Ex Parte Springfield

• Decision Date: 01 June 1889
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: <I>Ex parte</I> SPRINGFIELD.

11 S.W. 677

Ex parte SPRINGFIELD.

Court of Appeals of Texas.

June 1, 1889.

Appeal from district court, Harris county; C. L. CLEVELAND, Judge.

Application by Dick Springfield, under indictment for murder, for a writ of habeas corpus for bail. Bail was refused, and the relator appeals.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Davidson, for the State.

HURT, J.

The applicant was indicted for murder by the grand jury of Waller county, and the venue was changed to Harris county, where the case is now pending. Before the writ now before us was issued, the case had been heard and the applicant refused bail. The present writ was issued by the Hon. CHARLES L. CLEVELAND, judge of the criminal district court of Harris county, the application therefor being based on newly-discovered evidence. The writ was made returnable to the criminal district court of Harris county, and the case heard there. The applicant was again refused bail, and he appeals. The learned judge properly granted the writ, but it was error to make the same returnable to Harris county. The statute (Code Crim. Proc. art. 137) provides that, after indictment found, the writ must be made returnable in the county where the offense was committed. The writ in this case should have been returnable before the district court or the district judge of Waller county. Ex parte Trader, 24 Tex. App. 393, 6 S. W. Rep. 533. In all probability the judge granting the writ was misled by the decision in the case of Ex parte Walker, 3 Tex. App. 668. The rule announced in that case does not apply to cases like the one before us, which is a hearing upon the facts. In the Walker Case the application for bail was made on the sole ground that the prisoner had demanded a trial, and the state had been granted more than one continuance. The hearing on that application did not involve a hearing or inquiry as to the facts of the homicide. The applicant, as matter of law, was entitled to bail if the record before the court where the cause was then pending agreed with the facts stated in the application. A simple order of the court, either on motion or in granting the continuance to the state, would have sufficed to dispose of the matter of bail as the case and the record then stood. This case now before us involves an inquiry into the very facts of the homicide, and the statute is imperative that the inquiry be made in the county where the offense was committed, and where presumably the evidence exists, and can be more readily obtained. The...