Ex Parte Snodgrass

• Decision Date: 18 December 1901
• Citation: 65 S.W. 1061
• Parties: Ex parte SNODGRASS.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

65 S.W. 1061

Ex parte SNODGRASS.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

December 18, 1901.

Habeas corpus by Frank L. Snodgrass to set aside a judgment convicting relator of contempt. Relator discharged.

B. D. Tarlton and Frank L. Snodgrass, for relator. Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROOKS, J.

Upon application of relator for the writ of habeas corpus, the same was granted by Presiding Judge Davidson, and made returnable before the court for hearing on November 13, 1901, at which time the assistant attorney general filed the following motion to dismiss the application, to wit: "Now comes the state by the assistant attorney general, and would show the court that the applicant herein was ordered by the district judge committed to jail pending the payment of the fine of $50 assessed against him for contempt of court, and that said applicant was never by the sheriff committed to jail, so the state is credibly informed and believes, but was by the sheriff admitted on parole, and permitted to be enlarged, upon his promise to protect him in the premises; and said applicant was beyond the custody of the sheriff, and not within the jail of said Coleman county, before this court admitted him upon bail, as shown by the record herein. Wherefore the state would show the court that, by reason of the enlargement of the applicant, this court is without jurisdiction to hear this application, and the state moves the court that this application be dismissed." The judgment of the court finding applicant guilty of contempt was entered on September 11, 1901, and the commitment was issued on the 26th day of September. The writ of habeas corpus was granted by this court on October 7th, applicant being admitted to bail in the sum of $200 pending the disposition thereof. Relator, Frank L. Snodgrass, being sworn, stated substantially that, some days after the court fined him, judgment was entered by the court, and upon said judgment commitment was issued: that the sheriff met relator upon the streets, and arrested him on said commitment. Thereupon relator requested the sheriff to appoint some one or go himself with relator to relator's house, as his child was very sick with diphtheria, and relator could not with safety ask the neighbor ladies to wait upon his child with a contagious disease. Relator's wife was dead, and there was no one to properly care for the child besides himself. The officer informed relator he would not go himself, nor appoint any one, but relator could go home, if he would promise that under no circumstances or conditions would he leave the bedside of his child, except to go to relator's office and back. Relator promised upon his honor to comply with the conditions imposed upon him, which he did. While this character of enlargement, if it be termed such, was in existence, relator applied to this court for the writ of habeas corpus, which was granted, and he was released on bond. It will be noted this is an original application for the writ of habeas corpus, and not an appeal from an order refusing bail; hence we apprehend the rules covering the same are somewhat different, in reference to the confinement or imprisonment.

Article 170, Code Cr. Proc., provides:

"The same power may be exercised by the officer executing the warrant (and in like manner) in cases arising under the foregoing articles as is exercised in the execution of warrants of arrest according to the provisions of this Code.

"Art. 171. The words `confined,' `imprisoned,' `in custody,' `confinement,' `imprisonment' refer not only to the actual, corporeal and forcible detention of a person, but likewise to any and all coercive measures by threats, menaces or the fear of injury whereby one person exercises a control over the person of another and detains him within certain limits.

"Art. 172. By `restraint' is meant the kind of control which one person exercises over another, not to confine him within certain limits, but to subject him to the general authority and power of the person claiming such right.

"Art. 173. The writ of habeas corpus is intended to be applicable to all such cases of confinement and restraint, where there is no lawful right in the person exercising the power, or where, though the power in fact exists, it is exercised in a manner or degree not sanctioned by law."

Article 154, Code Cr. Proc., requires that "every provision relating to the writ of habeas corpus shall be most favorably construed in order to give effect to the remedy and protect the rights of the person seeking relief under it." Articles 151, 152, 164, 166, 167, Id., contemplates that a person is entitled to the writ not only in case of actual custody, but also in case of any illegal restraint. Article 172 states that by "restraint" is meant the kind of control which one person exercises over another, not to confine him within certain limits, but to subject him to the general authority and power of the person claiming such right. We think this article alone is decisive of the contention, and that the state's motion should not prevail. We deem it unnecessary to enter into a long discussion of these articles, but suffice it to say that any character or kind of restraint that precludes an absolute and perfect freedom of action on the part of relator authorizes such relator to make application to this court for release from said restraint. It certainly cannot be insisted that, if relator is illegally arrested (if he is illegally arrested), he must be placed in jail, and thereby be subjected to an additional outrage, before he can apply to this court for the writ of habeas corpus. The motion of the state to dismiss the application is overruled.

The following, in substance, are the facts upon which the commitment was based: Relator was an attorney at law, and engaged in the practice thereof in the town of Coleman, and was representing his client in the trial of Bob Gatlin, and in the course of his speech before the jury used such language that the court fined him for contempt. The judgment of the court is as follows: "State of Texas, County of Coleman. September 11th, 1901. It is considered and ordered by the court that F. L. Snodgrass be, and he is hereby, adjudged to be in contempt of this court, in this: That during the progress of his argument to the jury in the case of The State of Texas v. Bob Gatlin, and in open court, said F. L. Snodgrass, in discussing the testimony of witnesses H. N. Beakley and J. M. Crawford, who testified in said cause, with reference to said two witnesses stated and said to the jury, and in the presence and in the hearing of the court, and in the presence and hearing of the witness, in substance and effect, that either Beakley or Crawford (meaning the aforesaid witnesses) were mistaken, or one of them had lied. That H. N. Beakley, one of said witnesses, upon hearing said statement of F. L. Snodgrass, arose and stated to Mr. Snodgrass that he must not say that he (Beakley) had lied, whereupon said Snodgrass turned toward said Beakley, and, in an excited voice and manner, pointing and waving his hand toward Beakley, stated and said, `I stated that either you or Crawford was mistaken, or one of you had lied, and I have nothing to take back,' which language and conduct on the part of said Snodgrass provoked said H. N. Beakley, and caused him in open court, and in the presence of the court and jury, to commit an assault and battery upon said Snodgrass; and for which language and conduct on the part of said Snodgrass, in provoking such assault, he is adjudged guilty of contempt of this court, and fined in the sum of fifty ($50.00) dollars. And it is further ordered and decreed that said Snodgrass be, and he is hereby, committed to the jail of Coleman county, Texas, until such fine and all costs is paid. It is further ordered that the clerk of this court forthwith issue a writ of commitment to the sheriff or any constable of Coleman county, Texas, commanding such officer to take into custody and commit to jail said F. L. Snodgrass until said fine and all costs are fully paid." We find from an inspection of the affidavits filed both by the state and relator that the foregoing judgment is substantially supported by the affidavits. The affidavit of the trial judge, which contains some additional facts, is as follows: "I was presiding judge in the trial of the case, State of Texas v. J. M. Gatlin, at September term, 1901, district court, Coleman county, Texas. F. L. Snodgrass represented the defendant on the trial of said case. H. N. Beakley was a witness for the state in said case. Snodgrass, in his speech to the jury in said cause, and in discussing Beakley's testimony in said cause, made use of the language attributed to him in the judgment for...