Ex Parte State
| Decision Date | 23 September 1988 |
| Citation | 539 So.2d 1074 |
| Parties | Ex Parte STATE of Alabama. (Re Odell SCALES v. STATE of Alabama). 87-866. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., J. Randall McNeill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Joe N. Lampley, Huntsville, for respondent.
We granted certiorari in this case because our decision in Branch v. State, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987) leaves unanswered the question of whether all cases raising a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), issue must be remanded for a hearing under the procedure formulated in Branch. We agree with the dissenting opinion of Judge Bowen that the answer is in the negative and that whether such a hearing must be held must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
In this case, the record indicates that the trial judge understood, as well as anyone does, the teachings of Batson. He conducted a hearing, and the prosecutor articulated his reasons for exercising his peremptory strikes to exclude the four blacks on the venire. He stated that he thought that the first was slow in responding to questions put to the venire, and he questioned her ability to understand the State's case against the defendant, which involved complex issues. The trial judge indicated that he, too, noticed these characteristics in this person. The second was struck, according to the explanation offered by the prosecutor, because she was approximately the same age as the defendant and was similar to her in appearance and background. These characteristics gave the prosecutor a reasonable basis for intuitively concluding that this prospective juror might be sympathetic to the defendant. The third juror stricken had a prior arrest record and had had "involvement with the law," and the final person eliminated had the same employer as the defendant and worked with a person who was scheduled to be a witness for the State.
The prosecutor explained that the facts led him to doubt whether these jurors would be fair to the State. Defense counsel noted the association of the juror with the State's witness (the fourth strike) which seemed to him to indicate that the juror would be more inclined to favor the State's position. The prosecutor responded that he was uncertain how her association with the State's witness would affect the juror.
In Batson the Supreme Court did not eliminate peremptory strikes altogether. It simply said that such strikes must not be used to discriminate on a racial basis. We appreciate that it is impossible to know what is in the mind of another person, and that it is possible that, in stating his reasons for striking a black member of the venire, a prosecutor may give a reason that is not the true reason, but we are convinced that the trial judges in our system are in a much better position than appellate judges to decide whether the truth has been stated.
In this case, the reasons given by the prosecutor for using his strikes to eliminate these four people were facially race neutral. The trial judge found them to be credible. No more is required under Batson, and the procedure adopted by the trial court, although this case was tried before Branch was decided, comports with the criteria established in Branch.
We hold that Branch does not require a new hearing in all cases where a Batson issue was preserved. Where the trial court, as it did in this case, complies with the Batson mandate, a second hearing is not required by Branch. Ex Parte Shelton, 521 So.2d 1038 (Ala.1988).
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 539 So.2d 1069, is reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
I agree with the holding of the majority that Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987), does not require a new hearing in every case where a Batson issue is raised, but I believe that the facts of this case show that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly remanded this particular case in order to allow the trial court to review its determination in view of the guidelines set out in Branch.
At the time this case was tried, the Batson decision had been released, but this Court had not rendered its decision in Branch, which implemented the Batson requirements. Because of that fact, and the fact that there is a serious question in my mind as to whether the State presented sufficient race-neutral reasons for challenging prospective Jurors Ethel Hamlett and Michelle Hurt, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which remanded the case to the trial court. I think the State presented sufficient race-neutral reasons for challenging prospective Jurors Lizzie Hambrick and Clarence Hawkins, on the ground that Hambrick was "very slow responding to questions," which fact was also noted by the trial judge, and on the ground that Hawkins had a prior arrest and had been involved with law enforcement authorities.
The concluding statement of the trial judge is instructive: "I think the reasons stated are sufficient; however, I do make the observation that if the [prosecutor] strikes all the blacks from the jury he might do so at his peril." I believe that happened here.
The race-neutral reason given by the State for striking Juror Hamlett was that she "is approximately the same age and appearance to the defendant in the case." I cannot tell from this record whether there were other prospective jurors who were also "approximately the same age and appearance" as the defendant. In other words, were there persons on the venire with the same or similar characteristics as Hamlett who were not struck? Branch, 526 So.2d at 624.
The following transpired with regard to Juror Hurt:
In Branch, this Court articulated some guidelines that would aid in determining whether the nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by the prosecutor would pass the test of Batson:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stephens v. State
... ... Appellant's defense counsel timely objected to the composition of his client's jury based on the State's alleged discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987). Finding that the defense had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the trial court required the prosecution to state the reasons for its strikes, and the following reasons were given: ... 1. Mr. Mickens--expressed serious reservations about ... ...
-
Johnson v. State
... ... Rule 45A, A.R.A.P. In considering what constitutes 'plain error' in a capital case, the Alabama Supreme Court has looked to the federal court's interpretation of what is 'plain error.' See Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985); Ex parte Womack, 435 So.2d 766 (Ala.1983) [cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 436, 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983) ] ... "In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the ... Page 690 ... Supreme Court stated that ... ...
-
White v. State
... ... 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), or a prima facie violation of fundamental fairness under the due process clause, see Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 104 S.Ct. 3093, 82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984). The record does not even raise the inference of unconstitutional jury selection. See Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074, 1076-77 (Ala.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987) ("The defendant cannot successfully argue that error is plain in the record when there is no indication in the record that the act upon which error is predicated ever occurred.") ... ...
-
Fisher v. State
... ... See Whisenhant v. State, 482 So.2d 1225, 1229 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), aff'd in part and remanded in part, Ex parte Whisenhant, 482 So.2d 1241 (Ala.1983), on remand, Whisenhant v. State, 482 So.2d 1246 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), reversed on other grounds, Ex parte Whisenhant, 482 So.2d 1247 (Ala.1984). " 'Common sense, as well as sound legal authority, dictates that the trial judge not grant a psychiatric examination ... ...