Ex parte Shonnell Jackson
Decision Date | 15 February 2002 |
Docket Number | 1981723 |
Parties | Ex parte Shonelle Jackson (In re: Shonelle Jackson v. State of Alabama) 1981723 |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-97-2300; Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-97-2050)
On Return to Remand
Shonelle Jackson was convicted of murder made capital because the killing occurred during the commission of a robbery in the first degree, see § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced to death on that conviction. He was also convicted of first-degree theft of property, see § 13A-8-3, Ala. Code 1975, and on that conviction was sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual offender with three prior felony convictions, see § 13A-5-9(c)(2), Ala. Code 1975. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both convictions and sentences. See Jackson v. State, [Ms. CR-97-2050, May 28, 1999] So. 2d (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). This Court granted certiorari review, see Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P., as it read before it was amended effective May 19, 2000, 1
and remanded the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for that court to remand the case for the trial court to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of Jackson's inculpatory statement. Ex parte Jackson, [Ms. 1981723, May 18, 2001] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2001). We instructed the Court of Criminal Appeals to forward the trial court's return to this Court. It appears that the trial court has complied with our directions and has conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of Jackson's statement.
Jackson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he made to a law-enforcement officer because, he says, the officer tricked him into making the statement. "'In reviewing the correctness of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court makes all the reasonable inferences and credibility choices supportive of the decision of the trial court.'" Kennedy v. State, 640 So. 2d 22, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), quoting Bradley v. State, 494 So. 2d 750, 760-61 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 923 (1987). The trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence. See Dixon v. State, 588 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1991); Parker v. State, 587 So. 2d 1072, 1088 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Rutledge v. State, 680 So. 2d 997, 1002 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); and Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff'd, 758 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 831 (2000).
Extrajudicial statements are prima facie involuntary and inadmissible; the duty rests on the trial court to determine whether the statement is voluntary, and unless it appears that it is voluntary it should not be admitted. See Farrior v. State, 728 So. 2d 691 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). The burden is on the State to show voluntariness and a Miranda 2 predicate before such a statement can be admitted into evidence. See Lewis v. State, 535 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1988). "Whether a waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent depends on the particular facts and underlying circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused -- i.e., the totality of the circumstances." Click v. State, 695 So. 2d 209, 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). The voluntariness of an inculpatory statement remains undetermined until the trial court has examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. See Ex parte Hill, 557 So. 2d 838, 841 (Ala. 1989).
The trial court's finding that a statement was voluntary need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Dixon v. State, supra. The test for the voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession or an inculpatory statement is whether, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the statement was free from inducement, threat, or promise, either expressed or implied, that would have produced in the mind of the accused any fear of harm or hope of favor. Ex parte Price, 725 So. 2d 1063 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133 (1999).
Moreover, "more subtle forms of psychological manipulation, such as trickery or deception by the police, have not been considered sufficiently coercive, standing alone, to render a confession or incriminating statement involuntary." Ex parte Hill, 557 So. 2d at 841.
The trial court submitted the following order on return to remand:
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