, 214 N.C. 276, 199 S.E. 10; State v. Harris, 213 N.C. 758, 197......
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