Ex parte Springsteen

• Decision Date: 21 December 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 03–14–00739–CV,03–14–00739–CV
• Citation: 506 S.W.3d 789
• Parties: EX PARTE Robert Burns SPRINGSTEEN IV
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

506 S.W.3d 789

EX PARTE Robert Burns SPRINGSTEEN IV

NO. 03–14–00739–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Filed: December 21, 2016

Broadus A. Spivey, Charles F. Baird, James W. Hackney, Amber D. Farrelly, for Robert Burns Springsteen.

Patrick M. Kelly, Sherine E. Thomas, Andrew M. Williams, for the State of Texas.

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Bourland

OPINION

Bob Pemberton, Justice

The issues presented in this appeal concern whether a claimant can bring suit under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)¹ to establish a right to compensation under Texas's wrongful-imprisonment statute.² The district court concluded that such a suit was beyond its subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate. We agree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

Compensation for wrongful imprisonment in Texas

An initial overview of Texas law governing compensation for wrongful imprisonment aids understanding of the suit in question and, ultimately, the issues on appeal. It is well established that the common law—the starting or default legal rule—recognizes no right to recover against the government for wrongful or erroneous imprisonment,³ and sovereign immunity—the age-old common-law doctrine that "generally shields our state government's ‘improvident acts' ... against the litigation and judicial remedies that would be available if the same acts were committed by private persons"⁴ —would bar both jurisdiction and liability in any lawsuit purporting to seek that relief in court.⁵ Texas has departed somewhat from the strict common-law rule, however, beginning with a 1950s–era amendment to the Texas Constitution that authorized the Legislature, "under such regulations and limitations as the Legislature may deem expedient," to "grant aid and compensation" to any person fined or imprisoned under the laws of this State "for any offense for which he or she is not guilty."⁶ Because the amendment in itself did not grant a right or means of compensation, but merely authorized the Legislature to create one,⁷ any recovery for wrongful or erroneous convictions in Texas has depended upon statutes enacted pursuant to the constitutional grant and "such regulations and limitations as the Legislature has deemed expedient" within them. The most recent iteration of these statutes—and the only one presently existing—is found in Chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code,⁸ now commonly known as the Tim Cole Act.

In its current form, Chapter 103 in material part limits eligibility for compensation solely to a person who has "served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state" and also satisfies one of three alternative additional prerequisites that are prescribed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Section 103.001(a)(2) :

(2) the person:

(A) has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced;

(B) has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus that is based on a court finding or determination that the person is actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced; or

(C) has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus and:

(i) the state district court in which the charge against the person was pending has entered an order dismissing the charge; and

(ii) the district court's dismissal order is based on a motion to dismiss in which the state's attorney states that no credible evidence exists that inculpates the defendant and, either in the motion or in an affidavit, the state's attorney states that the state's attorney believes that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced.⁹

Paragraphs (B) and (C) are of primary importance in this case, and we should initially note two of their features that will become relevant to the discussion. First, Paragraphs (B) and (C) each require that a claimant "has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus ."¹⁰ Second, Paragraphs (B) and (C) each incorporate an additional requirement that the claimant be deemed "actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced ."¹¹ Paragraph (B) requires that the "relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus" must be "based on a court finding or determination that the person is actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced ."¹² Paragraph (C), on the other hand, requires "relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus" plus dismissal of pending charges "based on a motion to dismiss in which the state's attorney states that no credible evidence exists that inculpates the defendant and, either in the motion or in an affidavit, the state's attorney states that the state's attorney believes that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced ."¹³

