Ex parte State ex rel. Attorney General

• Decision Date: 09 November 1922
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 15.
• Citation: 96 So. 450,209 Ala. 3
• Parties: EX PARTE STATE EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL. v. STATE. MOSS
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

96 So. 450

209 Ala. 3

EX PARTE STATE EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL.

MOSS v. STATE.

4 Div. 15.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 9, 1922

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

Walter Moss was convicted of an offense, and appealed to the Court of Appeals; and the judgment of conviction being by that court reversed, and the cause remanded, the State, on the relation of its Attorney General, petitions the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment of reversal therein entered. 96 So. 447. Writ granted. Reversed and remanded.

Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Lamar Field, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Farmer Merrill & Farmer, of Dothan, opposed.

GARDNER J.

Petition for certiorari by the state to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of conviction against one Walter Moss charged with having in his possession, subsequent to December 1, 1919, a still, apparatus, appliance, or some device or substitute therefor, to be used for the purpose of manufacturing prohibited liquors or beverages.

Upon the trial of the cause the witness for the defendant testified that the defendant's general character was good. The witness was then asked by the defendant if he knew defendant's general character in the community where he lived for possessing or having in his possession a still, and also if he knew his character in the community where he lived for possessing a still, an apparatus, appliance, or some device or substitute therefor, to be used for the purpose of manufacturing prohibited liquors or beverages. The state's objection to each of these questions was sustained, and this ruling constitutes the ground upon which rests the reversal of the cause by the Court of Appeals. That court reached this conclusion upon a consideration of the authorities holding in effect that the accused may introduce evidence of his good character as to the particular trait of character involved in the nature of the charge, citing, among other authorities, Underhill on Criminal Evidence (2d Ed.) § 77; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (16th Ed.) p. 39; 1 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) p. 150; 20 L. R. A. 612 (note); Weeden v. State, 17 Ala. App. 516, 86 So. 130.

We do not question the general principle involved in these decisions, but we are of the opinion that principle is without application to the instant case. The particular trait of character referred to in these authorities is such as arises from the nature of the charge as illustrated in 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, supra, where the author says "The character offered must be as to the specific trait-e. g., honesty, violence, chastity, etc.-involved in the act charged."

It is well understood that evidence of character goes to general repute, and not to particular acts or specified conduct. Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. 132, 6 So. 420; Sexton v. State, 13 Ala. App. 84, 69 So. 341, reviewed by this court in 195 Ala. 697, 70 So. 670.

It has also been held that a defendant may not prove his good character by his own testimony to the effect that he had never been arrested or prosecuted for any violation of law before the arrest on the charge for which he is being prosecuted. Patton v. State, 197 Ala. 180, 72 So 401. See, also, Stout v. State, 15 Ala. App. 206, 72 So. 762, reviewed by this court in 198 Ala. 695, 73 So. 1002.

The case of Commonwealth v. Nagle, 157 Mass. 554, 32 N.E. 861, bears close analogy to that...