Ex parte Ridley
Decision Date | 11 January 1910 |
Parties | Ex parte RIDLEY. |
Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Syllabus by the Court.
A "parole," as the term is used in criminal law, may he defined as the release of a convict from imprisonment upon certain conditions to be observed by him, and a suspension of his sentence during his liberty thus granted.
Under the constitutional provision conferring the pardoning power upon the Governor (Const. art. 6, § 10), the Governor Ires exclusive power to parole a convict, with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper, and upon a violation by such convict of the terms and conditions of his parole the Governor has power to revoke his parole, and direct that such convict be rearrested and returned to custody, and required to serve out the unexpired part of the sentence of the court, as though no parole had been granted, even after the time his sentence would have ended but for the suspension thereof by the parole.
An executive order, revoking a parole for violating a condition thereof, and directing the rearrest and return to custody of the convict, is not violative of the constitutional guaranty "that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law," and "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation," since being a convict at large by executive elemency, which he has accepted on conditions included therein, the convict, upon violation of such conditions, is merely an escaped convict, and not entitled to invoke such constitutional guaranty.
When a convict has been released upon a parole, and where said parole has been revoked by order of the Governor for violation of the conditions thereof, in the absence of a statute or of an express provision of the parole providing for a hearing, the convict is entitled to a hearing on habeas corpus, before the Criminal Court of Appeals, or the district court of the county where he is held, in order that he may show, if he can, that he has performed the contions of the parole, or that he has a legal excuse for having not done so or that he is nor the same person who was convicted.
Under section 10, art. 6, of the Constitution, the pardoning power is vested exclusively in the Governor of the state, and any law which restricted this power would be unconstitutional and void. Held, that article 26, c. 89, Snyder's Comp. St. 1909, being chapter 62, p. 576. Sess. Laws 1907-1908, entitled "An act relating to the granting of pardons; creating a board of pardons and defining its duties," in conferring pardoning powers upon other state officers, and restricting the Governor in the exercise of the pardoning power, is an unconstitutional infringement and interference upon the executive power. The Constitution only vests in the Legislature the power to provide by law regulations relative to the manner of applying for pardons.
The law giving to prisoners certain deductions from their term of imprisonment for good behavior is not unconstitutional as an infringement of the prerogative of the Governor to pardon. It does not restrict or interfere with this power in any way. It simply fixes the term of imprisonment in certain cases and upon certain conditions, and thus enters into and becomes a part of the judgment and sentence of the court.
Application by William Ridley for writ of habeas corpus alleging that relator was illegally restrained of his liberty by W. M Cates, Sheriff of Stephens County. Writ denied, and petitioner remanded.
The statute giving prisoners deductions from their term for good behavior is not unconstitutional as conferring pardoning power.
Writ heard on agreed statement of facts as follows:
E. E. Morris, for petitioner.
Charles West, Atty. Gen., and Charles L. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The proposition presented involves the power of the Governor to grant paroles and to revoke paroles upon a violation of the conditions thereof, after the expiration of the period of time designated in the sentence of imprisonment. Our Constitution confers on the...
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