Ex parte Sargent

• Decision Date: 03 September 1993
• Citation: 634 So.2d 1008
• Parties: Ex parte Charles SARGENT. (Re Charles SARGENT v. DIRECTOR, STATE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and Mobile Housing Board). 1920409.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1008

634 So.2d 1008

Ex parte Charles SARGENT.

(Re Charles SARGENT v. DIRECTOR, STATE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and Mobile Housing Board).

1920409.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 3, 1993.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Dec. 17, 1993.

Christopher Knight of Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Mobile, for petitioner.

George Cocoris, Gen. Counsel, and Frank D. Marsh, Asst. Gen. Counsel, State of Alabama Dept. of Indus. Relations, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This petition for certiorari review presents the question of whether an employee who has violated an employer's rule against receiving three garnishments has necessarily engaged in "misconduct committed in connection with his work." Ala.Code 1975, § 25-4-78(3)b. If violation of such a rule is necessarily misconduct committed in connection with his work, then the discharge of the employee for violating the rule disqualifies him for unemployment compensation. Id.

Disqualification provisions in the Unemployment Compensation Act should be narrowly construed. Ex parte Flowers, 435 So.2d 76, 78 (Ala.1983); Holmes v. Cook, 45 Ala.App. 688, 236 So.2d 352 (1970).

The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that such conduct is not misconduct connected with the employee's work:

"We hold that the conduct of an employee in so acting as to create a situation where garnishments are filed with his or her employer is not 'misconduct connected with his or her work.' Suffering repeated garnishments is not generally such misconduct as to disqualify a discharged employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Individual financial reverses may well be the result of a person's inability to cope with the system in which that person is trying to make a living. Bankruptcies, both personal and corporate, are almost a way of life in our society. To deprive a debtor of the right to unemployment benefits for a limited time, where the unemployment results from his position as a debtor unable to pay his bills, would be to defeat the purpose of the Nebraska Employment Security Law. The 'Employment Security Law is to be liberally construed in order that its beneficent purpose of paying benefits to involuntarily unemployed workers may be accomplished.' Sorensen v. Meyer, 220 Neb. 457, 462, 370 N.W.2d 173, 177 (1985).

"In so holding, the court does not say a company rule against garnishments is unreasonable for all purposes. Such a rule may govern whether or not an employee is retained in employment. A violation of the rule may warrant termination of employment, but the resulting discharge cannot be considered to be for misconduct connected with one's work in determining the right to receive unemployment compensation benefits. Unemployment benefits to aid individuals in financial difficulties should not punish them for being in that condition. A violation of a garnishment policy may warrant termination but cannot operate so as to result in disqualification from receiving unemployment benefits.

"In so holding, we agree with the holding of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Reed v. Employ. Security Comm., 364 Mich. 395, 397, 110 N.W.2d 907, 908 (1961), where that court stated:

" 'Garnishment of plaintiff's wages may well have been a nuisance to defendant company. Many acts of an employee might meet with the displeasure or disapproval of an employer and be prohibited by rule by him. Breach of such rule might, in a sense, be considered misconduct warranting discharge from employment. Unless the rule and its violation bear some reasonable application and relation of the employee's task, can the breach be said to be misconduct within the disqualifying language of section 29(1)(a)(2) of the statute? The purpose of the act is to benefit unemployed in financial straits, not to penalize them for being in that condition. We do not believe that the language of the statute discloses or its purpose permits reading into it a legislative intent to stamp the conduct here involved as misconduct within the meaning of the cited section.'

"See, also, Chalker v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 126 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1955); Horns v....