The Texas Supreme Court has held that "actually innocent" within Paragraph (B)—and which logically would also apply to the parallel usage in (C)—denotes either of the two "actual innocence" concepts that have evolved in criminal jurisprudence as a basis for obtaining relief through post-conviction habeas corpus¹⁴ —the "bare" or "Herrera –type" actual-innocence theory founded on newly discovered evidence or the procedurally-focused "Schlup -type" theory¹⁵ —such that a habeas petitioner successful under either theory could qualify for compensation under Paragraph (B).¹⁶ This Court had previously reached a similar conclusion in State v. Young when construing a prior version of Section 103.001 that had not contained an explicit reference to habeas corpus, but based compensation eligibility on whether the claimant had been "granted relief on the basis of actual innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced."¹⁷ Considering that "actual innocence" had acquired a specific meaning and significance in habeas-corpus jurisprudence, we reasoned that " ‘has been granted relief based on actual innocence’ " as used in the then-applicable version of Section 103.001"connotes both a specific standard of proof and a procedural framework through which such relief is obtained—a [post-conviction] writ of habeas corpus on grounds of ‘actual innocence.’ "¹⁸ Consequently, we held that a claimant who had obtained reversal of a criminal conviction on direct appeal had not been "granted relief based on actual innocence" and was not eligible for compensation.¹⁹

Chapter 103 also prescribes the procedural mechanism by which a claimant must seek any compensation for which he or she is made eligible under Section 103.001. Although the Legislature had previously authorized recovery under Chapter 103 through suit against the State,²⁰ the sole means provided under the current version is administrative—the claimant must make application with the Comptroller²¹ by the third anniversary of the date either (as applicable to the basis for eligibility) the person received the pardon required under Paragraph (A) of Section 103.001(a)(2), the order of dismissal required by Paragraph (C) was signed, or "the person's application for a writ of habeas corpus was granted as provided by [Paragraph (B) ]."²² Chapter 103 further specifies that the claimant must submit a completed application form together with documentary support for the claim, which must include "a verified copy of the pardon, court order, motion to dismiss, and affidavit, as applicable," on which the claimant relies to establish eligibility for compensation.²³ The Comptroller is then charged with determining the claimant's eligibility from these verified documents, and "shall deny the claim" if the documents "do not clearly indicate on their face that the person is entitled to compensation under Section 103.001(a)(2)."²⁴ Chapter 103 additionally specifies that the Comptroller's eligibility determinations are "ministerial,"²⁵ denoting legislative intent to leave nothing to the Comptroller's discretion.²⁶

If the Comptroller determines that the claimant is eligible for compensation, the Comptroller is then to ascertain the amount of compensation owed by examining the documentation under standards prescribed elsewhere in the statute.²⁷ If, on the other hand, the Comptroller denies the claim, the Comptroller must "state the reason for the denial" and provide the claimant thirty days in which to submit an application "to cure any problem identified."²⁸ In the event the claimant submits a second or revised application in an attempt to cure the defect, the Comptroller must again determine the claimant's eligibility and (if found eligible) the amount owed.²⁹

In the event the Comptroller denies this second or revised claim, the Legislature has provided for judicial review to the extent "the claimant may bring an application for mandamus relief."³⁰ Although not specified explicitly in Chapter 103 itself, this mandamus proceeding must be filed in the Texas Supreme Court, as only that court has jurisdiction to issue the writ against the Comptroller.³¹

Springsteen's efforts to obtain compensation

The claimant here, Robert Burns Springsteen, IV, was imprisoned for several years—some spent on death row—after being convicted in Travis County of capital murder and sentenced to death on evidence implicating him in Austin's notorious "Yogurt Shop Murders." Springsteen's trial had predated the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal Crawford decision concerning "testimonial" hearsay and the Confrontation Clause,³² and in 2006 the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction based on the State's use of a co-defendant's statement in a manner proving to be inconsistent with Crawford .³³ But the court overruled a challenge by Springsteen to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction (thus permitting retrial) and to the voluntariness and admissibility of a purported confession he himself had made.³⁴

In 2008, as Springsteen remained incarcerated awaiting retrial, DNA testing of crime-scene evidence through techniques not previously available revealed the DNA of an unknown...