Ex parte Plaistridge
| Decision Date | 11 June 1918 |
| Docket Number | 9249. |
| Citation | 173 P. 646,68 Okla. 256,1918 OK 352 |
| Parties | Ex parte PLAISTRIDGE. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
This court on habeas corpus will not look beyond the judgment and sentence of any court of competent jurisdiction as to mere irregularities of procedure, or errors of law on questions over which the court had jurisdiction.
A court of competent jurisdiction is one having power and authority of law at the time of acting to do the particular act.
[Ed Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Competent Jurisdiction.]
Section 4893, Rev. Laws 1910, limits inquiry on habeas corpus to whether the district court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter and authority of law at the time of acting to render the judgment complained of.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 2277, defining "direct contempt" to be disorderly or insolent behavior committed during a session of court and in its immediate presence, and "indirect contempt" to be willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully made by the court, the refusal to obey an order made under section 4967, requiring defendant, failing in his suit for divorce, to pay certain sums to his wife as court costs and expenses of suit, was an "indirect contempt."
[Ed Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Direct Contempt; Indirect Contempt.]
While one proceeded against for an indirect contempt is entitled to a trial by jury, under Rev. Laws 1910, § 2279, the refusal of the court to award a trial by jury in a proceeding for an indirect contempt is an illegality not defeating its jurisdiction or rendering its judgment void.
In all cases where a trial by jury does not constitute an essential part of due process of law, it may be waived by the party.
A proceeding for an indirect contempt is civil in its nature, and the imprisonment is not imposed as a punishment for any offense, but is remedial in its nature, and is imposed for the purpose of coercing defendant to do that which he was commanded to do.
Error from District Court, Carter County; W. F. Freeman, Judge.
Original petition for habeas corpus by C. H. Plaistridge. Writ discharged, and petitioner remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Carter county.
Sigler & Howard, of Ardmore, for petitioner.
S. M. Davis, of Davis, for Mattie E. Plaistridge.
C. H. Plaistridge was committed to the county jail of Carter county by the judge of the district court for refusing in open court to obey an order theretofore made requiring him to pay certain sums to his wife as court costs and expenses of suit in an action for divorce, and files an original petition wherein he prays a writ of habeas corpus and urges as reasons for his discharge: First, that the judgment under which he was committed is void because not supported by sufficient pleadings; and, second, that he was denied a jury trial when brought before the court to show cause why he had not complied with the order. The order was entered at the trial of an action for divorce brought by himself against his wife upon the hearing of which demurrer was sustained to the testimony, and his prayer for divorce denied. Counsel for plaintiff insist that the order was void because the court was without jurisdiction to make the order after it had held that the evidence was insufficient to entitle plaintiff to a decree of divorce, and that alimony cannot be decreed except for causes for which a divorce might be granted. Under section 4967, Rev. Laws 1910, where a divorce is refused on the application of the husband, the court may require the husband to pay such reasonable expenses of the wife in the prosecution or defense of the action as may be just and proper. This section was sufficient authority for the making of the order complained of.
In support of the second proposition it is urged that the failure to comply with the former order of the court constitutes constructive as distinguished from direct contempt, and petitioner was entitled to trial by jury.
In Wells v. Wells, 46 Okl. 88, 148 P. 723, it was held that disobedience of an order to pay alimony and counsel fees in a divorce suit constitutes indirect as distinguished from direct contempt.
Section 2277 defines "direct contempts" to be disorderly or insolent behavior committed during the session of the court and in its immediate view and presence, and of the "unlawful and willful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness," and the "refusal to answer any legal or proper question," and "any breach of the peace, noise or disturbance so near to it as to interrupt its proceedings." And "indirect contempts" are defined to be "willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by the court; resistance willfully offered by any person to the execution of a lawful order or process of a court."
Under this decision and the statute quoted the facts recited in the journal entry show petitioner to be guilty of an indirect contempt.
Under section 4893, Rev. Laws 1910, the scope of our inquiry is limited to the question whether the district court of Carter county had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, and the authority of law at the time of acting to render the judgment complained of. Ex parte Talley, 4 Okl. Cr. 398, 112 P. 36, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 805; Ex parte Justus, 3 Okl. Cr. 111, 104 P. 933, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483.
A court of competent jurisdiction is one having power and authority of law at the time of acting to do the particular act. The district court had power and authority of law to punish for contempt, and the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to perform the office of a writ of error, and its use must be...
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