Ex Parte Rieck, No. 74,799 (TX 9/15/2004)

Decision Date15 September 2004
Docket NumberNo. 74,799.,74,799.
PartiesEX PARTE GEORGE WILLIAM RIECK, JR., Applicant.
CourtTexas Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLER, P.J., delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court.

We filed and set this application for writ of habeas corpus to determine whether the "Forfeiture of Good Conduct Time: Frivolous Lawsuits" statute applies to Article 11.071 habeas corpus proceedings. On our own motion, we asked the parties to brief the issue. We hold that the statute does not apply in the habeas context.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1992, applicant pled nolo contendere to indecency with a child and was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment and a $750 fine. Since that conviction, applicant has filed twenty-one applications for writ of habeas corpus, many of which have been dismissed pursuant to Article 11.07 §4.2 In this application, he complains about the time credit consequences of his 1999 parole revocation. These claims are identical to those raised in his sixteenth application.

II. ANALYSIS
A. General principles

In construing a statute, we confine our analysis to the plain meaning of the text, unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not have possibly intended.3 When we are called upon to go beyond the plain meaning of the statutory text, we may consider various extratextual factors.4 Those factors include but are not necessarily limited to: (1) the object sought to be attained, (2) the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, (3) the legislative history, (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects, (5) the consequences of a particular construction, (6) administrative construction of the statute, and (7) the title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.5

B. The statute

TEX GOVT CODE §498.0045(a) provides:

In this section, "final order" means a certified copy of a final order of a state or federal court that dismisses as frivolous or malicious a lawsuit brought by an inmate while the inmate was in the custody of the department or confined in county jail awaiting transfer to the department following conviction of a felony or revocation of community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision.

On receipt of a final order, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice is to forfeit certain designated periods of time, which may not later be restored.6

We have not had occasion to analyze the statute before now, but we have referred to its language. In dicta in Jones v. State, we said: "Writ applications dismissed under section 4 may, in appropriate cases, be dismissed with a final order declaring the lawsuit frivolous."7 But we did not invoke the statute's provisions or even cite to it in Jones, let alone analyze it. Faced now with the potential applicability of the statute to habeas proceedings, we conduct an analysis.

C. Plain or ambiguous?

Does an Article 11.07 habeas corpus proceeding constitute a "lawsuit" for the purpose of the statute? Words should be defined in accordance with any technical or particular meaning acquired by legislative definition or otherwise.8 In determining the plain meaning of a word, we initially look to dictionary definitions.9 Since "lawsuit" is a legal term, we shall look to definitions from legal dictionaries.

Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law defines "lawsuit" as "an action brought in a court for the purpose of seeking relief from or remedy for an alleged wrong."10 This definition would appear to include postconviction habeas proceedings.11 But definitions from other legal dictionaries are not as favorable to that proposition.

Black's Law Dictionary defines "lawsuit" as a "suit" and defines "suit" as: "Any proceeding by a party or parties against another in a court of law."12 Whether a habeas proceeding is a proceeding by one party against another is questionable. Habeas proceedings in Texas are styled "ex parte," which means, "Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested."13 On the other hand, as a matter of statute and practical fact, an Article 11.07 habeas corpus proceeding does involve a party adverse to the applicant — the State — which, contrary to what occurs in traditional ex parte proceedings, is given notice and the opportunity to respond.14

Some legal dictionary definitions cast doubt on the propriety of using the term "lawsuit" to describe criminal proceedings. Citing the Michigan Supreme Court case of Patterson v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.,15 Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "lawsuit" as: "An action or proceeding in a civil court in law or equity, but not a criminal prosecution."16 And Barron's Law Dictionary, citing Kohl v. United States17 and Patterson, equates "lawsuit" with "suit," and defines the term more expansively, saying that it could be used to describe criminal proceedings but is more appropriate for civil proceedings.18

In Patterson, an insured involved in an automobile accident was prosecuted for manslaughter.19 The insurance policy provided that the insurance company would defend the insured in any "suits" brought against him on account of the accident.20 The insured claimed that "suits" included criminal prosecutions, while the insurance company interpreted the term "suits" to refer only to civil actions.21 Ruling in favor of the insurance company, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the word "suits" in the insurance policy did not extend to criminal prosecutions.22 The Michigan court acknowledged that the word "suit" enjoyed broad usage, including being applied to a criminal prosecution in some contexts, but that application to criminal proceedings was disfavored.23 The court also looked at the specific context before it and concluded that its interpretation of "suits" as meaning "civil suits" conformed to the purpose of automobile insurance contracts.24 Two cases involving a corporation's right to prosecute and defend "suits" after dissolution have relied on or cited Patterson to determine that "suits" applies only to civil proceedings.25

The construction of the word "suit" in these cases and others,26 and the dictionary definitions of "suit" and "lawsuit" derived from the cases, are attempts to determine the meaning of a word by looking at its context and common usage — tools of construction that are well recognized in Texas.27 An examination of our own prior cases shows that the word "lawsuit" has been used to refer to a criminal prosecution in connection with a wide variety of issues.28 Our use of the word "lawsuit" to refer generally to both civil and criminal actions was evident in Taylor, where we held that it was not permissible for attorneys representing the same party to take conflicting positions: "The District Attorney does not point to any other court that is called on in any case to entertain conflicting decisions made by two attorneys representing one party to a lawsuit."29 Moreover, participants in criminal trials often refer to the criminal prosecution as a "lawsuit."30 In numerous cases we have referred to a civil action as a "civil lawsuit"31 while we have found just a few cases referring to a "criminal lawsuit," or a synonym thereof.32 Although this may indicate that the use of the word "lawsuit" is much more common in connection with civil proceedings, it nevertheless supports the proposition that the word "lawsuit" can sometimes broadly refer to both civil and criminal actions.

However, while "lawsuit" is used in its broad meaning in our cases, statutory references to the word almost uniformly involve the more narrow use as a description of civil actions.33 Excluding the statute under consideration in this case and related statutes,34 the only possible exceptions appear to be the statute describing the barratry offense in the Penal Code and a Water Code statute that may refer to criminal offenses committed under that code.35

The United States Supreme Court has, at times, used the word "suit" or "lawsuit" broadly. In Kohl, the Supreme Court defined "suit" in relation to the expansive federal jurisdiction created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.36 And in the context of the federal statute authorizing the filing of in forma pauperis actions, the Supreme Court has referred to the word "lawsuit" in connection with both criminal and civil actions.37

Regardless of how one resolves the meaning of the word "lawsuit," whether habeas proceedings in particular can be properly characterized as lawsuits is unclear. In addition to this Court's own casual reference to a habeas corpus proceeding as a "lawsuit,"38 there is the pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in Kohl that expressly includes habeas corpus within its own list of proceedings that constitute "suits."39 However, implicitly utilizing the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "suit" as an action by one party against another, the Texas Attorney General has concluded that "there is no consensus on whether habeas corpus is a `suit' or 'action.'"40 In connection with this conclusion, the Attorney General cited the Texas Supreme Court case of Ex parte Ramzy and several out-of-state cases for the proposition that habeas corpus is not a "suit" but instead a "summary remedy."41

To the extent that the criminal nature of a proceeding might be a stumbling block to characterizing the proceeding as a lawsuit, it should be observed that most jurisdictions have traditionally regarded habeas corpus as a civil remedy, even when the relief sought is from confinement in the criminal justice system.42 Yet courts have struggled with how to characterize habeas proceedings and have sometimes characterized them as "neither civil nor criminal but rather sui generis" or "an exercise of special constitutional and statutory jurisdiction."43 The United States Supreme Court has...

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