Ex parte Shula
| Decision Date | 11 January 1985 |
| Citation | 465 So.2d 452 |
| Parties | Ex parte Jonathan David SHULA (Re: Jonathan David Shula v. State of Alabama). Ex parte State of Alabama (Re: Jonathan David SHULA v. STATE of Alabama). 83-800, 83-820. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
James H. Lackey, Mobile, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and Susan McKinney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee/cross-appellant.
We granted these petitions for writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, 465 So.2d 448, erred when it remanded a case to the trial court for a post-conviction evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of a confession. We hold that the post-conviction hearing is an improper procedure in this case and we, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Jonathan David Shula was convicted in the Circuit Court of Mobile County of first degree rape. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment in the state penitentiary. During the trial, a confession was introduced into evidence in which Shula admitted his guilt. The issue decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the state met its burden of proving that Shula made a voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver of his constitutional rights, such proof being a prerequisite to the admissibility of the confession.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the state had not met this burden of proof and that the confession was, therefore, not properly admissible into evidence. The court's solution was to leave the conviction intact and remand the case for a post-conviction evidentiary hearing to determine whether Shula, in fact, made a valid waiver of his rights. We do not here review the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the state did not meet its burden of proof on this issue. We are concerned only with the Court's directions for disposition of the case. Shula argues that the proper remedy is a new trial, not an after-the-fact hearing on the admissibility of evidence already entertained by the jury which convicted him. We agree.
A confession is not properly admissible into evidence in a trial without a showing by the state that the defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his or her constitutional rights before making the statement. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Confessions are presumed to be involuntary, placing the burden on the state to prove a valid waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840 (1965). As stated above, the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case found that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof in Shula's trial. We now decide the proper means of rectifying this error.
In determining what is the proper method by which to dispose of the case, of crucial importance are the roles of the trial judge and the jury in deciding the voluntariness of the confession. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the "New York rule" governing this determination of voluntariness. The rule allowed the trial judge to conduct a preliminary review of the evidence regarding the confession and exclude it only if under no circumstances the confession could be deemed voluntary. Otherwise, the confession was admitted into evidence and the jury determined both voluntariness and truthfulness. In other words, "if there [was] a factual conflict in the evidence as to voluntariness over which reasonable men could differ, the judge [left] the question of voluntariness to the jury." 378 U.S. at 414, 84 S.Ct. at 1801 (Black, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow the convicting jury to determine both the voluntariness and the credibility of a confession. In footnote 19 of the majority opinion, the Court stated:
Whether the trial judge, another judge, or another jury, but not the convicting jury, fully resolves the issue of voluntariness is not a matter of concern here. To this extent we agree with Stein [346 U.S. 156 (1953) ] that the States are free to allocate functions between judge and jury as they see fit. [Emphasis added.]
378 U.S. at 391, 84 S.Ct. at 1788. Although Jackson struck down the New York rule, other rules regarding the voluntariness of confessions were apparently approved.
Under the "Wigmore" or "orthodox" rule, the "judge hears all the evidence and then rules on voluntariness for [the] purpose of admissibility of [the] confession; [the] jury considers voluntariness as affecting weight or credibility of [the] confession." Jackson, 378 U.S. at 411, 84 S.Ct. at 1799 (Black, J., dissenting). The Court distinguished the orthodox rule from the questionable New York rule by noting that under the orthodox rule
the judge's conclusions are clearly evident from the record since he either admits the confession into evidence if it is voluntary or rejects it if involuntary. Moreover, his findings upon disputed issues of fact are expressly stated or may be ascertainable from the record. In contrast, the New York jury returns only a general verdict upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. It is impossible to discover whether the jury found the confession voluntary and relied upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored it. Nor is there any indication of how the jury resolved disputes in the evidence concerning the critical facts underlying the coercion issue. Indeed, there is nothing to show that these matters were resolved at all, one way or the other.
378 U.S. at 379-380, 84 S.Ct. at 1782. Under Jackson v. Denno then, separate triers of fact must determine the voluntariness of a confession for purposes of admissibility on the one hand and the credibility of a...
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Griffin v. State, 2 Div. 491
...The cases which support this ancient proposition are legion....," Ex parte Callahan, 471 So.2d 463, 464 (Ala.1985). Ex parte Shula, 465 So.2d 452 (Ala.1985); Hadley v. State, 448 So.2d 465 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). To render a confession admissible, the State must "lay two predicates": "[t]he firs......
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...cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019, 106 S.Ct. 567, 88 L.Ed.2d 552 (1985). "Confessions are presumed to be involuntary...." Ex parte Shula, 465 So.2d 452, 453 (Ala.1985). "The record must affirmatively show that [the prosecution's] burdens have been met." Ex parte Callahan, 471 So.2d at 471. Based ......
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