Ex parte Salim

Citation595 S.W.3d 844
Decision Date16 January 2020
Docket NumberNo. 02-19-00200-CR, No. 02-19-00201-CR,02-19-00200-CR
Parties EX PARTE Mohammad Rashid SALIM
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: HEATHER M. LYTLE, ARLINGTON, TEXAS.

ATTORNEY FOR STATE: SHAREN WILSON, CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY; JOSEPH W. SPENCE, CHIEF OF THE POST-CONVICTION DIVISION; ANDREA JACOBS, TIMOTHY RODGERS, SAMANTHA FANT, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT, ATTORNEYS FOR TARRANT COUNTY, FORT WORTH, TEXAS.

Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Wallach, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

Appellant Mohammad Rashid Salim, a citizen of Jordan, appeals the trial court's denial of his requests for habeas relief. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Plea Bargain

Appellant pled guilty to two separately charged counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in exchange for five years' deferred adjudication community supervision. A week later, his trial counsel (Trial Counsel) filed a "Motion for New Trial and Motion in Arrest of Judgment," seeking to withdraw Appellant's guilty pleas on the basis of incompetency due to drug use. That motion was denied by operation of law.

B. First Application for Habeas Corpus

About seven months after the plea bargains, the State filed a motion to adjudicate Appellant's guilt in both cases, arguing that he violated his terms of community supervision by using drugs, twice refusing to submit to drug tests, and failing to complete an intensive day treatment program. Appellant was arrested pursuant to a warrant. In each case, Appellant's new counsel (Habeas Counsel One) filed an application for writ of habeas corpus on a Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07 form (Application One), arguing that Appellant's guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary and that Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07.

The trial court treated Application One as an Article 11.072 application and denied relief in a written order in June 2018. See id. art. 11.072. The trial court also issued the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, adopting all but one of the State's proposed findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS OF FACT
General Facts
1. App[ell]ant pled guilty, pursuant to plea agreements, to two second degree felonies of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a motor vehicle, on June 9, 2017. ...
2. In accordance with the plea agreements, the trial court placed App[ell]ant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of five years. ...
3. App[ell]ant did not appeal his placements on deferred adjudication. ...
4. App[ell]ant is currently on deferred adjudication. ...
Procedural Facts
5. App[ell]ant filed ... [A]pplication [One] ... pursuant to [A]rticle 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure on March 13, 2018. ...
....
Involuntary Plea–Controlled Substances
....
12. On the day of the plea, App[ell]ant had an active warrant. ...
13. On the day of the plea, App[ell]ant seemed scared and acted nervous. ...
14. App[ell]ant was worried about going to jail. ...
15. [Trial Counsel] advised App[ell]ant of his options, and he chose to accept the plea offer. ...
16. App[ell]ant questioned [Trial Counsel] regarding whether he was going to jail. ...
17. Although App[ell]ant was acting nervous, his questions to [Trial Counsel] were interactive and rational. ...
18. App[ell]ant appeared to be rational but very nervous. ...
19. [Trial Counsel] concluded that App[ell]ant's decision to plead was voluntary. ...
20. At the time of the plea, [Trial Counsel] had no idea that App[ell]ant [could] be under the influence of drugs. ...
21. App[ell]ant was not slurring, falling over, or showing any type of intoxicat[ed] behavior. ...
22. [Trial Counsel] now concludes that App[ell]ant's nervousness and antsy behavior could have been the result of being on some form of methamphetamine. ...
23. This Court has personal knowledge that [Trial Counsel] used to be a police officer.
24. This Court concludes that, based on her training and experience, [Trial Counsel] would have noticed at the time of the plea if App[ell]ant was under the influence of drugs to the point that his plea was not freely, voluntarily, or knowingly made.
25. [Trial Counsel] advised the court that App[ell]ant was competent. ...
26. This Court interacted thoroughly with App[ell]ant during the plea proceeding. ...
27. This Court would have noticed if App[ell]ant was under the influence of drugs to the point that his plea was not freely, voluntarily, or knowingly made.
28. This Court would not have accepted App[ell]ant's plea if it believed that the plea was not freely, voluntarily, or knowingly made.
29. Immediately after his plea, App[ell]ant tested positive for methamphetamine and morphine

. ...

