Ex parte Rains
Decision Date | 14 September 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 54898,54898 |
Parties | Ex parte Will RAINS, Jr. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
This is a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding brought under the provisions of Article 11.07, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.
The petitioner was convicted of murder in 1961 and a sentence of forty (40) years' imprisonment was imposed. Petitioner contends that at the time of formal sentencing he was indigent, was without counsel, and that as a result was denied an appellate review of his conviction.
After a hearing on petitioner's application for habeas corpus, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding petitioner to be lawfully restrained. The record was forwarded to this court.
The record reflects that petitioner was convicted of murder with malice on May 23, 1961 and assessed a punishment of forty (40) years in the penitentiary by a jury. On June 23, 1961 formal sentence was imposed. No notice of appeal was given.
At the habeas corpus hearing held on February 18, 1977, Lillie Mae Dansby, petitioner's mother, testified he was born on June 13, 1942 and that at the time of his 1961 trial he was 19 years old. She related that in 1961 she was a widow and after posting bond for the petitioner and retaining counsel for trial she had exhausted her funds; that while he had counsel for the trial, no attorney was present at the time of the sentencing on June 23, 1961.
Petitioner Rains testified that prior to the murder offense he had no encounter with law enforcement, that he did not know any law. He stated that counsel retained by his mother because he was indigent, a Mr. Duke, was not present at the time of formal sentencing; that he did not waive his right to counsel. He admitted he did not tell the sentencing judge, Judge J. Frank Wilson, that he was indigent and did not request counsel. He stated his counsel had never discussed appeal with him, that he did not know he had a right of appeal and no one at the sentencing explained that right to him. He related he would have appealed his conviction if he had known of his right to do so. It was further shown by his testimony that he was sent to prison on July 5, 1961 and that he was released on parole in March, 1975. He admitted that he had since been convicted of burglary of a vehicle and that the Board of Pardons and Paroles was seeking to revoke his parole on the basis of the subsequent conviction. He acknowledged he had not previously filed an application for habeas corpus, but stated he had only learned of his right to have counsel present at sentencing when he was brought into another district court.
Upon petitioner's request, the trial court took judicial notice of the court records of the 1961 conviction. The docket sheet and the formal sentence are silent as to counsel at the time of the sentencing. No other evidence indicates counsel was present. It was stipulated that the court reporter's notes from the 1961 trial were no longer available.
The State offered no testimony or any other controverting evidence.
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law filed on March 28, 1977 were in part as follows:
It is here observed that this court is not bound by the findings of the trial court in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding. Ex parte Garcia, 548 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Bagley, 509 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Here, the court's conclusions of law are general and vague and do not deal specifically with the allegations in petitioner's habeas corpus application.
The conclusion reached seems to be based largely (according to the findings) on the "court's personal knowledge of the parties associated with this case as well as other factors . . . ." The extent and nature of such personal knowledge is not disclosed, nor did the habeas corpus judge, who was not the sentencing judge in 1961, indicate to the parties he was going to rely upon personal knowledge. It is well established that a judge's personal knowledge of matters not contained in official judicial records of the court is not a proper matter for judicial notice. Jackson v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 582, 157 S.W. 1196 (1913); Lerma v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 109, 194 S.W. 167 (1917); Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) ( ).
The burden of proof in a habeas corpus proceeding is upon the petitioner. It was incumbent upon the petitioner here by a preponderance of the evidence to show that he was indigent, had no counsel and did not affirmatively waive the right to counsel. Ex parte Auten, 458 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Ex parte Morgan, 412 S.W.2d 657 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
In determining whether the petitioner met his burden of proof, we find that Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 91 S.Ct. 1089, 28 L.Ed.2d 519 (1971), is instructive. There, the petitioner pleaded guilty to robbery in a Georgia state court in 1944. He escaped while serving his sentence and did not return to Georgia until 1969 to serve the remainder of his sentence. He then brought state habeas corpus proceedings to declare his conviction void under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), since he was not represented by counsel at the time of his trial. The trial court denied relief because Gideon was "recent law and under the law at the time of his sentence, the sentence met the requirements of the law at that time." The United States Supreme Court noted that this was error as Gideon is fully retroactive, citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 250, n. 15, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-298, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).
On appeal the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of habeas corpus but on different grounds, saying that the petitioner did not testify at the habeas corpus hearing that he "wanted a lawyer, asked for one, or made any effort to get one" or that "because of his poverty, or for any other reason, he was unable to hire a lawyer."
In granting the petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court stated, " " See also Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18 L.Ed.2d 33 (1967); Ex parte Perez, 479 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
As to whether the petitioner in Kitchens v. Smith, supra, had sustained his burden of proving his inability at the time of trial to hire an attorney, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
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