Ex Parte Siegel
| Decision Date | 19 December 1914 |
| Docket Number | No. 18393.,18393. |
| Citation | 173 S.W. 1 |
| Parties | Ex parte SIEGEL. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
In Banc. Habeas corpus proceeding by Joseph Siegel. Petitioner remanded.
Upon his plea of guilty to a charge of illegal voting, petitioner was sentenced to serve a term of two years in the penitentiary by the criminal court of Jackson county, Mo., and he brings habeas corpus in this court to secure his discharge.
The complaint of petitioner is accompanied by a copy of the information under which he was convicted upon a plea of guilty, a copy of the judgment and sentence, together with a copy of an ordinance of Kansas City which purports to authorize the holding of an election on July 7, 1914, in said city to determine, by vote, whether or not said city would grant a franchise to certain corporations to maintain and operate certain street car lines upon its streets. Petitioner asserts that there is no law which denounces as a crime his act in voting more than once in the beforementioned municipal election, and that therefore he is entitled to his discharge. We will consider this insistence first, for, if it be true that the acts of which petitioner was convicted are not denounced as a crime by any law in force in this state, then his confinement is unlawful, notwithstanding his plea of guilty to the information preferred against him.
Petitioner concedes that by section 6155, R. S. 1909 (), he was expressly prohibited from voting more than once at any election held in said city pursuant to law. However, he earnestly insists that the election held on July 7, 1914, to adopt or reject a street car franchise, was not an election held by law, being merely an election held pursuant to a city ordinance, and therefore not within the purview of that part of section 6177 which reads as follows:
"The word `election,' as used in this article, shall be construed to designate elections had within any city, for the purpose of enabling electors to choose some public officer or officers under the laws of this state or the United States, or to pass any amendment, law or other public act or proposition submitted to vote by law." (Italics are ours.)
Petitioner stresses the last two words quoted from section 6177, and insists that a proposition submitted to voters by a city ordinance is not a submission of such proposition by law, for the reason that city ordinances are not laws; so that a proper ruling on this issue depends, in a large measure, upon a correct interpretation of the words "by law," as found in section 6177, supra.
Numa F. Heitman, of Kansas City, for petitioner.
BROWN, J. (after stating the facts as above).
To sustain the last-noted contention, petitioner cites City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, wherein Chief Justice Sherwood, in discussing the right of a city to appeal from a judgment of acquittal in an action to recover a fine for violating its ordinances, stated that the violation of a city ordinance was not a crime, because the ordinance was not a public law, but only a local law.
Petitioner also cites the case of Baldwin v. City of Philadelphia, 99 Pa. 164, in which it was held that a provision in the Constitution of Pennsylvania which ordained that "no law shall increase the salary of any public officer after his election or appointment" did not apply to the increase of salary of an officer by city ordinance.
Notwithstanding the authorities cited, we think petitioner's contention is unsound. The Clark Case, supra, was not, in a strict sense, an interpretation of the word "law"; but what was there said was in the nature of obiter, or the reasoning of the judge, and intended merely to illustrate the reason why a city was entitled to appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a suit to enforce its ordinances. As will be seen, that opinion does not hold that an ordinance is not a law, but only that it is a "local law" as distinguished from a "public law." That view did not meet the approval of all of the judges of this court.
In the subsequent case of Grand Ave. Ry. Co. v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 148 Mo. 665, loc. cit. 671, 50 S. W. 305, it was held that a power to hear and determine a certain class of causes conferred upon circuit courts by a valid city ordinance was a jurisdiction conferred upon such courts by law. This last-cited case met the unanimous approval of this court in banc, except Valliant, J., who did not sit. If that ruling was sound, it would necessarily follow that an election held under a city ordinance is an election held "by law."
McQuillin, in his treatise on Municipal Corporations (volume 2, § 643), says:
"Valid ordinances of municipal corporations are as binding on the corporators and the inhabitants of the place as the general laws of the state upon the citizens at large."
Can it be a misnomer to classify as a law that which was enacted by a legislative body and possesses all the force of law?
Section 10, art. 1, of the federal Constitution, provides that "no state shall * * * pass any * * * law * * * impairing the obligation of contracts." This constitutional provision has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to include ordinances enacted by cities which impair the obligation of contracts. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. Ed. 760. See, also, Iron Mountain R. Co. v. City of Memphis, 96 Fed. 126, 37 C. C. A. 410. Of course, the Murray Case, supra, is not directly in point here, because Constitutions are not always construed by the same rules as criminal statutes; but it does tend to show that the ruling in the Pennsylvania case, cited by petitioner, is erroneous.
In Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, loc. cit. 465, 14 Pac. 27, 1 Am. St. Rep. 67, the Supreme Court of California was urged to hold that the word "law," as found in the Constitution of that state, was intended to cover only statutes enacted by the General Assembly; but, instead of announcing such a rule, that court said:
However, leaving out of view the precedents, we think the statute under consideration ought to be construed to include an election held pursuant to the ordinance hereinbefore mentioned. If one speak generally of the laws of a certain city or place, he is presumed to refer to all laws having a binding force in that locality, and not merely to a certain class of laws by which that vicinity is governed.
If a state statute using the word "law" in its broad general sense is intended to apply exclusively to places where no incorporated city or town exists, we might be justified in holding that such word so used did not apply to city ordinances; but we find that sections 6155 and 6177, supra, are a part of article 14, c. 43, R. S. 1909, which by its very terms is intended to govern elections in cities having a population of 100,000 or more (section 6090, R. S. 1909), and, as we judicially know that cities of that size are empowered to enact ordinances, it is but natural that the Legislature should intend that said sections 6155 and 6177 should apply to elections held pursuant to the valid ordinances of such city.
We are not unmindful of the fact that all criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the accused. State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271, loc. cit. 284, 161 S. W. 1169, and cases there cited. However, this well-known and universally accepted rule of construction does not warrant such an unreasonable construction of even a criminal statute as will thwart the intention of the lawmaker. 36 Cyc. p. 1183, b. We think such would be the result if we adopted the views urged by petitioner's resourceful attorney. That the adoption or rejection of the street car franchise, upon...
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