30. Positive results for methamphetamine from a urinalysis "generally indicate use within 1–4 days but could be up to a week following heavy chronic use." ...

31. "Positive morphine urine results generally indicate use within the last two to three days, or longer after prolonged use." ...

32. A positive urinalysis result was only evidence that App[ell]ant had used methamphetamines and morphine within the last couple days.

33. App[ell]ant presents no evidence that he was incompetent at the time of his plea. ...

34. [Trial Counsel]'s affidavit is credible and supported by the record.
35. There is evidence App[ell]ant was able to consult with his attorney and the trial court with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. ...
36. There is evidence App[ell]ant had a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. ...
37. The evidence demonstrates that App[ell]ant was competent to plead guilty even though he tested positive for drugs.
38. App[ell]ant presents no evidence that he was not competent to plead guilty. ...
39. There is no evidence to overcome the presumption that App[ell]ant's plea was regular.
40. There is evidence that App[ell]ant's plea was freely, voluntarily, and knowingly made.
Involuntary Plea–Immigration Consequences
41. App[ell]ant acknowledged by his signature that he was aware that he "may be deported, excluded from admission to the United States, or denied naturalization under federal law" as the result of his plea of guilty. ...
42. App[ell]ant was advised by trial counsel on the record as follows:
... I just wanted to make sure that wasn't being used under pressure to force you to take this plea when there might be some immigration consequences.
...
I also got your plea bargain down a little bit off the deferred, but like the Judge says, a deferred can be taken as a conviction from the Feds. Do you understand?
...
If (the Feds) let you stay here , a deferred is not a conviction. And for future purposes, we talked about non-disclosures, correct?
...
43. Thus, counsel advised App[ell]ant that he may be deported as a result of this plea....
44. The trial court advised App[ell]ant that typically these pleas "would cause (his) deportation." ...
45. App[ell]ant admits that his father was eligible to apply for asylum status but did not apply in time. ...
46. App[ell]ant believed that special rules applied to him because he was eligible for asylum. ...
47. At the time of App[ell]ant's plea, [he] was twenty years of age. ...
48. App[ell]ant alleges that he "is now at risk of deportation because of his guilty plea." ...
49. App[ell]ant does not allege that he is being deported. ...
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
....
Involuntary Plea–Controlled Substances
....
5. App[ell]ant was properly admonished.
6. A trial court may not accept a criminal defendant's guilty plea unless the defendant is legally competent to make such a plea. SeeGodinez v. Moran , 509 U.S. 389, 400, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2687, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 ... (1993).
....
11. App[ell]ant has failed to prove that his drug usage caused him to not be competent to stand trial at the time of his plea.
12. App[ell]ant has failed to prove that his drug usage caused his plea to not be freely, voluntarily, or knowingly made.
13. App[ell]ant has failed to overcome the presumption that his plea was regular.
14. App[ell]ant's plea was freely, voluntarily, and knowingly made.
15. App[ell]ant's first ground for relief is DENIED .
Involuntary Plea–Immigration Consequences
16. There is a presumption of regularity with respect to guilty pleas under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure [A]rt. 1.15. Ex parte Wilson , 716 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
17. Before accepting a guilty plea, the court must admonish the defendant as to the consequences of his plea, including determining whether the plea is freely, voluntarily, and knowingly given. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13.
18. App[ell]ant was properly admonished.
19. When a defendant complains that his plea was not voluntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, " ‘the voluntariness of the plea depends on (1) whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and if not, (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ " Ex parte Moody , 991 S.W.2d 856, 857–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted).
20. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided that immigration consequences are unique in nature and are no longer considered collateral consequences of a plea. Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 365, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 ... (2010).
21. A defendant must be advised of the immigration consequences of his plea. Padilla ..., 559 U.S. [at] 374, 130 S. Ct. [at 1486]....
22. "When the law is not succinct and straightforward ..., a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, ... the duty to give correct advice is equally clear." [Id. at] 369, 130 S. Ct. [at] 1484 ....
23. An unmarried, under twenty-one year-old child "of an alien who is
...

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